Hiromi Fujishige, Hosei University

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SEMINAR TRANSCRIPT

Discussants:
Hiromi Nagata Fujishige, Associate Professor, Hosei University
Yuki Tatsumi, Senior Associate, East Asia Program, Stimson Center

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Yuki Tatsumi: Thank you so much for joining us on relatively short notice. We’re really sorry we couldn’t get the invitation out until last week, but I’m really grateful that you could join us. My name is Yuki Tatsumi, I’m a Senior Associate here at Stimson. I’m delighted to have Dr. Hiromi Fujishige from Hosei University in Japan to talk to us a little bit this morning about the evolution of Japan’s participation in peacekeeping operations. This is part of the project that Stimson manages throughout this year with support from the partnership of the Embassy of Japan in Washington, D.C. We are grateful for the opportunity. The purpose of this project is to bring in Japanese experts in various fields in Japanese foreign policy who don’t necessarily work on the narrow bilateral alliance issues but rather other areas of Japanese foreign policy, because obviously when we have many visitors in Washington many of them have been focused on alliance management and therefore we usually see the same people over and over, so we try to break that mold by bringing in – focusing on slightly different issues. So we’re really delighted that Dr. Fujishige could come and join us. It turns out that she will be in New York later this week for the academic conference that focuses more squarely on U.N. peacekeeping operations and the rules of engagement and things like that. But anyway, she will talk to us a little bit about how Japanese peacekeeping operations started, how it has evolved over time, and the enactment of the peace and security legislation in Tokyo this spring. Will we see much of a change? And I think her initial remark will stop there and I think she will respond to your questions and comments at that point. So she will speak probably around twenty to twenty-five minutes and then we will open the floor for questions and comments. So, without further ado –

Hiromi Nagata Fujishige: Thank you, Yuki, for your kind introduction and good morning, everyone. I’m delighted to have this opportunity to share my view with you. I’m not necessarily a specialist in terms of Japanese peacekeeping operations strategies, but this is one of my favorite issues. Recently we had quite a significant change in our policies, so I would like to share my findings with you as well. Please allow me to speak about twenty minutes or so. I’ll try to speak not too much so we can have more active discussion. And just one thing, I would also like to remind you that this is just only for a draft, so early next year I have to publish it, as Yuki asks me. I kindly ask you not to cite my handout at this time. I’d like to polish it a bit more to make it early next year. Please allow me to see my slides on my laptop in case I need to reference something important. So, I don’t know if you’re familiar with Japanese peacekeeping operations, so please let me start with some background information. If you’re a specialist in this field, it might be a bit boring but please allow me to do so.

First of all, as you surely know Japan has been showing a very reluctant and minimal defense posture since 1945, so this has not been changed much after our U.N. membership in 1956. It was [inaudible]
that requested the Japanese government to contribute military personnel to the then-ongoing peacekeeping operations in Lebanon in the 1960s, so the Japanese government – so they didn’t even discuss it. Just no, just impossible. So this kind of attitude was maintained the 1980s, but the significant change and turning point came to us in the early 1990s. When we had some kind of challenge during the Gulf crisis and the war in 1990 and 1991. Because the Japanese government could not make any military contributions in the crisis of 1990 and 1991, there was a call for what is called “international contribution” and this resulted in what is call the Peacekeeping Operations Bill, or PKO Bill, in 1992.

So this was one of the turning points in our position in peacekeeping operations. This, what we call PKO Bill or PKO Law, enabled the Japanese government to contribute military personnel to U.N. peacekeeping operations. And actually, as soon as the law was enacted in June 1992, the Japanese government soon contributed military personnel that mainly consisted of engineering units, so this was the first breakthrough. That was a big turning point in 1992.

However, our contribution has been very much limited and we have since 1992 contributed our military troops to first Cambodia, Mozambique, and East Timor, and most recently South Sudan. We have tried to do some things, but our contributions have been quite limited. Why? Because we have very strict constraints in what’s called the PKO Bill. And that is why the Japanese government has realized that this constraint is too strict and we have revised this PKO Law three times so far, in 1998, 2001, and 2015 last time. So out of these three revisions, amendments, out of the three the revision of last year was the most significant one. This significant amendment to the PKO Law was possible under the strong leadership of the Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. He has been an advocate of what is called proactive pacifism. It sounds a bit strange in English, but that is what he has been advocating. Under the framework of – to realize the proactive pacifism, there has been a revision of what is called security legislation. This was a set of several lawmaking efforts and a part of them and one of the goals of the administration was to amend the PKO Law. And as I told you, it was the most significant change in the peacekeeping bill as far as the military aspect is concerned. But what I would like to tell you about today is the gap between the significance of the major change and the more modest or limited changes in practice. So I’d like to show what kind of gaps between the major change and the practices in reality.

