Prioritizing the Indian Ocean in US Indo-Pacific Strategy

The United States’ lack of focus on the Indian Ocean undermines the Indo-Pacific Strategy’s goals

Washington’s Indo-Pacific framework merges theatres in East Asia, South Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the Western Pacific into an integrated theatre that envisages working with like-minded countries to uphold a regional rules-based order. However, the U.S.’s lack of focus on the Indian Ocean within the Indo-Pacific strategy demonstrates singular tunnel vision that limits a holistic, context-specific view of the wider region. Against increasing Chinese presence and influence in the region, pushing the Indian Ocean to become a mere appendix to the Pacific Ocean could threaten U.S. long-term national interests.

This policy memo highlights the Indian Ocean’s role in the Indo-Pacific and makes a case for Washington to strengthen engagement with actors across the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Building on the existing policy focus on enhancing relations with India, this memo provides recommendations for strengthening U.S.-India cooperation in the Indian Ocean.

Importance of the Indian Ocean

The Indian Ocean has been a critical trade route for centuries and currently accounts for “one-third of the world’s bulk cargo traffic and two-thirds of the world’s oil shipments.”1  Note: Indian Ocean Rim Association, “About IORA,” iora.int, www.iora.int/en/about/about-iora.     Home to roughly 35 percent of the world population, the Indian Ocean economy2  Note: Here Indian Ocean economy refers to the collective GDP of the following countries: Comoros, Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, Tanzania, UAE, Yemen, Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vietnam.     accounted for 10.7 percent of the global GDP in 2017 and is expected to account for a fifth by 2025.3  Note: Ganeshan Wignaraja, Adam Collins, and Pabasara Kannangara, “Opportunities and Challenges for Regional Economic Integration in the Indian Ocean,” Journal of Asian Economic Integration 1, no. 1 (2019): pp. 129-151.     Spanning three continents, the Indian Ocean’s vast and diverse maritime geography is often understood as consisting of several sub-regions broadly encompassing Australasia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, West Asia, and Eastern & Southern Africa. This view is prevalent in Washington’s military and civilian institutions. The Indian Ocean is divided across commands in the Department of Defense and the Department of State’s geographical bureaus, arguably due to bureaucratic tractability and institutional history. Whether the Indian Ocean is best viewed as a unified whole or a set of interconnected subregions is a matter of scholarly debate.4  Note: For details see Peter Dombrowski and Andrew C. Winner, “The Indian Ocean and US Grand Strategy: Ensuring Access and Promoting Security,” Georgetown University Press, 2014.    Still, there is a broad consensus on the growing geostrategic importance of the Indian Ocean.

With intensifying great power competition between the United States and China, the relatively peaceful Indian Ocean region is metamorphosing into an important theatre of strategic competition and power politics. During the Cold War, the Indian Ocean was a secondary theatre. The United States’ presence in the region was largely reactive to the growing strength of the Soviet Union’s Indian Ocean Squadron. The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution, both in 1979, pushed the United States to establish a forward presence with carrier battle group presence in the Indian Ocean and expand the naval base at Diego Garcia, located in the heart of Indian Ocean in the Chagos Archipelago.5  Note: Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, USN (Ret.), “Great Power Competition in the Indian Ocean: The Past As Prologue? ,” CNA, February 2018, https://www.cna.org/archive/CNA_Files/pdf/dop-2017-u-015750-final2.pdf.   

With the end of Cold War and the subsequent reorganization of foreign policy priorities, the Indian Ocean was seen as important for supporting engagements in Afghanistan and the Middle East, and as a transit corridor between the Persian Gulf and the Western Pacific.6  Note: The Indian Ocean was an important staging ground during US operations in the First Gulf War (1990-1991) and Operation Desert Fox (1998).     Washington maintained a security presence in the region through its military base in Diego Garcia, naval assets in Gulf states, and regular operation of Seventh Fleet and Fifth Fleet warships—mainly concentrated in the northwestern Indian Ocean, in and around the Persian Gulf. However, Washington did little to expand its non-military presence across the region. Washington’s reduced dependence on energy imports from the Persian Gulf and more active involvement in the militarized disputes in the Western Pacific—the primary theatre of maritime competition with China—relegated the Indian Ocean to secondary importance in the hierarchy of U.S. foreign policy priorities.

Washington’s reduced dependence on energy imports from the Persian Gulf and more active involvement in the militarized disputes in the Western Pacific—the primary theatre of maritime competition with China—relegated the Indian Ocean to secondary importance in the hierarchy of U.S. foreign policy priorities.

