Yuki Tatsumi: Good afternoon. Thank you for joining us this afternoon for the release of our Stimson East Asia Program’s latest publication, Peacebuilding and Japan: Views from the Next Generation. This Views from the Next Generation is so far counting four years – going into a fourth year. The project purpose is to bring emerging scholars in each of the important Japanese foreign policy areas who doesn’t – who don’t often necessarily get to travel to D.C., and have more of a policy-focused dialogue to a Washington audience. So I would like to thank the cooperation and collaboration from the Embassy of Japan on this project. Without their support, this is not – this would not have been possible. For the last two years, I have chosen peacebuilding and Japan’s relationship with the broader U.N. system as the theme for this project. And the reason being is that Japan started the – Japan started the non-permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council that will go until the end of next year. And in fact Japanese government – excuse me – identified peacebuilding as the priority areas that they would like to work on during their time on the Council. So this is the—so last year was more about the overall relations between Japan and the United Nations, and this year I decided to delve into a little bit about what Japan has been up to in this area of peacebuilding. As you all walk outside of this conference room, you will see several publications. Those are the bundled, packaged if you will, of our past publication, including this one. So please do feel free to pick up that package as you walk out. Of course, those are also available online. So you’re welcome to read that too.

As I said, this year the theme is peacebuilding and Japan. Actually, Japan’s work in this area often gets underacknowledged because of its limitation in the ability to send the Self-Defense Forces to engage in the more of the stabilization operation that tends to grab headlines. But if you look underneath, from – by providing economic development or more of grassroots support, Japan has actually taken more of a holistic approach to support the vulnerable areas for post-conflict reconstruction process. So hopefully the author that we have here today will enlighten us a little bit on that angle. I would go – I would turn the author of each chapter by the order this report is organized, so I would – the first speaker will be Dr. Kei Koga, who is sitting right – immediate left of me. He’s assistant professor of the Nanyang Technological University, currently living in Singapore. Following Dr. Koga will be Dr. Fujishige, who is associate professor at Hosei University, who is currently on sabbatical and doing her research in England. Then we will move onto Dr. Aizawa, who is associate professor of Kyushu University to talk about Southeast Asia, and we will wrap up by turning to Ms. Takezawa, from Institute for International Policy Studies, who will also tell us what Japan has been up to in Africa. And the last but not least, my
name is Yuki Tatsumi for those of you who don’t know me. I’m a Senior Associate here at Stimson, managing the project on East Asia security and U.S.-Japan relations. So without further ado, Koga-san.

Kei Koga: Thank you very much. Thank you very much Tatsumi-san for the kind introduction. Today I’m going to talk about my chapter, which is titled “Toward Effective Institution-Building in Peacebuilding,” and my objective in this paper is pretty simple. I was actually trying to be exploring – explore Japan’s contribution to the peacebuilding. The activities, by looking at the past experiences and specifically in Asia because I – I chose Asia because the region is the most important for the geostrategic and geo-economic reasons. So I went through the experiences in these – Asia and would like to understand what the comparative advantage is, and also what the experiences that Japan had for the peacebuilding program. So my question, pretty simple—what kind of peacebuilding activities has Japan engaged in the past, and also, what kind of activities can Japan contribute more?

But before going into the answering these questions, I think it’s better to define the term peacebuilding because the concept has been evolving and then there’s no kind of one, set definition of the peacebuilding. Basically, I borrowed the information that is actually presented by the so-called U.N. Capstone Doctrine, which is the range of the measures targeted to reduce the risk of the lapsing and then the relapsing into the conflict by strengthening national capacities at all level. So conflict-management, and to lay the foundation for the sustainable peace and development. What is said – I mean, it’s really kind of long definition, but basically but it says that peacebuilding aims to the consolidated peace and security, and through the social-economic, political, and military assistance in capacity-building. So interesting thing about this definition is that it actually is really comprehensive, but at the same time doesn’t really specify what kind of field the actors need to emphasize or prioritize. So I think there are many variants of the peacebuilding programs, and then I think the – Japan has also one. So this leads to my argument – and then Japan, what I said in the report is Japan should emphasize that their various, different type of peacebuilding activities, and Japan have the one, and making the most of its comparative advantage, Japan should contribute to the consolidating of peace in the near or post-conflict areas. And let the kind of international community know that the Japan’s type – Japanese type of peacebuilding activity as a policy option for the peacebuilding.

And so the – then what is the Japanese type of peacebuilding program? There are I think three characteristics. One is the non-military approach. Second one is orientation towards social and economic development. And third one is the long-term commitment. The first one, the non-military approach, this is, I think, most of you already know about this, but because of the Constitution and political constraints, Japan cannot actually dispatch the Self-Defense Force to any kind of like conflict area. And even though the Japanese government adopted the 1992 International – so-called International Cooperation Law, it has the five sets of conditions which are ceasefire agreement, consent from parties concerned, impartiality, right to suspend the mission or assignment when the situation changes, and then the limited use of force. So these direct Japan’s peace operations – peacebuilding efforts to the non-military means. The second one, relating to the first one, is the emphasis – Japan’s emphasis on the social and the economic development. These include the institution-building and then the financial support. Japan generally emphasizes the role of the civilians, including the government, because socioeconomic aspect also plays an important role in consolidating the stability in the post-conflict areas. Japan plays the kind of role in the DDR, which are the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration, and also Japan provided the economic assistance to those areas in addition, Japan contributed the institution-building as well, as the last stated in the East Timor case. Moreover, this kind
of civilian commitment actually creates the personal ties between the leaders in the areas and then these actually personal ties help kind of mitigating crisis and the conflict tension between leaders as is shown in the Cambodian case as well. So the emphasis of the socioeconomic development is one of the characteristics Japan has. And this actually the, not only coming from the limitation on the Self-Defense Force, but also Japan’s emphasis on the concept of the human security, which I’m going to talk a little bit about. And third characteristic is Japan’s shows its long-term commitment in its peacebuilding activities. Generally peacebuilding requires the long-term commitment because the stability actually requires the social and also the economic infrastructure, even the political and security infrastructure as well. And in order to build that, you actually have to commit for a long time. And this is actually what Japan did to the Asian countries and even though Japan did not provide the SDF much in terms of the peacekeeping effort, they could actually create the kind of infrastructure and they could actually help the kind of like creating the – laying the foundation of the stable peace. And again, like, this is coming from the human security issues, and then the – just quickly, on the human security issue, human security is deriving from the two concept which are the freedom from want and freedom from fear. And freedom from fear is basically some type of the political pressure and the people on the ground needs to actually be free from that. And then freedom from want is more on the poverty or those kind of like social programs, and Japan focused a lot on that, and Japan tried to actually alleviate this difficulties in the post-conflict situation. And so these are the kind of three basic characteristics of Japan’s peacebuilding efforts.