So, yes, that is my intention for today. And now, I’ll go back to more of the basics and fundamentals about Japanese peacekeeping policies. So as I told you, the original PKO Law, it was initially enacted in 1992, had two sets of very strict constraints. One of them was what is called the “Five Principles of Peacekeeping” – the Japanese government has to keep when they deploy military personnel to peacekeeping operations. So what is it? The data is on the slide, I don’t want to go into the data because it’s not very exciting.

So first of all, the ceasefire truce must be made when the military troops deploy on a mission. Secondly, there should be a constant clause. And also, the activities by PKO must be impartial. Fourthly, if those three conditions are not met, so, Japanese peacekeepers are expected to be neutral. This is the fourth thing. And lastly, the use of weapons. This is a little bit of a tricky one. When Japanese call it the use of weapons, it means the use of force. So this would mean it would not allow the use of force. It means we are not allowed the use of force abroad because it is prohibited by our Constitution. So that is what it means by use of weapons – it must be minimized. So the use of weapons can only be used in the name of self-defense. This is the five principles.

And these principles are very, very problematic. Why? First, because they are too strict. Secondly, these kinds of principles are made on the presumption on the kind of traditional truce or ceasefire
observing peacekeeping operation. So this means that these five principles are not necessarily means of reality of the peacekeeping operations.

So these five principles have been so firmly established and installed in the Japanese peacekeeping system and still exist today. This is one of them. A second constraint is what is called “Suspension of Contributing Infantry." So again, this suspension was included to make sure Japanese peacekeepers are not involved in the battles or use of force. But this constraint, the second one, the suspension of the infantry units has been already lifted – I think it is 2001? So it is already over.

However, even after this constraint was removed in 2001, Japan has never ever contributed infantry units. The reality has not been changed. And as I told you, I would say that there is some sort of glass ceiling for the dispatch of infantry units even though there are no legal constraints. And also the five principles are still in place. So this is our situation.

So, this amendment is some representation of the constraint on the PKO Bill which happened in 1998 and 2001. And so this time last year? So, one of the most significant changes brought by the amendment last year is what is called – I’m sorry to use Japanese but this is what the Japanese government officially says – but the most significant change the inclusion of what is called kaketsuke-keigo. I know this is weird to you, but kaketsuke-keigo is the Japanese official term. Why? Because this is a very peculiar concept for Japanese; that is why it is very difficult for the Japanese government to translate it into English. Even in the English literature it is still called kaketsuke-keigo, but it can be translated as rush-to-rescue. So as you are familiar with the changes of the principles of the U.N. peacekeeping operations, you should know that there is an increase in numbers of the Security Council resolutions that has been issued to protect civilians. Protection of civilians sounds nice, kind, and generous, but in reality it is directed by what is called POC mandate that has been issued. This means it is more likely that it is in a combat mission – that means there is civilians in danger’s way and that is why military personnel have to go rush and rescue. So this is quite dangerous. But now after the Japanese amendment last year, it allows Japanese peacekeepers to engage in kaketsuke-keigo or rush-to-rescue mission, which is the best defense for the protection of civilians. So that is why it was very controversial in Japan both among politicians and also in media coverage as well.

And the second point, I’d like to raise a question whether it is actually a substantial change or caught within the system, because as long as I know – I am not actually one but I have close communication with politicians and with civilians as well. And as long as I have [inaudible] related to Japan. We don’t think so, this current rush-to-rescue mission is actually assigned to Japanese peacekeepers is a good sign. Why? Because this kind of rush-to-rescue mission should be, I’m talking about generally, this kind of rush-to-rescue mission should be carried out by the infantry unit.

But as I told you, even after the Japanese legal system allowed us to dispatch the infantry units, we never ever sent infantry units. We mostly only contribute engineering units, though there have been some small-sized medical units as well, but almost all the Japanese peacekeepers have been working in engineering units. Yes, the engineering units are made up of military personnel, they’re soldiers and they can do some things. It’s not impossible for them. But that is their major task. So, as a last resort they may be to engage in rush-to-rescue mission, but I don’t think this will happen very often, right? I recognize the possibility, but I think it is very unlikely for Japanese peacekeepers as long as the Japanese government continues to maintain the current focus on the engineering centers.