The ‘China Challenge’ In The Indian Ocean

Beijing has successfully expanded its military footprint in the Indian Ocean despite the tyranny of distance between Chinese ports and the Indian Ocean. From having a negligible military presence in the Indian Ocean during the 1990s, Beijing today has a growing presence of People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) warships and submarine deployments conducting naval operations in the northern Indian Ocean.7  Note: “’Keeping a Close Eye on Chinese Presence in Indian Ocean,’ Says Admiral Lanba,” Hindustan Times, March 13, 2019, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/keeping-a-close-eye-on-chinese-presence-in-indian-ocean-says-admiral-lanba/story-pr7dzln0KC1wPxLrzV182M.html.     Since 2014, China has been conducting regular exercises in the eastern Indian Ocean8  Note: “China’s Navy Extends Its Combat Reach to the Indian Ocean,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Report, March 14, 2014, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20Report_China%27s%20Navy%20Extends%20its%20Combat%20Reach%20to%20the%20Indian%20Ocean.pdf     and has secured its presence in the western edges through its overseas naval base in Djibouti. The elevation of the Indian Ocean in Beijing’s maritime calculations is not surprising. Rather, it is part of China’s “two oceans” approach to maritime security, paralleling PLAN’s expanded focus from “offshore waters defense” to “open seas protection.”9  Note: Caitlin Campbell, “Highlights from China’s New Defense White Paper, ‘China’s Military Strategy,’” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 1, 2015, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Issue%20Brief_Highlights%20from%20Chinas%20New%20Defense%20White%20Paper_Campbell_6.1.15.pdf.     According to the Pentagon’s estimate, Beijing is likely to continue “developing the capabilities and operational concepts to conduct offensive operations” (emphasis added) in the Indian Ocean.10  Note: Office of the Secretary of Defence, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, Annual Report to the Congress,” Department of Defence, 2021, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF.     

Many in Washington’s strategic community do not assess China’s military presence in the Indian Ocean as an immediate cause of concern. One interviewee highlighted that China’s military presence in the Indian Ocean creates more vulnerabilities than advantages for Beijing because of China’s relatively limited power projection capabilities in distant waters.11  Note: Zoom interview, July 13, 2022    Others saw China’s military presence to be relatively benign, aimed at protecting its overseas investments and providing security to its nationals living in the region, rather than a challenge to US presence in the region.

Undoubtedly, the Indian Ocean is too large for any one country to dominate militarily. However, a myopic focus only on Chinese military presence in the region risks misreading Beijing’s strategy, which is based on the political and economic realities of the region. The challenge comes from growing Chinese influence and acceptability as a “welcome alternative to Western powers”12  Note: Darshana Baruah, “China’s Influence in South and Central Asia, Panel IV- Maritime Competition in the Indian Ocean,” Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, May 12, 2022, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/Darshana_Baruah_Testimony.pdf.     in the region. China is acting in tandem with Russia and Iran to build a “regional coalition”13  Note: “Iran’s Navy Chief: U.S. Dominance in Region Is Over,” Tehran Times, December 29, 2019, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/443534/Iran-s-navy-chief-U-S-dominance-in-region-is-over.     of countries to buttress China’s maritime security in the Persian Gulf through the formation of the “Marine Security Belt.” China, Russia, and Iran held their first joint naval drill in the region in 2019. Their coordinated efforts could present a potential challenge to the U.S.-led International Maritime Security Construct, which was also formed in 2019 to support regional stability and security of maritime commons in the Gulf region. Building economic dependency and political ties with regional military leaders, local officials, and port authorities are elements in Beijing’s strategy toward the region, especially in littoral African countries. Under the Maritime Silk Road rubric, China is bolstering its visibility and building dependencies with partner states through lucrative investments in maritime infrastructure, especially deep-water ports, in the region.14  Note: ABHISHEK MISHRA, “A Chinese-Built Port in the Indian Ocean: The Story of Kenya’s Lamu Port,” Observer Research Foundation, June 1, 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/a-chinese-built-port-in-the-indian-ocean-the-story-of-kenyas-lamu-port/.     The dual-use potential of these bases is still uncertain. Still, its more obvious and immediate effect has been strengthening Chinese soft power in the region as a reliable “development partner.” China is successfully building strategic leverage in the region, paving the way for Beijing’s use of “coercive economic tools” to secure its regional interests.15  Note: Rajat Pandit, “China Using ‘Coercive’ Economic Tools in Indian Ocean to Achieve Security Aims: US ,” The Times of India, September 24, 2022, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/china-using-coercive-economic-tools-in-indian-ocean-to-achieve-security-aims-us/articleshow/94405786.cms.   

Indian Ocean in the Indo-Pacific

While Indo-Pacific discourse emerged in the Obama years, it was under President Trump that the “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy gathered steam. His administration made the region a top priority as rivalry with China came to define U.S. grand strategy.