But then the, what are the challenges? I think I can point out – like, there are many challenges, but I can point out like three factors. One is the dilemma between human security and then the state consent. Japan tends to actually respect for the principle of noninterference, and then whenever they actually try to help, they try to get the state consent. But then the – if they face the situation that the human security is in danger, but like then they couldn’t actually get the state consent, then like there is going to be a kind of limitation on the Japanese peacebuilding effort because since the Japan respect for the state consent, they cannot actually go on. So this is actually kind of one dilemma that Japan faces. And second one is legitimacy. Even though Japan provides the socioeconomic assistance to these post-conflict areas, these – if these kind of assistance is not evenly distributed they could actually create some kind of division in the society, and it could actually empower one particular part of society, which divides the society again. So in that sense, this needs to be kind of carefully considered. And then thirdly, the force, the military – there is the limitation on the military and the security aspect because the SDF is militarily constrained by the constitution, and they could not actually go into the main places. So these are kind of the limitations we can find in Japan’s peacebuilding activities.

And when I was thinking about like this kind of difficulties, I thought there was – if there was – I was trying to find out if there is any way to overcome these challenges. But when I think about peacebuilding, there is no kind of one-size-fits-all solution for the peacebuilding. And I think rather than focus on the difficulties that Japan has, maybe we could like focus on their comparative advantages that Japan have, and then enhance it. So in that sense, probably like Japan could actually create certain kind of policy options for the international community in the contributing to the stability in the post-conflict areas. So, with that in mind, the – I actually provided several recommendations, and then the, using the comparative advantage does not necessarily mean that we can just stay the same. Like probably in order to enhance that like we need to actually push forward what we kind of – enhance what we have now.

And in this connection, I provided four basic recommendations. One is the engage proactively in the peace-mediating role, because the civilians’ involvement in the Japanese peacebuilding program is really, really kind of intensive, so they could actually create a personal tie with the leaders, and then by using these kind of personal ties, maybe like Japan could play more active role in the peacemaking, in
the post-conflict situation. And then second one is enhance the Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters in the Cabinet Office. The government already have this kind of headquarters for the peacekeeping, peacebuilding program, but then probably like enhancing this unit, such as creating the lessons-learned unit, or the whole-of-society coordination unit, then probably we could find – provide creative ideas to enhance Japan’s peacebuilding activities. Third one is support the establishment of Asia-wide research network on the peacebuilding, because in Asia there are many countries which are interested in the peacebuilding activities, and then if we could create certain research network, we can gather the past experience that each country had in the peacebuilding activities. Maybe this creates the kind of intellectual foundation for the furthering the betterment of peacebuilding activities. And then lastly, the fourth is utilize Japan’s alliance and partners, partnership, to coordinate their peacebuilding policy and have a appropriate division of labor. Because each country that Japan has as a partner have the different comparative advantage. For example, the United States has the more kind of strong military aspect of peacebuilding. Maybe this could be, if coordinated well, then like we could actually enhance the peacebuilding programs, so that the host nations could actually choose which one it would be kind of suitable for the consolidating peace and stability. So this is kind of a gist of what I brought in the report, and I’d be happy to actually answer the questions if there are.

Thank you very much.

Tatsumi: Thank you, Dr. Koga. And then Dr. Fujishige?

Fujishige: Good afternoon, good afternoon. And I would like to appreciate the Stimson Center and all concerned for giving me these valuable opportunities. And, Dr. Koga just pointed out that Japanese peacebuilding issues – efforts usually focuses on non-combat, non-military aspect. In fact, the word “peacebuilding” itself usually implies something non-military activities. But in my paper I focus on the military aspect of Japanese peacebuilding efforts. Tokyo has especially – I focused on Japanese military roles in peacebuilding and peacekeeping issues. Tokyo has dispatched Japanese Defense – Self-Defense Forces, or JSDF, to U.N. peacekeeping operations since 1992, when the International Peace Cooperation Act, or IPCA, was enacted. But since then, Japanese peacekeepers has been dispatched to Cambodia, Mozambique, Timor-Leste, Haiti, and most recently South Sudan. But even after that, Japanese military contribution to peacebuilding and peacekeeping has been largely restricted. Why? Because IPCA was enacted in 1992 but it was also installed with very strict constraints which are called the five principles. Because the government needed to make sure Japanese military contribution do not – does not breach the Constitutional bounds on the use of the force abroad. Because of this, even though Japanese peacekeepers has been dispatched all over the world, so the case is that the dispatch has been limited in the number and the quality in what Japanese peacekeepers can do in peacekeeping operations; it has been restricted to only non-combat missions like engineering, transportation, medical care, and so on. So in this sense, we can say that this has been the – just an unavoidable choice for Tokyo because it was not really possible for Tokyo to dispatch more combat-oriented infantry units to U.N. peacekeeping operations.