So that is why I was thinking that the Japanese media very harshly criticized the rush-to-rescue mission, but I do not think that Japanese peacekeepers actually are involved in the high profile
missions. So my tentative conclusion about the addition of rush-to-rescue missions is that, yes, there is a possibility now as far as the legal system is concerned, but I don’t see that much change on it. So this is my tentative conclusion.

This does not necessarily mean nothing has changed. Yes, I do see the change, not a big one but some minimal change. So as long as the Japanese government continues to engineering unit deployment, this addition of the rush-to-rescue mission could — we are able to do something maybe in certain situations, some which were advantageous to the engineering units. Why? Because, for example, when the Japanese engineers go somewhere to go do something, for example to go do road repairs or construct something they may by chance happen to encounter a situation in which a civilian is in danger, right? They may be in danger, like, “Oh, Japanese soldier, please help me!” So even if they encounter this kind of situation in which the protection of civilians must be fulfilled, before the legislation last year they couldn’t do anything: “Oh I’m sorry, that is beyond our boundary.” So that was the situation before last year. But after the legislation last year, now they can support them if they happen to find a situation with civilians in danger. “Oh, this is not our mission but we can do that.” Right? So this is a positive change that I can find about the addition of rush-to-rescue missions. But you must think of this as late with Abe, a tiny change and limited, but I don’t think so. This is not significant like this, but this is a quite meaningful change. Why? Because their traditional attitude is, “Oh, I’m sorry you’re about to be killed. I’m sorry but I can’t do anything about it to help you.”

So this kind of situation might cause the people, “Oh, Japanese soldiers didn’t do anything and my family was killed,” right? And also this kind of thing happened to be very minimal and also rare. It is very stand-out, very different from the general U.N. rules of engagement. This also could cause conflict among the U.N. missions as a whole if Japanese peacekeepers don’t do anything. Now after the legislation last year, so I would say this kind of danger can be possible, but the possibility for danger happens now less and less. So we are going to stick to the deployment of engineering units, but the situation is now easier for military units. So this is my thought.

Okay, let me try to touch up on the other things very briefly. The other major change from my point of view is what is called SSR Division. I don’t know how many of you are familiar with the concept of SSR but it says that — SSR stands for the Security Sector Reform. Specifically, it includes the various kinds of security or border and those kind of related legislative issues, including for example police or defense. And actually last year, the amendment last year allowed the Japanese government to embark on the anti-wholesale business, so not only military related but also more non-military issues. So this is important but I will try to stick to major things today because time is limited. So since the last year, last autumn it is possible for the Japanese government to dispatch — not troops, but some military personnel to support defense reform in the country of the conflict. Because reforming and reconstructing defense organization is one of the important things so they make ensure sustainable and durable peace in the country. So I think this new addition has attracted only a little attention in the political discussion and media coverage, but I would say this is a field in which Japan should put more emphasis on it. Why? Because as long as we stick to the non-infantry missions, it is very unlikely we can contribute a hundred thousand big contributions to U.N. missions. But in reality, it is not only Japan who is shying away from the dispatch of the infantry missions. Today, lots of the infantry missions are contributed from the developing countries such as Ethiopia — Ethiopia is the largest country, and they are contributing about eight thousand, and India and so on. On the other hand, I think I put my figures and graphs in your handouts so you can — I hope you can see it right there — but most of the advanced countries, not only Japan, but most of the G7 countries and Nordic countries like Sweden and Norway, and Canada, and Australia, these countries are often remembered as very active countries in the field.
of peacekeeping operations but in reality not really. They used to be active, but not recently. So it is not only Japan who tend to shying away from the very dangerous U.N. missions. Why? Because they have been increasing the POC missions. So, I would say we should pay more attention and energy to more quality focused activities rather than just sending troops and soldiers because we, Japan has ourselves have the experience and expertise of forming our security-related organization after defeat in 1945. So we are one of the most advanced countries in the field of the – in the accounting of rich countries that have developed democratic ideology. So, I think that we should put more emphasis in this field. That is my perspective, to pay more attention to peacekeeping operations. I have more but I don’t want to talk too much, so this is my talk so if I could just – I want you to realize that there are some gaps between what Abe’s political rhetoric said and the reality of what we can do in field peacekeeping operations. And these are things we should be thinking about, and ask what we can do in peacebuilding. The other thing that I’d like to mention, although this is not directly related to the amendment of the law last year, we have been very active in the field of engineering units. I think that was first of all initiated because we didn’t have much chance or option as a standing army, but now we have experience and we have expanded the laws. And actually the Japanese government has created DPKO – DPKO means Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the U.N. [inaudible] for engineering units; this was last year. This is one thing. The other thing is that the Japanese government has been very active to support and to send out Japanese military personnel to the peacekeeping operations in Sudan and in Mali. So this is not directly related to changes last year. Again, this is quality-focused PKO, PKO engagement. So this is what we should focus on.