Although the “Indo-Pacific” was meant to represent the confluence of the Indian and Pacific Oceans—where the U.S. would act in concert with like-minded allies and partners—Washington adopted a narrow geographic frame of reference relative to Japan, India, France, and ASEAN. The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy defined the Indo-Pacific as stretching from the “west coast of India to the western shores of the United States.” This conceptualization of the region left out the entire Western Indian Ocean (WIO). Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, and India’s SAGAR vision all define the Indo-Pacific to include the entire Indian Ocean reaching the African continent.

In the 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy, the framing of the Indo-Pacific coincided with the U.S. Pacific Command’s area of responsibility. The command name change to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in 2018 reinforced India’s importance to U.S. defense strategy. However, it was not until the Biden administration that the U.S. government acknowledged that the entire Indian Ocean was an integral part of any Indo-Pacific vision. Even with this acknowledgment, the Biden administration’s revised Indo-Pacific strategy report does not mention Africa, the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, or the Bay of Bengal. It only mentions the Indian Ocean in one instance. The entire WIO, which stretches from the Red Sea, along coastal East Africa, to the Gulf of Oman and the island nations of the Arabian Sea—linking Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, is virtually absent from public Indo-Pacific strategies, despite the importance of the WIO for sea-borne trade, uninterrupted energy supply, and global economic security.

A case could be made that this lesser emphasis on the Indian Ocean in the Indo-Pacific construct is appropriate. Unlike the heavily militarized Western Pacific, the threat of a direct military conflict in the Indian Ocean is low. Washington is bound by collective defense arrangements16  Note: The US has a bilateral treaty with the Philippines by which the parties recognize that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and each party agrees that it will act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes. The US also has a similar treaty with the Republic of Korea. The US, New Zealand, and Australia also have a treaty through which the three member states recognize that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the three-member states “would be dangerous to its own peace and safety.”    in the Pacific area, making it the Pentagon’s primary focus area, especially the volatile first and second island chain, and Taiwan.  Yet, the U.S. military’s deteriorating position within the first and second island chains in the Pacific reinforces the Indian Ocean’s role as a strategic theatre in the event of a contingency in the Pacific.

Professor Aaron L. Friedberg highlights how despite China’s relatively fragile Indian Ocean posture, it has strong incentives to launch an attack in the Indian Ocean “in the first blow” to compel the “shift of some U.S. forces from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean.”17  Note: Aaron L. Friedberg, “What’s at Stake in the Indo-Pacific,” U.S. Naval Institute, October 2021, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/october/whats-stake-indo-pacific.     Even though China’s rapid militarization in the Indian Ocean does not present operational challenges to US naval fleets, such presence “in terms of intelligence gathering, stealth, and endurance” could “severely upset American strategic and operational planning” in the wider region.18 Note: Iskander Rehman, “Drowning Stability: The Perils of Naval Nuclearization and Brinkmanship in the Indian Ocean,” Naval War College Review: Vol. 65 : No. 4 , Article 8, 2012.    Given China’s expansion of nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean, and in the event of deterrence failure, Washington needs to maintain a credible, sea-based, second-strike retaliatory nuclear capability to prevent coercion of U.S. allies and ensure unimpeded movement of U.S. military forces across the Indian Ocean.

As proposed by current Indo-Pacific Coordinator Kurt Campbell and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan in 2019, this necessitates diversification of “military presence towards Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, making use of access agreements rather than permanent basing when necessary.”19  Note: Kurt M. Campbell and Jake Sullivan, “Competition Without Catastrophe, How America Can Both Challenge and Coexist With China,” Foreign Affairs , 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/competition-with-china-without-catastrophe.    The Biden administration did not address this proposal in the 2021 Global Posture Review.20  Note: “DoD Concludes 2021 Global Posture Review,” U.S. Department of Defense, November 29, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2855801/dod-concludes-2021-global-posture-review/.     

Given China’s expansion of nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean, and in the event of deterrence failure, Washington needs to maintain a credible, sea-based, second-strike retaliatory nuclear capability to prevent coercion of U.S. allies and ensure unimpeded movement of U.S. military forces across the Indian Ocean.

Beijing has shown utter disregard for the lawful order in the Indian Ocean, which the United States and its partners stand for. China’s increasingly aggressive and disorderly behavior is threatening the rules-based order—which forms the normative rationale for the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy—while carefully remaining below the threshold of armed escalation.