But in recent years, Tokyo has more emphasized on the role of the non-combat units, especially in emphasis on the engineering units with more and more projects to them. So actually this kind of the what is called “PKO” and “ODA” cooperation has been emerged, first around early 2000s in the case of the peacekeeping operations in East Timor, and then in Iraq. Even though Iraq was not U.N. peacekeeping operations, so the experience there was fortified – Tokyo’s focus on PKO-ODA collaborations. And this was also applied later in Haiti and in most recently South Sudan. And in this cases, actually, so it was mainly carried out by the military forces, so what they actually did was much more closer to socioeconomic assistance, but it was carried out by engineering units. For example,
Japanese engineering units constructed or repaired the roads and other social infrastructures. And with the close relation with the JICA, which is Japanese donor agency, and with ODA funding. So in this sense, I would say that yes, Japanese – JSDF are Japanese armed forces, but they are actually doing very similar to peacebuilding. This what they call PKO-ODA collaboration has been our firmly installed not only in practice but as one of the key features of Japanese foreign policies. For example, it was clearly mentioned in the National Security Strategy and National Defense Program Outline and the Development Cooperation Charter. Those in 2004, again, 2015, in the middle. In peacekeeping, Prime Minister Abe clearly mentioned Japan would focus on the engineering contribution in Japanese international peace cooperation as well. So now to say, yes, of course, Japanese peace – as Dr. Koga clearly mentioned, Japanese peacebuilding efforts are ranging and it is basically non-military issues. But those who say that the close collaboration partnership of PKO and ODA is also now one of the major features of Japanese peacebuilding issues.

Now let’s – I personally believe that this is best – appropriate connection, because once again Dr. Koga mentioned the Japanese military contribution has been constrained with Constitutional bound on the use of force abroad. However, so, basically this direction is appropriate; however, the reality has been made more and more difficult for Tokyo to stick to this line. So, because in recent peacekeeping operations as you surely know most of the U.N. peacekeeping operations has been set up in sub-Saharan Africa, and the security situation in most of the recently set-up new operations is very, very serious. So because of this, whether in this new security – newly set-up peacekeeping operations, they mostly given what the scope of protection of civilian mandates which usually authorize use coercive military measures. So under such a serious security situation and with a mandate that authorize use of force for military measures, so it is actually very – getting more and more difficult for Japanese peacekeepers to stick to such a peacebuilding issue – peacebuilding-related works. And there is – this is especially so because at this moment Japan’s contributing its troops only to South Sudan, since January 2012; why? Because when peacekeeping operations was initially set-up with the independence of South Sudan in 2011, the security situation was quite okay, and mandate was not protection of civilian but state reconstruction mandate. So because of this, that is why Tokyo decided to dispatch engineers but in December 2013, the civil war occurred there, and accordingly the mandate was switched from state reconstruction to protection of civilians. So this makes it very difficult for Tokyo to stick to the pseudo-peacebuilding issues. And because of this, Tokyo decided to add what is called “rush and rescue” missions since December of last year.

So what is “rush and rescue” missions? So previously, with the very strict constraint on the use of weapons in the engineering units, what the engineering units could do in peacekeeping operations was only – they were allowed to use the weapons only to protect themselves. So this is very strict legal constraint. They could not use the weapons to protect civilians in remote distance. So it is okay to use weapons if they are civilians under their control but if they are located somewhere in the distance they are not allowed to use the weapons. But now with the addition of “rush and rescue” missions, so now they are allowed to use the weapons, but only to a very limited extent. So in my conclusion, so, actually if you know something about the security legislation in 2015, addition of the “rush and rescue” mission invoked very harsh criticism, and also controversy. But in the end it is only to a very limited – only a limited extent of the addition to enable engineering units to stay in South Sudan to adapt to the reality of the protection of very serious security situation, as well as the protection of civilian mandate. So, in conclusion, yes, I said basically believe use of the military forces for peacebuilding issues is appropriate for Japanese foreign and security policies, but in reality it is quite difficult, because cases which allowed Japanese engineers to play a pseudo-peacebuilding issues are very limited.
So because – concerning this, I made four suggestions or policy recommendation in my report. So one of them is to enhance, to maintain and further develop rapid deployment capability of engineering units.

So I told you, it seems to me quite difficult – getting more and more difficult to use Japanese engineers for the purpose of the peacebuilding, but it does not mean that there is no need for the Japanese engineering units. There is a very high demand for engineering works, even for the protection of civilian mandates, for example, to construct protection of civilian sites and repairing roads and so on. So under the situation, under such case of emergency, it is very, very important to deploy engineering units very quickly, when, if necessary. This was one of my recommendations. And second and third recommendations are quite related, because in reality I don’t see there is much room for Japanese peacekeepers to be deployed in the future after the South Sudan, because as I told you, most of the peacekeeping operation is too dangerous for Japanese peacekeepers, so I would say – now, Japan should – Tokyo should more focus on the role of – to develop Japanese peacekeepers’ role as mentors or like trainers rather than to construct. Because, as I told you, it is not very easy for Tokyo to dispatch troops on the ground. But on the other hand, there is a high demand for the training or educating, the engineers as peacekeepers, because the quality of the peacekeepers – improving the quality of the peacekeepers has been one of the important agendas on the U.N. side. So this can be one of the key features Tokyo can do. And also, not only educating peacekeepers from other countries, Japanese peacekeepers can also engage in defense reform of other countries, of the post-war nations. And actually this is one of the things – one of the items from the recent law changes. And to enable to carry out these changes to enhance Japanese keepers’ role as mentors rather than constructors, it is also easier to develop what is called whole of government approaches. So as I told you, Japanese, Tokyo has already focused on the PKO-ODA collaboration, but I think it is too narrow. So I think what this should be developed into more comprehensive until the whole of government or what is called All Japan approach. So this is one of my suggestions. And lastly, I also recommend to enhance the cooperation with the United States, because as I told you, what “rush and rescue” mission can do is really limited. Actually even though the engineering units now are allowed to use weapons to protect civilians, but in reality I really don’t know if they can do that because they are engineers, right? They are equipped and trained to construction work. If they are not a part of the military forces, they are not suitable for the combat missions. But in reality if the turmoil or combat situation arises, I really don’t know if they can adapt to this very dangerous situations. So concerning that, I believe that JSDF to develop further close cooperation with the American – U.S. forces, especially with Africa. I think that’s all, thank you very much.