Last year, Japan first tried to contribute engineering-focused training in Kenya, so this is something we combined, engineering unit and training for most of the part of the advantage that we have. I’m not quite sure to what extent Prime Minister Abe tried to achieve or realize by that change. Thank you very much and I’m very happy to answer all of your questions.

Tatsumi: Before opening up for questions and comments, I have a couple of questions that I would like to ask for clarification. So as we often hear about Japan’s participation peacekeeping operations, it almost exclusively focuses on what the Self-Defense Force is doing or can do or will be able to do. But from what you just said, I have the impression that probably the focus needs to be more than that. So for example, security sector reform that you mentioned, it’s more about how Japan can help close to conflicts societies rebuild its law enforcement structure that can have a confidence of the residents. And in fact some PKO experts have mentioned that Japan’s know-how in community-based policing that the Japanese police current does within Japan, that could be a very good, I guess, knowledge to share with those countries. And obviously, there are economic development aspect of it. So in your views, do you get the sense that debates in Japan, particularly in Japan, talks about participating in PKO, do you think Japan’s focus is too narrow? Do you get the sense that you almost only exclusively look at what Self-Defense Forces can do, but as you mentioned, there are other aspects that are important for sustainability in peacekeeping operation or keeping peace is often very much neglected.

Fujishige: Thank you, Yuki, very much for you very insightful comments. I totally agree with you. So actually I’ll focus on the aspects of our contributions to PKO just because time is limited so we should have some focus on it. But, in reality, I don’t think that we should limit the scope of our contributions to peacekeeping operations only to the military. Why? Military contributions are not our strongest part. But also we can do something more. We have various strengths and other advantages in non-military aspects, so this is not rational for us to focus on the military contributions only. So this is our opposite option, our own reason. Secondly, I can also point out more general progress. So, it is not only for Japan but also for the international community, we have seen what is called the security
development nexus, right? So, until the 1990s, security developed quite differently, but nowadays under the program it’s quite mixed.

Especially in countries after conflict, insecurity still remains so they don’t expect immediate development. If there’s no steady economic development, people’s tangible feelings are weird, or some other direction. If there are currently still people feuding, it is very difficult to prevent the recurrence of other conflict. So because of these two reasons, I myself must firmly believe the solution is that we should – actually Japan has been doing these things in development and security. I’m coordinating a study group, this may sound a bit weird, but what is called “All Japan.” “All Japan” is what is called intragovernmental – not necessarily intragovernmental, but there also are Japanese NGOs and Japanese workers and so on – to do something more efficient for education, not only for peacekeeping but also humanitarian and development issues as well.

And so we have been doing this study group for more than two or three years, and our finding is what Japanese military personnel have been doing in the field of peacekeeping operations is – yes, they are military personnel, they are soldiers, but in reality what they have been doing is quite similar to development because they are rebuilding walls, trying to construct bridges, and so on. They have been more counted as construction and so on. So in Japan’s military issues which is politically controversial – but this is what we have done so far, so this is more of a tangible material contribution. And as I mentioned before in my talk, I think that it is time for us to do something more non-material, something like training issues.

Tatsumi: Thank you. With that, I think I would like to see if there are any comments or reactions to what she just said in the beginning, or if there some points – I know there are some details about Japanese security that are a little bit harder if you are always not working on this issue so if there is any clarification that you want to seek from her you can do that as well. So, there are microphones – right? – in the room so if you can raise your hand and then wait until a microphone gets to you then you can just tell her who you are and where you’re from so she can just know who she’s responding to. I would really appreciate it. So with that, I open up.

Dolan Bortner: Hello, my name is Dolan Bortner and I’m a student at Brown University, and I was just wondering if you could just expand a little bit on the idea of kaketsuke-keigo. You said that it basically consists of Japanese soldiers being able to partake in saving civilians if they encounter them, but are they allowed to conduct reconnaissance missions or do they quite literally have to stumble upon civilians being attacked in order to act? Thank you.