One example of such behavior is the PLAN’s use of “non-lethal electromagnetic weapons” such as lasers to stop what it sees as “intrusions” by foreign navies.21  Note: Chen Zhuo, “US Intrusions in S.china Sea Can Be Stopped by Electromagnetic Weapons: Experts,” US intrusions in S.China Sea can be stopped by electromagnetic weapons: experts – China Military, March 18, 2020, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2020-03/18/content_9771389.htm.     Although such activities have mainly been concentrated in the East and South China Sea and surrounding regions, China has demonstrated its ability to do so in the Indian Ocean by lasering US Air Force personnel in Djibouti in 2018.22  Note: Aaron Mehta, “Two US Airmen Injured by Chinese Lasers in Djibouti, DoD Says,” Defense News, May 3, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/05/03/two-us-airmen-injured-by-chinese-lasers-in-djibouti/.     In 2017, PLAN’s live-fire drills in the Western Indian Ocean garnered international attention for its presentation of the exercise as explicitly targeting the vessels of unnamed “enemy ships” in the Indian Ocean.23  Note: Ankit Panda, “Chinese Navy Holds Rare Live-Fire Drill in Western Indian Ocean,” The Diplomat , August 28, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/chinese-navy-holds-rare-live-fire-drill-in-western-indian-ocean/.     

The Indian navy has raised concerns about Chinese marine research vessels entering India’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) without New Delhi’s prior consent, which violates the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.24  Note: “Navy Drives Away Chinese Ship from Indian Waters in Andaman Sea,” The Indian Express, December 3, 2019, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/navy-drives-away-chinese-vessel-from-indian-waters-in-andaman-sea-6148685/.     China has been bolstering its fishing presence in areas like the northwestern Indian Ocean, which are subject to “very little management and limited regulatory oversight,” raising concerns about Beijing’s unregulated fishing threatening the sustainability of fish stocks in the region.25   Note: “Squid Fishing In The Northwest Indian Ocean – Clear As Ink,” Trygg Mat Tracking, November 2021, https://1ae03060-3f06-4a5c-9ac6-b5c1b4a62664.usrfiles.com/ugd/1ae030_45e0fa195f4f43fa9f0da3da2b78d8c3.pdf.     Unregistered Chinese fishing vessels have increased their operations in the northwestern Indian Ocean (NWIO) at a time when the reported incidents of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing notably increased throughout the Indian Ocean.26  Note: Dinakar Peri, “Extra-Regional Fishing Fleets Present in Indian Ocean: Navy,” The Hindu, November 13, 2022, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/extra-regional-fishing-fleets-present-in-indian-ocean-navy/article66131872.ece.     This is in addition to the Chinese-flagged vessels operating in the high seas of NWIO, just outside Omani and Yemeni EEZs, which have increased their presence from just four in 2015 to over two hundred in 2020.27  Note: Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, “China’s IUU Fishing Fleet: Pariah of the World’s Oceans,” International Law Studies, Stockton Center for International Law 99 (2022), https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3005&context=ils.    

China, which already has agreements with several coastal West African countries for fisheries operations in their EEZs, is now looking to African countries along the western Indian Ocean as Beijing looks to expand its distant water fishery sector further.28  Note: Mark Godfrey, “China Seeks More Fisheries Partnerships in East Africa, Latin America, South Pacific,” SeafoodSource Official Media, April 7, 2022, https://www.seafoodsource.com/news/environment-sustainability/china-seeks-more-fisheries-partnerships-in-east-africa-latin-america-south-pacific.     These agreements have “transformed the political ecology” of fishing in West Africa by impoverishing local small-scale fisheries that have to unfairly compete with large Chinese industrial vessels and multinational corporations for access to local maritime resources.29  Note: “THE EVERWIDENING NET: Mapping the Scale, Nature and Corporate Structures of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing by the Chinese Distant-Water Fleet,” Environmental Justice Foundation, March 30, 2022, https://ejfoundation.org/resources/downloads/The-Ever-Widening-Net-2022-final.pdf.     Beijing is gaining access to the sovereign resources of many of these African coastal countries by entering into joint ventures with local companies, giving Chinese trawlers access to their resources.30  Note: Beatrice Gorez, “Small Scale Fisheries at Risk: Madagascar Signs Destructive Fishing Agreements with Chinese Investors,” Coalition for Fair Fisheries Arrangements, December 17, 2020, https://www.cffacape.org/publications-blog/small-scale-fisheries-at-risk-madagascar-signs-destructive-fishing-agreements-with-chinese-investors.     

Washington needs to pay careful attention to such Chinese moves and respond assertively as the Indian Ocean comes to play an increasingly important role in the rules-based international order.31  Note: Nilanthi Samaranayake, “The Indian Ocean’s Key Role in the Indo-Pacific Rules-Based International Order,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Indo-Pacific Perspectives, December 2020.     In the United States’ renewed attempt to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific, Washington needs to come up with cost effective policy instruments curated to address local regional challenges. Looking forward, Indian Ocean needs to feature more prominently into U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy.