Tatsumi: Thank you, Fujishige-san. Now we’re going to move on to two case studies in two different parts of the region, starting with Dr. Aizawa, who will talk about the Southeast Asia.

Nobuhiro Aizawa: Yes, thank you very much, Tatsumi-san. Am I on? Yeah, okay, thank you very much. Thank you for inviting and thank you for the Stimson to make this project go forward, because I hope this kind of project is not the last, and you know, everybody knows about the news in the Japan, in China, in North Korea, it’s not really peaceful, it’s much more – you know the four missiles, right? There’s a lot of theme going on about more conflicts in Japan or war in Japan, I don’t know. But I hope the peacebuilding theme still keeps on, so I will try to emphasize historical kind of lessons that we have learned so far and I just hope the lessons will be there and to kind of make room for peace in the future as well.

That’s the point of what I was trying to investigate through the experience of Southeast Asia. If you know about Southeast Asia, Southeast Asia’s a very difficult place, especially because of the diversity in political legitimacy – you know there is kingdoms, you know there is authoritarian regimes, you know
there is one party system. You know there is democracy, you know there is too much “demo-crazy” – that’s what they call it – you know, so there’s multiple justifications in political regimes. And that’s how difficult it is. And if you look at the 1950s, 60s, 70s, it was a warzone, I mean, it was constant war between so many players. But since 1979 there was no more interstate war in Asia – not just in Southeast Asia, but in Asia. The last one was between China and Vietnam, which was followed by a, you know, by definition it’s a civil war in Cambodia, but you know it was a proxy war as well. So we could say since 1990, Asia has been quite peace place, and of course if there is Aceh, Mindanao, East Timor, you can have these kind of regime conflicts, including in Myanmar. But think about the kind of, the level of conflicts in Asia since 1990 – it’s kind of a very, a resounding victory for all the countries in terms of their peace efforts.

So I think the key question will be how did that happen? So far for 27 years, it’s a relative peace region, despite of all these variations in political legitimacy, despite of this difficult, you know, multiethnic, multi-religious region in the world, despite of this strategically important part of the global strategies in major power – for major powers. I think that was the biggest theme that we have to struggle to study from and – but I’m not going to do everything now for this project. But I will just try to put Japan in the picture. What has Japan contributed to this place? Basically, my chapter, it’s only one phrase – so Japan, in my view, has contributed in a way that sets the standard of politics as development, economic development, precisely. I think that, to convince that, that was the most biggest Japan had played. It’s not the conflict resolution among military forces, it’s not the more direct PKOs that was the biggest contributions – of course there are some small cases, like maritime security patrol assistance, you name it, you have all these cases. But the most biggest single thing I would pick is how Japan convinced is development as the purpose of politics, regardless of what political regime you are, be it kingdom, be it democracy, be it one-party system, it’s the development. And Japan will be in the position to support that, be it industrialization, be it agriculture, be it any sector. And to have that position, well, it was – you know, we didn’t have a choice, but I think that was – Japan had maximized that position, and that set the stage, a region for development, rather than identity politics or continuous interstate conflicts.

However, we do see a lot of challenges. I think from the 1990s it was a resounding victory of that strategy until recently, but we do acknowledge a lot of challenges are coming. One is for example the kind of enhanced strategic attention onto Southeast Asia, among the big powers like United States, like China, like Japan, and having that kind of power balance shift, I think, I mean Southeast Asia is having a different political stress. Southeast Asia since the 1990s has proven as an ASEAN they could maintain their peace within the conflict – I mean, within the conflict among themselves. Just for example, like Thai-Cambodia case. Thai-Cambodia case, you know, there was a conflict, border conflict in the Preah Vihear Temple, conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia among the borders, you have Philippines and Malaysia too – I mean you have all these border fights. But within ASEAN, ASEAN took care of it, and they didn’t have to have this major politics proxy war coming in like what happened in the Middle East, etc. So I think if it was about within ASEAN, ASEAN has proven that it was okay, but not with like South China Sea, which the other party is non-ASEAN member, ASEAN has disproven the capability to maintain peace if the conflict was with a non-ASEAN member. I think this is a different limit that we are now seeing since the 1990s. From the 1990s, everybody agree that we don’t have those kind of fights, but now with this strategic importance, that is one challenge we are facing. Number two, I think when I talk about development has been the purpose of politics, there was a kind of a rule of development, a shared rule of development especially when the development actors was for example dominantly the United States and Japan from abroad. If you look at the early 80s and 90s, like 90 percent of the wealth came from U.S. and Japan for example in Southeast Asia. But now it’s a different story. For example, the big players are from China, also South Korea, and especially China doesn’t have a shared rule of for
example FDI. They are not a DAC member. So the way of development assistance, it has different rules, right? So if there are different rules, there will naturally create a competition, and that competition of development will easily create a competition into politics. It’s a different game. This is something that’s happening in this five to ten years, and this is a new challenge that we’re not – that we didn’t see in the early 90s. The third one is environment. We do see like huge scale of environmental challenges in these ten years. The biggest among them could be like for example the Aceh tsunami – if we are talking about Southeast Asia, the Aceh tsunami was in 2004, so maybe it’s already 13 years ago, but also the hurricanes in Myanmar, Nargis, the typhoon in Yolanda in the Philippines, if you count the numbers of the causalities that they claimed, it was much more than the communal violence. And if you’re thinking about peace in terms of casualties, I think these environmental challenges are something that has to be tackled with like full power. And I think that it was – it has been a much more challenge that Japan was in a position to take care – better of. For example, in the Philippines’ case especially, a lot of meteorological facility enhancement has been very much been focused on from Japan, and it has been a gradual success. Of course, it’s not complete, but I think those emphasis on these challenges by the environment, I think that is a very strong point on kind of a peacebuilding in the coming years ahead.