Tatsumi: That’s a very good question because if I could tack on one, for clarification for everyone, kaketsuke-keigo, rush-to rescue, is very uniquely Japanese and as a background I think it stems from the fact that the use of weapons by Self-Defense Force soldiers in peacekeeping operations is really strictly minimized to self-defense, and yet, in the reality, like you said, it really doesn’t match with the reality of the peacekeeping operation. And now there’s this new mandate for protection of civilians. So this particular concept is kind of born out of that necessity that PKO Self-Defense Force soldiers still have to fulfill that mandate when they are put in that situation but they don’t necessarily have to seek for that opportunity. Now if you can actually explain to us in responding to his question, what is it exactly? Kaketsuke-keigo. In what situation is kaketsuke-keigo, rush-to rescue? And I guess now with your point of this new legislation, now this is possible. But then, so what? Because the next question is, naturally, like his question, what about reconnaissance missions? What about when they doing a patrol? Or even those engineering units, they go from point A to point B, they see some suspicious people who could potentially harm the civilians. Can they, you know, actually eliminate the threat? So,
you know, if you can just clarify that. I think his question was a very logical next step question. But at the same time, *kaketsuke-keigo* is very uniquely Japanese.

**Fujishige:** Thank you very much for your very interesting and important and very difficult question. Actually, this is a bit tricky. So it is a bit difficult for us to talk about Japanese peacekeeping operation missions, because the Japanese government, especially [inaudible] the Cabinet [inaudible] in charge of checking every Japanese law to make sure it is compatible with the Japanese Constitution. They are very strict about it. They often force the Japanese government to make unique tricks. *Kaketsuke-keigo* is one of those unique tricks. It’s very difficult for even Japanese to understand this kind of logic.

But *kaketsuke-keigo*, rush-to-rescue, even if it’s translated into English it still doesn’t really make sense. It’s quite difficult to understand so I’ll try to do my best to explain it. So first of all, I should mention, in the original PKO Law in 1992, so Japanese peacekeepers were allowed to use a weapon only for themselves individually.

**Tatsumi:** But it was only for themselves.

**Fujishige:** This was another definition of self-defense. But after the amendment in 1998 and 2001, that scope of the range of the self-defense has been graduated and slightly expanded. So before the amendment in 2001, it was possible for Japanese peacekeepers for example to use their weapons not only for themselves but also to aid their colleagues, right? This is one of the changes, and the other change is, even before the amendment in 2015, Japanese peacekeepers could use their weapons to protect civilians if those civilians are within their camps.

**Tatsumi:** “Under their protection” was the term that they used.

**Fujishige:** Even if they’re out of the camps, the civilians are actually protected by the army. So they could use their weapons to protect civilians under their protection. So this is what happened in 1998 and 2001. I’m sorry, it’s very complicated. But before 2015, last year, it was not yet for them – while civilians who exist in remote places, so out of their control and protection, Japanese peacekeepers could not go and rush there to protect them. I don’t know how much they have to regard it as to apply this rush-to-rescue. From a legal point of view, they should be somewhere in remote areas. So, that law amendment last year made it now possible for Japanese peacekeepers – once the U.N. force commander, top military officer with the mission, orders them, “Okay Japanese peacekeepers, there are people who are in danger and are seeking assistance from you. And You can go there and shoot the enemy.” So this is a major change added last year.

**Tatsumi:** So I guess more directly answering your question, what about patrols – I think it depends on whether they’re on patrol as a mission, and then there is a tangible threat vis-à-vis the civilian that’s either close by or in an area they have identified, then with this new law, supposedly they should be able to respond to that. But can they go on a patrol mission at their own initiative? That’s I think very grey. There needs to be an explicit order either by the Japanese government as a condition – as a mission of these particular peacekeepers or a U.N. force commander who is in charge of that area to explicitly give them patrol mission, to go on that reconnaissance.

**Fujishige:** Yuki is right, however, as I told you earlier, I don’t think it is likely that our U.N. force commander would order a Japanese engineering unit, like, “Okay, you guys should go and do that.”

**Tatsumi:** Yes it’s legally, theoretically, systematically possible. But, reality-wise would a U.N. force commander order an engineering battalion to go patrol? Probably not.
Fujishige: If the Japanese government sent for some reason to contribute infantry units, it is possible that they are ordered to do something like patrol, like they are ordered to go to a remote area to save some civilians, but as I told you, it is not only Japan but other developed countries who have been very hesitant about sending infantry units, so I don’t see much rationale to contribute infantry. That is why I don’t think there is much change in reality.