Policy Recommendations

Increase US Coast Guard Presence Along the Indian Ocean Coast of Africa

Since the African Command (AFRICOM) formed within the U.S. Department of Defense in 2008, the U.S. Navy has maintained a steady presence along the coast of Africa, especially with the establishment of Cutlass Express in 2011. Working closely with the U.S. Coast Guard, AFRICOM executes two primary maritime security programs, African Partnership Station (APS) program and the African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP).  Under the APS banner, coast guard vessels began training exercises in East Africa in 2009 which since then have been few and sporadic.32   Note: Lauren Ploch, “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa,” Congressional Research Service, July 22, 2011, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf.     Coast Guard operations conducted with AFRICOM to address the problem of IUU fishing have been mostly along the Atlantic Coast of Africa.33  Note: Ibid., Ben Werner, “The U.S. Coast Guard’s Mission to Africa,” USNI News, April 22, 2019, https://news.usni.org/2019/04/22/the-u-s-coast-guards-mission-to-africa.     More notable is the US Coast Guard’s active presence in training the Pacific Islands nations, primarily through the Oceania Maritime Security Initiative. The framework to engage the US Coast Guard in activities to deter, detect and disrupt IUU fishing already exists with the APS and AMLEP. However, their activities need to be attuned to focus more along the east coast of Africa, especially in training and strengthening maritime law enforcement capabilities of key coastal east African countries.

Improve Representation of Key States in Indo-Pacific-Focused Platforms

Progress toward building an Indian Ocean regional grouping has been slow. Only the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) can be considered as “near region-wide” bodies in the Indian Ocean.34   Note: Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, “Strengthening Maritime Cooperation and Security in the Indian Ocean,” IISS, September 6, 2018, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2018/09/maritime-cooperation-indian-ocean.
  
 Although all 23 IORA members and countries participate in the IONS, U.S. diplomatic engagement has been limited to IORA in the capacity of a dialogue partner. Washington’s non-participation in the IONS—despite reportedly being extended an invitation to join IOR-ARC35  Note: In 1997, the organization was named Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation which was renamed to IORA in 2013. Vijay Sakhuja, “Increasing Maritime Competition: IORA, IONS, Milan and the Indian Ocean Networks,” in The Maritime Great Game India, China, US & The Indian Ocean, ed. Aparupa Bhattacherjee (Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2014) https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/177823/SR150-IPCSSpecialFocus-MaritimeGreatGame.pdf.   —limits avenues for multilateral engagement with Indian Ocean littorals. Currently, Washington has only three embassies and two defense attaches covering the seven island nations in the Indian Ocean, which further handicaps the U.S. from diplomatically engaging in the region.

As the island and coastal states of the Indian Ocean expand their continental focus to embrace their maritime identity actively, Washington has an opportunity to engage with these actors to build wide-ranging support for extended regional conceptualization of the Indian Ocean as a part of the Indo-Pacific. The challenge for Washington is that these island countries’ engagement with the Indo-Pacific framework has been lukewarm—at best. Through the effort of key Indo-Pacific partners, India and Japan, there is a growing acceptance of the legitimacy of the Indo-Pacific strategy.36  Note: Sidhant Sibal, “Madagascar FM Calls Indo-Pacific a ‘Legitimate Vision’; Bats for Peaceful Military Ties with India,” WION, April 27, 2022, https://www.wionews.com/india-news/madagascar-fm-calls-indo-pacific-a-legitimate-vision-bats-for-peaceful-military-ties-with-india-474163.     However, there is an equally strong need for more dialogue with these countries to alleviate their concerns and fears of the increasing militarization of the region. Such dialogue should occur within existing Indo-Pacific forums such as Indo-Pacific Business Forum hosted and sponsored by the U.S. Trade and Development Agency in partnership with Japan or through minilaterals like the Quad in a ‘Quad-Plus’ format. Washington’s current level of economic engagement with IOR member countries is low compared to China, which can be improved by facilitating and encouraging their participation in the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity.

Align US Sub-Saharan Africa Strategy With Indo-Pacific Strategy

Although the U.S. strategy towards sub-Saharan Africa mentions the need to “integrate African states in Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific forum,” the State-US Aid Joint Regional Strategy does not mention Indian Ocean, highlighting the challenge of coordination across government agencies. President Biden’s ‘Prosper Africa Build Together’ initiative can help address this challenge as it brings together 17 government agencies to direct U.S. investments in Africa. Strategic investments under this initiative in supporting Africa’s marine economic development, especially maritime domain awareness, address the immediate challenges of coastal African countries. Additionally, it reinforces Washington’s narrative of the Indo-Pacific being centered on development and economic partnerships geared towards protecting a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”