And looking to the future, I think – I mean, thinking about these challenges, there are two major points that I really want to share with you. One is I think is a new key player in town – is much more of local governments. We did a lot of research about peacebuilding by nation or by the capital cities, like we talk about Tokyo, we talk about Washington, D.C., or we talk about Asia. But I think more of the challenges are with environments or with talking about a lot of urban issues. If you know the Asia has now entered 50 percent more are living in the urban zones – this is a very fundamental change in thinking about Asia. This kind of governance – urban governance is one of the major challenges that we are going to face and could be also a source of conflict if we fail to manage it. Just look at what’s going on in Jakarta right now. This is huge campaign of like the Ahok case if you know – the new governor in town has been claiming their capability in solving flood issues and also like traffic congestions and things like that. But if this kind of pragmatic approach of urban governance fails, what comes after is, you know, you have this Islamist groups, you know, using this case as a leverage to claim a different political ideology in the nation’s story. Maybe I’m making the story too short – it might doesn’t make sense but what’s happening is this kind of failure of, of the politics of governance in urban zones can create a new ideology politics, be it the religion, be it class, or be it ethnic because of all the economic disparity issues are now addressed very much in urban zones, right. Everybody knows this economic disparity is the driving force of politics right now, including in the United States, including in Japan, but not just in the developing countries. In the, the developed, but also the developing countries also this is the politics, and this is addressed in urban zones, and if you don’t have a good idea of addressing these issues. And therefore, and therefore, the kind of local government to local government cooperation would, I would stress, this will be the key for peacebuilding in Asia. And that’s what I think Japan could do. There’s a lot of Japanese local governments’ cases and experiences – be it the flood matters, be it the earthquake, or be it the waste management. I mean these kinds of issues is very much picking up pace in sharing with other Southeast Asia cities as well. And I think that kind of new ideas of governance will create a new format of peacebuilding. That’s one thing.

A second thing, it’s about U.S.-Japan partnership. When I stress the purpose of politics as development it might sound too Japanese. Especially, if you know the history between U.S. and Japan in the 70s and 80. But actually, this idea of purpose of politics as development has been started from the United States, at the Tennessee Valley Authority. And that model has been picked up by Japan. And that model has been picked up by Southeast Asia, as well. So if you look at the bigger history of Asia-Pacific, including United States and Japan, and Southeast Asia, of course at that time there was a Cold War context, now
it’s different. But development as primary importance in politics, not the class, not the religion, not the ethnic – I think there is much room where we could cooperate between United States and Japan. And I think there many, many fields where we can do that. But one of the strongest institutions in the United States is the educational system, the universities in the United States is still very strong institution. Maybe more than the government institution, I would say. And I think that there is so much room, like, if I, one example, like, you know we could have this local government Japan case used in the United States university education system. Together with that, we could have a much more holistic set of, you know, intellectual contribution to other Southeast Asian country, and that I think will give a stronger foundation for peacebuilding in the future years to come. So I can share more about this, but I think this is the kind of concept that I would like to stress. Learning from the past history, and looking at the challenges ahead, thank you very much.

Tatsumi: Thank you, Dr. Aizawa. And last but not least, Ms. Takezawa.

Rie Takezawa: Thank you very much, Tatsumi-san, for your kind introduction. I’m privileged to be part of this project, and I’ve been looking forward to sharing some of my observations and findings, and to receive comments and feedback from those of you that are present today. I will try not to repeat the points and issues that have already been mentioned by previous speakers so I will focus more on Japan’s general peacebuilding policy in Africa. So what is unique about the case of Africa, and the various aspects that have already been mentioned – what does that mean in the context of Africa? These are the things that I will be focusing on today. So what is Japan’s peacebuilding policy in Africa? This is my main research question. And to summarize my paper, Japan is pursuing peacebuilding through economic development and growth. Now this is a very unique style of peacebuilding, compared to other donors. Now why has Japan developed such a unique peacebuilding policy? Well, as already mentioned, Japan’s contribution mainly to stable areas during the post-conflict phase, or conflict-prevention in peacetime. And this is largely due to restrictions to Self-Defense Forces activities outside of the Japanese territory. So in this sense, Japan’s unique peacebuilding policy and implementation, I think, is particularly evident in the African region. As Dr. Fujishige explained, there are currently still many violent conflicts in Africa and unfortunately conflicts are recurring. So, by focusing on such reason, such region, I think Japan’s unique policy is going to become more evidential. So this is why I am focusing on Japan’s peacebuilding policy in the African region.