Tatsumi: So, now that we’re talking about this, I do actually have a question about their mission in Sudan. Every now and then I see this in the Japanese media that somehow the current mission that Japan sent to U.N. mission in South Sudan might be either modified or enlarged, but then how this conversation is very politically sensitive, so why it can’t take place before, let’s say, before the July Upper House election? And I’m not quite sure what they’re getting at, because the current mission that’s sent from Japan is in your traditional realm: engineering. So when they talk about expansion or adjustment that’s politically sensitive, you know, what are they suggesting? If you don’t know, then what is your speculation? I only read this in media. I haven’t heard anybody officially talk about – you know.

Fujishige: To clarify, you’re asking me why the Japanese government has not applied the new law? They have expanded –

Tatsumi: No, I mean – why the wait? Is there a – from your conversations, of course you can’t go into details, but from your conversation with government officials who actually work in this issue, is that actually being discussed? You know, whether to change the scope of the mission slightly beyond the traditional engineering battalion? And I think there is a lot of speculation about it sometimes openly in the media but there’s nothing really, you know, concrete that’s coming from the government. But then for some of us who watch this, how new peace and security legislation is implemented in a tangible change, something like that is one area we would gauge how much of that change we are going to see in Japan policy. So are they now willing to expand the missions into more of those sensitive areas? If not, you know, are there any indications that they might consider that any time soon?

Fujishige: Okay, thank you for your question. I think again this is one common aspect of the Japanese security dialogue but they tend to narrowly focus on the legal aspect especially in terms of the constitutional restrictions, which is on Article 9 of the Constitution. But as far as I know, the official discussion was on the PKO Law and really focused on whether it was allowed by the Constitution or not. Most of this had much discussion of what exactly they can do about this legislation or not. I have heard of more tangible changes; and I have to make sure this is strictly off-record, but I recently [inaudible] and was really quite disappointed because I specifically talked with one of the key figures of the prime minister’s advisory board which featured significant influence on the security issue as a whole. The person I spoke with was a very, very influential figure, but he really didn’t understand very well even if the kaketsuke-keigo, rush-to-rescue mission, is included. So this really happened, right? He didn’t understand very well. So, it may be misunderstanding but I thought that he didn’t understand if the Japanese government could continue to maintain the current system, current use of engineering dispatch. That is one reason why I thought there couldn’t be a big change. That was my common sense, but he didn’t share my understanding so that was quite a big surprise to me. So what I’m saying is that, what actually – kind of concrete tangible could happen? I don’t think that kind of public debate goes on very often for not only for officials but also top ranking key figures as well. Sorry, I might not be very well-spoken in English. Can you give me some more questions?

Tatsumi: It’s just that once in a while we all see in Japanese media, like, headlines – possibly U.N. missions in South Sudan – the way that Self-Defense Forces participate will change. So, the mission that
they’ll be given will be beyond just an engineering battalion. But then nothing concrete ever comes out of that ever. So I think some of us are wondering, is it only the media just openly speculating or – there is, off the record, a quiet conversation happening but not really been taken up a public way for one reason or another.

**Fujishige:** So I think that is quite common sense for a practitioners of military, and civilians as well, but this kind of common sense is not really share by the media. But maybe they do, but that was not very eye-catching in the media. I was also wondering why they only talk about negatives but they don’t actually talk about what actually happened.

**Skip Williams:** Skip Williams with the Rand Corporation. I just had a question about – I agree with you in terms of strengths being community-based policing. In terms of what Japan can offer, could you elaborate a little bit on that? Is it primarily teaching or is it actually going in there and assisting or performing community-based policing? And is there a technology component of this as well? I think Japan is probably a leader in some of that. Thank you. **Ohayou.**

**Fujishige:** So this is one of the other very difficult questions. Why? Because I’m sure there are some Japanese [inaudible] we did have a [inaudible]. I’m afraid that they’re awfully reluctant contribute to U.N. peacekeeping operations. Japanese observers tend to use the excuse of experiencing trauma because of the experience in Cambodia, because when they, as I told you, our first dispatch for special peacekeeping operations was in Cambodia in 1992. It was not only military components, the Japanese government also contributed – I’m sorry, I don’t remember how much, twenty or maybe thirty – military police officers as well. But unfortunately, one of them was shot. And because of this, the Japanese police agency has become more and more reluctant, even though they contribute a some police advisors to the mission in East Timor. And so, as I told you, that trauma of Cambodia was major but I really don’t think so. And I have spoken to the police officers many times about it, but what they say is so they wouldn’t participate. But this is not only for Japan, this is common in other developed countries too but it is not major role or mission for the national police officers because our primary responsibility is maintaining safety and order of Japan. So as long – we do something international, right? So as long as the international issue directly relates to our safety, security, and order we happy to do this. That is why the Japanese National Police Agency has been – not a priority but somewhat active to support that police reform, so this is more substantial. But also they have provided some technical assistance to other countries like Thailand and the Philippines and Brazil. Why the Philippines, and Thailand, and Brazil? Because they have a somewhat close relationship with domestic national internal security of Japan. They have the rationale – even if it is beyond our duty, we have the rationale to do something to help them. [Inaudible] in South Sudan, for example, they don’t see any direct linkage between police reform and South Sudan and the internal security of Japan. So that is their rationale, right? We understand this U.N. peacekeeping operation might be important but it is not written into our police law. So my aim of this – I know there is quite a huge hope and expectation in society including other countries regarding policing, but to participate more since most of them are in sub-Saharan Africa, we have to revise our police law. So if it is written in as a part of the police law, it is possible because it is our mission. But otherwise I don’t think that’s possible, I’m afraid.