Create Institutional Links With India to Coordinate Policies in the Indian Ocean

Washington and New Delhi are taking concerted steps to ensure cross-agency and departmental coordination to cover the vast geographical expanse of the Indo-Pacific effectively. The Biden administration has appointed a Deputy Assistant to the President and Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs in the National Security Council, as well as the appointment of Quad coordinator at the State Department under the directive of the Secretary of State.37  Note: Information received during interview with US government officials from the State Department.     In 2019, the Ministry of External Affairs established a new division for the Indo-Pacific, which integrates the Indian Ocean Region with ASEAN, while the Oceania division covers the Pacific Island Countries along with Australia and New Zealand. More recently, New Delhi appointed a Maritime Security Coordinator reporting directly to the National Security Advisor, which is mandated to ensure better coordination between the different authorities working on maritime security and civil issues.38  Note: Abhijit Singh, “India’s Maritime Security Coordinator Has His Mission Cut Out,” ORF, February 21, 2022, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/indias-maritime-security-coordinator-has-his-mission-cut-out/.     Institutionalizing an annual structured engagement between the Maritime Security Coordinators from each side can lead their respective delegations to the current India-US maritime security dialogue supporting Indian Ocean littorals with the current focus on “regional maritime security issues.”39  Note: “Fourth Round of the India-US Maritime Security Dialogue,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, August 27, 2019, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl%2F31770%2FFourth%2BRound%2Bof%2Bthe%2BIndiaUS%2BMaritime%2BSecurity%2BDialogue.         

Increase Coordination and Burden Sharing Between Indian and US Coast Guards Over Operations in South Asia Sub-region of the Indian Ocean 

To alleviate India’s possible “backyard anxieties”40  Note: Nilanthi Samaranayake, Catherine Lea, and Dmitry Gorenburg, “Improving U.S.-India HA/DR Coordination in the Indian Ocean,” Center for Naval Analyses, July 2014, https://www.cna.org/archive/CNA_Files/pdf/drm-2013-u-004941-final2.pdf.     over an active U.S. naval presence in South Asia,41  Note: “The U.S. Navy in the Indian Ocean: India’s ‘Goldilocks’ Dilemma,” War on the Rocks, May 11, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/05/the-u-s-navy-in-the-indian-ocean-indias-goldilocks-dilemma/.    the two countries can coordinate coast guard activities for operation in third-party countries in South Asia. In addition to a US Coast Guard presence appearing “less threatening”42  Note: Based on interview with Indian naval expert over Zoom during residency portion of the fellowship, July 26 2022.    from New Delhi’s perspective, such coordination has the advantage of   Washington avoiding duplicating assistance, which the Indian Coast Guard is already providing to these countries. Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy already identifies expanding “U.S. Coast Guard presence and cooperation in Southeast and South Asia” as a part of its action plan. Coordinated action will send a strong message about Washington and New Delhi’s partnership as like-minded Indo-Pacific partners committed to preserving a rules-based order in the region with the added advantage of burden sharing. It can take the form of India focusing on training the South Asian Coast Guard’s and sharing intelligence and the United States providing equipment to the regional coast guard, as it did with Sri Lanka43  Note: “Coast Guard Transfers High Endurance Cutter to Sri Lanka,” United States Coast Guard, September 4, 2018, https://www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/Assistant-Commandant-for-Acquisitions-CG-9/Newsroom/Latest-Acquisition-News/Article/1619516/coast-guard-transfers-high-endurance-cutter-to-sri-lanka/.     and Bangladesh.44  Note: “US Coast Guard Transfers Ex-Hamiltion-Class Cutter to Bangladesh Navy,” Naval Technology, May 27, 2013, https://www.naval-technology.com/news/newsus-coast-guard-transfers-ex-hamiltion-class-cutter-bangladesh-navy/ Regular and institutionalized engagement between U.S. and Indian Coast Guards addressing issues of maritime safety, maritime security, and marine environment protection will also allow both sides to learn from each other’s best practices and strengthen the civil maritime Indo-Pacific security community.