Now before I go into the details of Japan’s peacebuilding policy in Africa, I’d like to start by thinking of a very simple question, and the question is: “How does the Japanese public and government see Africa?” A very simple question. Well, it is often said that not only is there a geographical distance between Japan and Africa, but, as the Japanese say, a sort of psychological distance. Now this is due to lack of major historical connection and also interest in the African region. So generally speaking, the African region may often seem marginal to Japan’s economic and political interests. Well, if that is the case, then why is there the need to dig down on Japan’s peacebuilding policy in Africa? Okay – I’m going to raise three points. The first point is, needless to say, Africa continues to be an important continent for international peacebuilding efforts. So of course it is important to pursue, to think about what roles Japan can play in doing so, you know, how can Japan commit. The second point is, well, having mentioned that Africa, the Africa region seem to be marginal to Japan in various aspects – well this is changing in the recent years. This is changing, one, from the economic aspect and, two, the recent Abe administration is trying to expand Japan’s role in peacebuilding under its “proactive contribution to peace” diplomacy. So Japan is going under a significant turning point.
So how exactly has Japan’s peacebuilding policy in Africa evolved over the years? I’m going to explain three major turning points, in chronological order. The first point, well, rather than it being a turning point, it’s actually when Japan began, began implementing its policies in Africa. Well, this goes back to 1993, and Japan launched an international conference, so-called TICAD, “Tokyo International Conference on African Development.” Now this conference focuses on promoting Japan-Africa relations and also development in Africa. When this international conference was launched, at the time, peacebuilding was not directly mentioned. However, the Japanese government acknowledged the importance of peace in relation to development and growth in Africa. So Japan started trying to commit towards peace in Africa, in the early 90s. Now, the second turning point came about in 2002 under the Koizumi administration. The Koizumi administration addressed the concept of consolidation of peace and state-building. Now this is a Japanese version, or Japanese terminology of peacebuilding. And the Koizumi administration was very careful not to use the term “peacebuilding,” as it was used in the international society. The reason behind this was because Japan wanted to avoid the impression of the role of the Self-Defense Forces increasing overseas. And the implementation level, what did this consolidation of peace and nation-building mean for Africa? Well, frankly speaking, at the implementation level Japan carried, Japan did carry out some direct assistance projects but the implementation was still quite limited. Now the final turning point, as I mentioned earlier, occurred during the second Abe administration. So Japan is currently going under, I think, a major turning point. Well, the first point is that the Abe administration has started using the term “peacebuilding,” right. So they have stopped using “consolidation of peace” and state, and “nation building,” but have changed its terminology to peacebuilding. I think this is very significant, reflecting on the reasons why the previous administrations were not keen on using the terminology. So the term peacebuilding appears in the development cooperation charter, which was revised in October 2015. And in this development cooperation charter, the Abe administration also emphasizes another new concept, which is “quality growth.” Now, as the principals, the Abe administration is emphasizing sustainability, inclusiveness, and resilience. And they say that these are important principles that are essential for sustainable growth. Another aspect that the Abe administration is pursuing is to open new opportunities for the Self-Defense’s role in peacebuilding. So as Dr. Fujishige has also already mentioned, the legislation for peace and security was implemented in March 2016, and the role of the Japan Self-Defense Forces has been increased compared to the previous, previous legislations. So currently the Abe administration is trying to expand Japan’s commitment towards peacebuilding, peacebuilding efforts. And since there are so many conflicts in Africa at the moment, these policy changes, you know, they are going to have a great influence, especially, I think, on the African region.

Now let’s focus on the implementation strategy. So I just gave a brief overview of how the policy level has changed. So now let’s take a look at the implementation strategy. How has the actual project, and actual on-the-field efforts changed? Well, although Japan has been promoting economic development and quality growth principles in its peacebuilding policy, the range of sectors that are subject to peacebuilding remains very wide. So, for example, the sectors vary from, range from infrastructure, education, health, the various sectors are subject to peacebuilding efforts. Now, Sadako Ogata, then-president of JICA, has mentioned that. However, JICA is beginning to look more and more to accelerating overall economic growth in Africa. Now what this means is that Japan’s peacebuilding efforts focus on long-term economic growth, sharing the same goals as conventional development. Having said that I’d like to make a few additional comments. Well, besides these long-term efforts, of course, Japan has carried out more direct peacebuilding commitments. For example, a dispatch of Japanese instructors to PKO centers in Ghana, and also providing capacity-building training to post-conflict nations, and also for the purpose of conflict prevention.
So to summarize what I have just introduced, I would like to raise three challenges. The first challenge is the difficulty of balancing Japan’s unique peacebuilding style with contribution to international peacebuilding efforts, including during the conflict phase. So, as I mentioned, Japan’s peacebuilding policy is very unique, that it’s pursuing peacebuilding through economic development. So historically, economic development has been a key concept in Japan’s development assistance and this was a strong point for Japan because it was based on Japan’s own experience of post-war recovery. However, U.N. PKO practices changing greatly from the traditional PKOs, the mandates are more offensive, and stabilization is becoming a key issue. So taking this into account, Japan, although the Abe administration’s policy expansion is commendable to some extent, Japan is still facing some challenges on how it can actually contribute more to international efforts. So Japan needs to balance their uniqueness, their strength, but also at the same time, also keep in mind, you know, how it can also meet the needs of the international society. Now the second point is that Japan’s policy still remains vague, and too comprehensive at the implementation strategy level. And in relation to this point, Japan’s interests and overall strategy in Africa still remains unclear. And so I began by addressing, so how does Japan view Africa, but the reason I raised that question at the beginning is because such distance and lack of interest is the underlying cause for various challenges for Japan’s peacebuilding policy in Africa.

So I’d like to make three policy recommendations. The first one is to clearly articulate the focus and objectives of Japan’s peacebuilding in Africa. The second point is to bolster collaboration among various stakeholders to overcome their lack of coordination. So, for example, in the case of South Sudan, the Japan Self-Defense Forces and JICA have actually collaborated in peacebuilding efforts. Let me give you one example. The Japan Self-Defense Forces engineering unit demolished a bridge in the JICA development assistance project. So, but still, the number of collaboration is limited and it is said that such coordination is actually driven at the field level, and not the policy level. So maybe at the policy level there are still room for more collaboration, especially under the limited means and resources. My final policy recommendation is to encourage the Japanese private sector to set up operations in Africa. Now this was actually one of the key points in the latest TICAD, last summer. So Japan is promoting Japan’s private sector to go out more to Africa, but I think, again, there is room for more support. And the Japanese private sector expansion in Africa could contribute to accelerating economic growth in the region. And so since Japan’s peacebuilding policy is through enhancing economic development, I think the role of the private sector is going to become an important aspect. And thank you very much, that’s all from my side today, thank you.