**Williams:** So you need to see the connection to Japan?

**Fujishige:** Exactly, because there is an increasing pressure within our territory. There’s an increasing call for the Japanese police to react to the crimes or driving accidents within Japan, for example. So they might not have much rationale, right?
Tatsumi: So if, in other words, if at the political level, let’s say Prime Minister Abe makes that direct linkage, “You need to send, you know, police training to South Sudan because this is how your support will have a positive impact on internal security.” And then, they really don’t have any reason to resist.

Fujishige: Yes, I agree with Yuki. So if the bureaucracy is watching the position of the politicians, Prime Minister Abe clearly said the Japanese police force must be going to South Sudan, I’m sure they’ll do something even though it’s not written into Japanese police law. However, this is just one agency. The Japanese Police Agency is a bit different from the other ministries. Why? Because the other ministries of Japan, the Foreign Ministry and the MOD, they have a Minister of Defense, so they have the politician at the top of their bureaucratic organization but as long as the National Police Agency is concerned that they don’t have the politician at the top. They only have a minister, but the top of the bureaucracy is not going to listen. They have a slightly weak civilian control or political control. If Prime Minister Abe said, “Okay, you should go there,” right, they might.

Elliot Klosterman: Elliot Klosterman, U.S. Department of State. I have a couple questions in regards to Japan’s pledge during the 2015 Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping. Maybe you can remind us what that pledge was that Japan made was and the significance of that pledge. Also I’m curious if there are any missions that Japan would not want to deploy to? I’m thinking Mali. If the U.N. came and said to Japan, “We need you to deploy with your pledge to Mali.” What would be the Japanese government’s reaction and what would be the Japanese public’s reaction?

Fujishige: So you’re talking about the Peacekeeping Summit that had taken place just last September?

Klosterman: Yes.

Fujishige: Please allow me just a moment to look at my notes.

Tatsumi: She needs to find her notes.

Fujishige: Actually, I saw it just this morning but I don’t remember where. One thing which is very interesting about Abe’s speech from last September was he mentioned several things. One of the interesting things is that he didn’t mention contributing infantry units and also the *kaketsuke-keigo* or rush-to-rescue is supposed to be carried out by the infantry but he didn’t say that, “We would be happy to contribute infantry.” This is the interesting thing. I’m sure his speech was drafted by the bureaucracy, but I don’t know who exactly wrote it but Japanese bureaucracy clearly understood we’re supposed to do something through the legal system though nothing has changed. So, I suppose it should be – I’m sorry, it isn’t coming up. He also mentioned we’ll continue with our active involvement of dispatching engineering units. This is one thing. The other thing is we are both very active about training. As I told you, the Japanese government conducted the first ever trial to combine the training for the engineering unit in Kenya, so this is what he mentioned in his speech last September. And I think he also mentioned to contribute the aircraft transportation so that Japan can help the United Nations. And I think that Abe also mentioned that the Japanese will be active to do something to mitigate the current disasters in gender and sexual-related violence. This is interesting. If my memory serves me correctly, last year, that was the second meeting, right? In 2014, they have held the first Peacekeeping Summit. I may be wrong, but if I’m correct I think that Abe maybe mentioned that Japan may do something positive about gender-related things. But, last year they changed the wording. Last year Abe said we’d do something in the field of sexual and gender-related issues. This means that Japan is not ready to contribute more female peacekeepers, because we don’t have many female personnel to be contributed. I think that his statement from 2014 invited some misunderstanding. “Oh, they mentioned the gender thing? Does this mean Japan is now happy to contribute more female
officers to the field?” But that was not what we could do. That is why I think they changed their wording. Sorry, there may be more things but you can find it in the Peacekeeping Summit speech.