Notes

  • 1
      Note: Indian Ocean Rim Association, “About IORA,” iora.int, www.iora.int/en/about/about-iora.   
  • 2
      Note: Here Indian Ocean economy refers to the collective GDP of the following countries: Comoros, Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, Tanzania, UAE, Yemen, Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vietnam.   
  • 3
      Note: Ganeshan Wignaraja, Adam Collins, and Pabasara Kannangara, “Opportunities and Challenges for Regional Economic Integration in the Indian Ocean,” Journal of Asian Economic Integration 1, no. 1 (2019): pp. 129-151.   
  • 4
      Note: For details see Peter Dombrowski and Andrew C. Winner, “The Indian Ocean and US Grand Strategy: Ensuring Access and Promoting Security,” Georgetown University Press, 2014.  
  • 5
      Note: Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, USN (Ret.), “Great Power Competition in the Indian Ocean: The Past As Prologue? ,” CNA, February 2018, https://www.cna.org/archive/CNA_Files/pdf/dop-2017-u-015750-final2.pdf.   
  • 6
      Note: The Indian Ocean was an important staging ground during US operations in the First Gulf War (1990-1991) and Operation Desert Fox (1998).   
  • 7
      Note: “’Keeping a Close Eye on Chinese Presence in Indian Ocean,’ Says Admiral Lanba,” Hindustan Times, March 13, 2019, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/keeping-a-close-eye-on-chinese-presence-in-indian-ocean-says-admiral-lanba/story-pr7dzln0KC1wPxLrzV182M.html.   
  • 8
      Note: “China’s Navy Extends Its Combat Reach to the Indian Ocean,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Report, March 14, 2014, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20Report_China%27s%20Navy%20Extends%20its%20Combat%20Reach%20to%20the%20Indian%20Ocean.pdf   
  • 9
      Note: Caitlin Campbell, “Highlights from China’s New Defense White Paper, ‘China’s Military Strategy,’” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 1, 2015, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Issue%20Brief_Highlights%20from%20Chinas%20New%20Defense%20White%20Paper_Campbell_6.1.15.pdf.   
  • 10
      Note: Office of the Secretary of Defence, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, Annual Report to the Congress,” Department of Defence, 2021, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF.     
  • 11
      Note: Zoom interview, July 13, 2022  
  • 12
      Note: Darshana Baruah, “China’s Influence in South and Central Asia, Panel IV- Maritime Competition in the Indian Ocean,” Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, May 12, 2022, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/Darshana_Baruah_Testimony.pdf.   
  • 13
      Note: “Iran’s Navy Chief: U.S. Dominance in Region Is Over,” Tehran Times, December 29, 2019, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/443534/Iran-s-navy-chief-U-S-dominance-in-region-is-over.   
  • 14
      Note: ABHISHEK MISHRA, “A Chinese-Built Port in the Indian Ocean: The Story of Kenya’s Lamu Port,” Observer Research Foundation, June 1, 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/a-chinese-built-port-in-the-indian-ocean-the-story-of-kenyas-lamu-port/.   
  • 15
      Note: Rajat Pandit, “China Using ‘Coercive’ Economic Tools in Indian Ocean to Achieve Security Aims: US ,” The Times of India, September 24, 2022, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/china-using-coercive-economic-tools-in-indian-ocean-to-achieve-security-aims-us/articleshow/94405786.cms.   
  • 16
      Note: The US has a bilateral treaty with the Philippines by which the parties recognize that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and each party agrees that it will act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes. The US also has a similar treaty with the Republic of Korea. The US, New Zealand, and Australia also have a treaty through which the three member states recognize that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the three-member states “would be dangerous to its own peace and safety.”  
  • 17
      Note: Aaron L. Friedberg, “What’s at Stake in the Indo-Pacific,” U.S. Naval Institute, October 2021, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/october/whats-stake-indo-pacific.   
  • 18
    Note: Iskander Rehman, “Drowning Stability: The Perils of Naval Nuclearization and Brinkmanship in the Indian Ocean,” Naval War College Review: Vol. 65 : No. 4 , Article 8, 2012.  
  • 19
      Note: Kurt M. Campbell and Jake Sullivan, “Competition Without Catastrophe, How America Can Both Challenge and Coexist With China,” Foreign Affairs , 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/competition-with-china-without-catastrophe.   
  • 20
      Note: “DoD Concludes 2021 Global Posture Review,” U.S. Department of Defense, November 29, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2855801/dod-concludes-2021-global-posture-review/.     
  • 21
      Note: Chen Zhuo, “US Intrusions in S.china Sea Can Be Stopped by Electromagnetic Weapons: Experts,” US intrusions in S.China Sea can be stopped by electromagnetic weapons: experts – China Military, March 18, 2020, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2020-03/18/content_9771389.htm.   
  • 22
      Note: Aaron Mehta, “Two US Airmen Injured by Chinese Lasers in Djibouti, DoD Says,” Defense News, May 3, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/05/03/two-us-airmen-injured-by-chinese-lasers-in-djibouti/.   
  • 23
      Note: Ankit Panda, “Chinese Navy Holds Rare Live-Fire Drill in Western Indian Ocean,” The Diplomat , August 28, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/chinese-navy-holds-rare-live-fire-drill-in-western-indian-ocean/.     
  • 24
      Note: “Navy Drives Away Chinese Ship from Indian Waters in Andaman Sea,” The Indian Express, December 3, 2019, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/navy-drives-away-chinese-vessel-from-indian-waters-in-andaman-sea-6148685/.   
  • 25
      Note: “Squid Fishing In The Northwest Indian Ocean – Clear As Ink,” Trygg Mat Tracking, November 2021, https://1ae03060-3f06-4a5c-9ac6-b5c1b4a62664.usrfiles.com/ugd/1ae030_45e0fa195f4f43fa9f0da3da2b78d8c3.pdf.   
  • 26
      Note: Dinakar Peri, “Extra-Regional Fishing Fleets Present in Indian Ocean: Navy,” The Hindu, November 13, 2022, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/extra-regional-fishing-fleets-present-in-indian-ocean-navy/article66131872.ece.   
  • 27
      Note: Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, “China’s IUU Fishing Fleet: Pariah of the World’s Oceans,” International Law Studies, Stockton Center for International Law 99 (2022), https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3005&context=ils.    
  • 28
      Note: Mark Godfrey, “China Seeks More Fisheries Partnerships in East Africa, Latin America, South Pacific,” SeafoodSource Official Media, April 7, 2022, https://www.seafoodsource.com/news/environment-sustainability/china-seeks-more-fisheries-partnerships-in-east-africa-latin-america-south-pacific.   
  • 29
      Note: “THE EVERWIDENING NET: Mapping the Scale, Nature and Corporate Structures of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing by the Chinese Distant-Water Fleet,” Environmental Justice Foundation, March 30, 2022, https://ejfoundation.org/resources/downloads/The-Ever-Widening-Net-2022-final.pdf.   
  • 30
      Note: Beatrice Gorez, “Small Scale Fisheries at Risk: Madagascar Signs Destructive Fishing Agreements with Chinese Investors,” Coalition for Fair Fisheries Arrangements, December 17, 2020, https://www.cffacape.org/publications-blog/small-scale-fisheries-at-risk-madagascar-signs-destructive-fishing-agreements-with-chinese-investors.     
  • 31
      Note: Nilanthi Samaranayake, “The Indian Ocean’s Key Role in the Indo-Pacific Rules-Based International Order,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Indo-Pacific Perspectives, December 2020.   
  • 32
      Note: Lauren Ploch, “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa,” Congressional Research Service, July 22, 2011, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf.   
  • 33
      Note: Ibid., Ben Werner, “The U.S. Coast Guard’s Mission to Africa,” USNI News, April 22, 2019, https://news.usni.org/2019/04/22/the-u-s-coast-guards-mission-to-africa.   
  • 34
      Note: Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, “Strengthening Maritime Cooperation and Security in the Indian Ocean,” IISS, September 6, 2018, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2018/09/maritime-cooperation-indian-ocean.
      