Tatsumi. Thank you all for laying out some – identifying various issues in the Japan’s peacebuilding. I would like to open the floor for questions and comments. There are microphones in the room, so if you would, if you can wait until microphone gets to you, and please briefly identify yourself, and provide your comment, feedback, or questions. You can direct questions to any of the authors or you can direct them to all, it’s totally up to you. From here, I’ll open up the floor. Gentleman over there –

Robert Munson: Hey, good morning. My name is Bob Munson, I was a peacekeeper in South Sudan, so I sort of worked with the Japanese engineers there. I was there in ’12–’13 when it was still peaceful. One of the things that I noticed when we were working with the engineers, the Japanese engineers were not all that useful – at least, from the U.N. perspective, because they were limited around Juba, and we could’ve used them elsewhere. I mean there was a great need for infrastructure building, they just couldn’t go that far. And certainly as an American, I realize the political baggage they bring, but that was one thing they could’ve expanded. But when you’re looking at comparative advantage, one of the other things that the Japanese theoretically could bring would be something else like airlift that would be useful for the mission that would not be combat. But with that, I wanted to ask, are there considerations
in Japan to expand, like to airlift, or helicopters that could provide something? Also, in South Sudan it seemed obvious that the Japanese were there also because the Chinese were there. The Chinese engineers. And so that was significant, and then also, or at least appeared significant, but it also appeared that the Japanese were there because the Americans pushed to bring them to south Sudan because it was an American policy priority, so just I’m addressing anyone up there, just comments on that because I find it interesting to look at that.

**Tatsumi:** Um – I think this might be for you, Fujishige-san, probably.

**Fujishige:** Yes, thank you very much for very, very useful and insightful comment. I agree with you, Japan can do some more contribution by transportation, especially with the air lift – but I didn’t mention during it, because today we are focusing on the peacebuilding rather than the peacekeeping – but if you are talking about the peacekeeping, I do agree with you. But in answer, you could say Japanese contributions to engineering to only Juba can be useless, not very useful, but my answer is: is it not better than nothing? Because this change is a significant change – it is the beginning of the dispatch of the engineering unit in the early 2012, as was already mentioned so at the time, the situation was quite benign and there was only state reconstruction mandate, and there is also the other contribution [inaudible]. Today the situation ultimately is much more difficult and there is the protection of civilian lives mandate. But on the other hand, some contribution to South Sudan is the only military contribution from Japan to U.N. peacekeeping operation. Of course it is very much a matter of the political decision, maybe Tokyo decides, “Okay, this is too dangerous, we can – they can just come back,” but I don’t think, at least at that the administration will withdraw our military troops because I believe that is a general understanding in Tokyo – that we should maintain at least one, one, our contribution to South Sudan. So because, we look at the reality of South Sudan, it is very difficult to believe the reality of what Tokyo is saying is just continuing to say it is not civil war situation, but in reality it is difficult, so maybe a different decision is made after Abe resigned but so that is very much a political issue. Thank you very much for that interesting comment.

**Tatsumi:** And more directly into your question about whether there is a consideration to expand to the airlift, as a coming into the package, that is always one of the options, as a non-combatant role for Japan to play, and then I think, in fact, in the Iraq, this is not a peacekeeping operation umbrella – but Japan has done the airlift during the Operation Enduring Freedom, in a limited capacity, but still did that, and there were significant discussions within the government in terms of whether they can provide similar support to Afghanistan, when they had the stabilization forces more active and more expanded. It didn’t come to fruition, but airlift is, airlift is always, is a part of the option that the Defense Ministry do entertain and, but, I think there are increasing focus, particularly coming out of this administration to focus more on the “boots on the ground,” if you will. And that actually is an interesting case of sometimes boots on the ground, may actually be more limited. And where Japan can actually play a more useful role is not necessarily “boots on the ground,” but more on the logistics side, like airlift that you pointed out. Yes –

**Joel Diamond:** Hi, my name is Joel Diamond from Search for Common Ground, we’re an international peacebuilding organization. And I think all the panelist did a great job of explaining how Japan is interested in gaining a presence in peacebuilding, despite the restrictions on military force. And my question is – to what extent do any of the panelists see maybe an increased role in JICA to do so through international partnerships or grants in the peacebuilding governance or development fields? Thanks.

**Tatsumi:** Anyone would like to pick him up on that? When you mention “Jee-CA” it’s JICA you’re talking about? The Japan International Cooperation Agency”? Yeah? Um, I think this, who would like to take
that up? Do you want to start maybe, Aizawa-san, because the Southeast Asia has a long history with JICA involvement?

Aizawa: Yes, yes. I think the JICA has expanded its, its menus – I mean it’s not the size is not expanding, as wished to be, but the menu has been pretty much expanded, and the one I’m thinking I could stress, is what I just talk about, the local government to local government partnership. I think that is something very, very strong and increasing, so one is absolutely the waste management. I think this, this is going to be absolutely a very big issue in urban zones, in big mega-cities in Asia. That’s number one, and that’s the type of funding that’s going on, to facilitate these people interact between the local governments. That’s number one. Number two – I think there are a lot of, urban transportation issues, so it’s all, all about urbanization but the, many people talk about high-speed trains, I mean you know, inter-city, but now I think it is much more important to consider the transportation within the city. And it of course costs a lot, and of course, there is a lot of business interest to it – but one thing this public-to-public relationship can help, is to use these kind of second-hand facilities as well. It doesn’t always have to be brand new, as well. I mean it’s good to be brand new, but, things, there are, as the more we share the technology, the more we share the standard, the more we can share these kind of you know, second-hand materials, which is a much more efficient way to tackle these issues as well. You can think of the impact to it, I mean if you go to these mega-cities, and you’re stuck in the traffic jam, you will easily lose two to three hours a day, and then, ultimately, six to five hours per day. If you’re thinking about that cost, and the frustration that you get, I think it’s a major thing to deal with, and then kind of the seed money to start with, I think JICA has been putting in. And if that picks up, the private sector comes in, and everybody now knows, it could be a business, and then the momentum will pick up, so I think that seed money that’s facilitated by JICA, I think it’s very interesting. And another way JICA is making, is to make these local governments compete, it’s another very interesting thing. Even within Japan, as well. Like for example, there a major port cities that are very keen on this, like Yokohama, or Kobe, or Fukuoka. And these port cities are very aggressive, actually, but, I mean, JICA will kind of make them compete, who gets the best menu, who gets the best cooperation deals. And also let the other countries compete as well. Not just – you don’t have the only concentrating on the certain country. Everybody can join to compete on this. So this kind of new competition is a new kind of dynamic that JICA can create. And I think that that’s something that is making an impact.