  • 35
      Note: In 1997, the organization was named Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation which was renamed to IORA in 2013. Vijay Sakhuja, “Increasing Maritime Competition: IORA, IONS, Milan and the Indian Ocean Networks,” in The Maritime Great Game India, China, US & The Indian Ocean, ed. Aparupa Bhattacherjee (Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2014) https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/177823/SR150-IPCSSpecialFocus-MaritimeGreatGame.pdf.   
  • 36
      Note: Sidhant Sibal, “Madagascar FM Calls Indo-Pacific a ‘Legitimate Vision’; Bats for Peaceful Military Ties with India,” WION, April 27, 2022, https://www.wionews.com/india-news/madagascar-fm-calls-indo-pacific-a-legitimate-vision-bats-for-peaceful-military-ties-with-india-474163.   
  • 37
      Note: Information received during interview with US government officials from the State Department.   
  • 38
      Note: Abhijit Singh, “India’s Maritime Security Coordinator Has His Mission Cut Out,” ORF, February 21, 2022, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/indias-maritime-security-coordinator-has-his-mission-cut-out/.   
  • 39
      Note: “Fourth Round of the India-US Maritime Security Dialogue,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, August 27, 2019, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl%2F31770%2FFourth%2BRound%2Bof%2Bthe%2BIndiaUS%2BMaritime%2BSecurity%2BDialogue.     
  • 40
      Note: Nilanthi Samaranayake, Catherine Lea, and Dmitry Gorenburg, “Improving U.S.-India HA/DR Coordination in the Indian Ocean,” Center for Naval Analyses, July 2014, https://www.cna.org/archive/CNA_Files/pdf/drm-2013-u-004941-final2.pdf.   
  • 41
      Note: “The U.S. Navy in the Indian Ocean: India’s ‘Goldilocks’ Dilemma,” War on the Rocks, May 11, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/05/the-u-s-navy-in-the-indian-ocean-indias-goldilocks-dilemma/.   
  • 42
      Note: Based on interview with Indian naval expert over Zoom during residency portion of the fellowship, July 26 2022.  
  • 43
      Note: “Coast Guard Transfers High Endurance Cutter to Sri Lanka,” United States Coast Guard, September 4, 2018, https://www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/Assistant-Commandant-for-Acquisitions-CG-9/Newsroom/Latest-Acquisition-News/Article/1619516/coast-guard-transfers-high-endurance-cutter-to-sri-lanka/.   
  • 44
      Note: “US Coast Guard Transfers Ex-Hamiltion-Class Cutter to Bangladesh Navy,” Naval Technology, May 27, 2013, https://www.naval-technology.com/news/newsus-coast-guard-transfers-ex-hamiltion-class-cutter-bangladesh-navy/

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