Fujishige: Oh, yes, in my explanation I said there is less and less room for the PKO, less and less room, less chance for PKO-ODA collaboration because with the increase of the protection of civilian mandate, but, in reality, in UNMISS the peacekeeping operation in South Sudan, so the PKO-ODA collaboration has been carried out to a lesser extent. So I’m not particularly an expert on the JICA side, so don’t have the data, I’m afraid, but still, under a more volatile, more dangerous situation and a protection of civilian mandate is authorized, yes, I think that these noteworthy facts are still JICA, of course it’s this more financial assistance but still JICA is involved in a way, de facto – ongoing conflict is existing, so it might be a possibility – one possibility for JICA, new aspect, to addition – to examine what they can do when they are under such a dangerous situation, when the protection of civilian mandate is provided. So this is my belief.

Tatsumi: Takezawa-san, you want to say something?

Takezawa: Yes, I’d just like to add a little bit, to add from the case of the African region. Last summer, at the TICAD conference, the Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida, he mentioned the importance – he mentioned the importance of human resources development as one of the key factors for the future of peacebuilding in Africa. So he basically emphasized human resources development. Now, in Japan, JICA
is responsible for, mostly is responsible for implementing human resources development and capacity-building – this falls under Japan’s official development assistance. So, there are several of carrying out capacity development. One is to send professionals to the African region. Another one is to actually invite officials from conflict nations for technical training in Japan. And this is very interesting because, you know, various specialists are waiting for them in Japan. And so a lot of specialists are, Japan is trying, JICA is trying to engage a lot of specialists in such human resources development. So I think this human resources development is going to be one of the key areas where JICA is going to focus on for the next years to come, in the Africa case. Thank you.

Tatsumi: Thank you. Maeda-san.

Shuji Maeda: Hi, Shuji Maeda at the Embassy of Japan. I wonder, I’d like to ask a question about how the Japanese public’s view of the Self-Defense Forces’ role in peacekeeping or other missions in Africa. Takezawa-san has talked about this psychological distance of the Japanese ordinary people to remotely distant world. But at the same time, despite that, the Japanese government has been engaging in a series of initiatives that you talked about. Have those initiatives made the distance, psychological distance from Japan to Africa closer, and was that, or was that a reflection of the changing level of understanding of the Japanese public in those policy areas, and my main question is would that lead to a potential participation by the Self-Defense Forces unit in more currently politically difficult mission in the future?

Tatsumi: I will give this to Takezawa-san in the first place and then I think then Fujishige-san can jump in probably.

Takezawa: Thank you very much for your comment. A very, very good question. Very difficult question to answer. Well, first of all, yes I mentioned the psychological – so-called psychological distance between Japan and Africa. I also would like to mention that I think this is changing in the recent years. I think this – I think the TICAD has had a great influence on this aspect. You know, it was on the news in Japan a lot, and I think Africa has become more close towards the Japanese public. However, in the case of the dispatch of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces overseas, I think there still remains a diverse, I’m going to say, diverse, very diverse opinions I think still remains in the Japanese public. But, compared to times of previous administrations, I think the current administration is I think doing well in addressing, you know, why Japan needs to contribute more proactively to peace. So, that’s all I can answer in this limited amount of time, but I will definitely keep thinking about your comment, thank you so much.

Fujishige: Thank you very much for that very challenging question. And actually, that was a topic on which I wrote my PhD dissertation. My PhD dissertation was about the social understanding of Japanese military role in Japan. Yes, but as Takezawa-san mentioned, there is generally includes in our understanding or support, to the overseas, military, overseas military dispatch and I think additionally know Japanese Cabinet Office conducts public opinion survey every three years about how they view the military affairs, defense issues, and so on, and according to this, I have seen the survey, I could say there is increase in the support for the purpose of the “international cooperation” and so on. But, on other hand, Japan’s public is generally still quite skeptical to send their troops to Africa. Not because the Constitution ban, but more because – in my view it is because of the more practical causes, especially the security and safety of the personnel. So yes, I would say that Japanese population are still not very positive for sending troops to remote areas such as Africa, to Africa. Not only because it is very far away, and it has less relevance to Japan historically, politically, economically and so on, but it is too dangerous, too dangerous. So fortunately, since 1992, there has been no casualties on the part of Japanese casualties – but if there were any one casualties or if there is serious injury that happened among the
Japanese peacekeepers, I don’t know about, that would cause serious setbacks. It is a matter of safety, and security. So that is why, if thought Tokyo would like to maintain the peacekeepers’ presence in Africa for the future, it has to be very seriously discussed: what is rationale, what is good reason, what is the reason to do it? But I myself am quite skeptical about this. As I mentioned, I suggest that Japan and Tokyo should find options outside of the field such as training other peacekeepers, for example in the peacekeeping centers in Africa, or to commit to defense reforms support and so on.

Tatsumi: Which is kind of an interesting. I generally agree with Dr. Fujishige in terms of the hesitance of the Self-Defense Force deployment overseas. The farther it is, the more skeptical they are, and the reason it is because it is dangerous, when actually there are diplomats and aid workers from Japan actually there, and you would think military would go to those dangerous missions – but then that is the one institution that Japanese public is most hesitant to send out. It’s a little bit ironic, I would say. But with that actually, it is already 1:30 so I would like to thank you all for joining us today, and if you could join me in thanking these four wonderful panelists for today’s discussion.

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