**Klosterman:** Yes, I think they were going to contribute a Level 2 hospital as one of the concrete pledges.

**Fujishige:** I’m sorry?

**Klosterman:** Japan was going to make a concrete pledge for a Level 2 hospital? Level 2 hospital, beyond Level 1?

**Fujishige:** I don’t think he mentioned – sorry, I don’t think he mentioned a hospital in his speech –

**Tatsumi:** I don’t think he had anything specific example of – I don’t think he had any specific mission in mind when he mentioned it, but I think it was in a list of the things he said that Japan is ready to do – A, B, C.

**Fujishige:** Oh! Okay.

**Tatsumi:** And part of that was Japan, like you said, Japan makes more investment in the training of the peacekeepers and considering more positively about, I guess, contributing medical facilities and medical doctors or nurses. So I don’t think in his pledge he had any kind of specific mission in mind. In the future when things arise, “Here are the things that my government is willing to consider.”

**Fujishige:** I don’t think he mentioned too many of those things in his speech last year, but I personally think that it is a possibility of what we can do. And again, please, make sure this is off-record but some –

**Tatsumi:** This is public so there’s nothing off record about this, so kind of –

**Fujishige:** Oh, sorry. But, some people, a top-ranking official in the Japanese government, I don’t think I can mention who, but a high-ranking official and expert in his personal field expressed his reasons that that can be one of the things Japan can do. I think he mentioned – what was the mission?

**Tatsumi:** Mali. So how, if for example, United Nation DPKO came to Japan and said “We need your contribution, Japan. We need your specific contributions for a mission in Mali.” How would Japanese respond?

**Fujishige:** So this is just an assumption right?

**Klosterman:** Yes.

**Tatsumi:** Yes, for example.

**Fujishige:** Okay, so, your question reminded me of a discussion with my colleague about why the Japanese government decided to deploy the Self-Defense Force to South Sudan. And we’re all experts in the field of Japanese peacekeeping but now we have a concrete idea about “Oh, that’s a good question.” But we just imagined that, first of all, we have to do something, right? The number of our country’s participation is decreasing so we have to find something we can do. Especially after we dropped from Syria, so this is part of the reason, and the second reason can be South Sudan is kind of a pet case – American’s pet case. I don’t have much time to talk about it, but I think we have pay attention to the bilateral relations when we’re talking about our contributions to peacekeeping operations. I don’t know. So this is just our evaluations, we don’t have any concrete evidence but that
is possible inside your country. The United States has been providing support in this, and why not? We thought we should do something. And third is that we imagine that, again no evidence about it, but we imagine that the South Sudan case had a good excuse to – not necessarily an excuse – but a good reason to attract Japanese public support even though it’s a remote country, because it is a young country that has recently become independent, so why not? Why don’t we support this? This is something that seemed like a good idea to support. I tentatively conclude that it was possible for the Japanese government to support it and there is not any tangible opposition about this. So why I talk about this: this example of South Sudan does ask, I think, once the Japanese government agrees to be determined, and if the Japanese public supports it, we can do anything. So if they find a good reason and the Japanese government is so determined to do that, if you can find any good reason to persuade them – Japanese citizens – that’s not impossible for us.

**Tatsumi:** One thing is that the concept of nation-building sounds very positive and it appeals to – makes it more palatable to the Japanese public when the government discusses this – and remember, all this needs to be debated in the Diet because it does require Diet approval – but there are a couple of elements, big factors that would go in as Japan considers. So what is everybody else doing for that particular mission, for example, the mission in Mali – but then especially what the U.S. is doing or will be doing. Even if this is a global agenda, the Japanese reflex always looks to first what the U.S. is doing in this, then how to couch it, and then whether it can be couched and packaged and discussed in context of forward-looking and positive-sounding concepts, like nation-building is one and I think assisting in a country’s development or something like that is another. And it’s just – I’m sure it is a case here too, that somewhere remote happening that has not much to do with your country’s image or your country’s own security makes it less palatable and makes is less politically sellable. So I think in missions like Mali or South Sudan’s case I think Japan – the Japanese government finds that narrative. It’s a new country; Japan needs to help with nation-building. The international community helped Japan nation-build, rebuild after the war, so that sort of narrative is actually more important in terms of getting the public support.

**Fujishige:** How interestingly, I have some evidence of what I told you. In the case of Kosovo, that is an example of a new nation, nation-building, but I don’t think there’s much interest or attention both in Japan’s public level and the political level to support that. Most of the Japanese people really don’t know what Kosovo is. So I don’t know what is the difference between Kosovo and another, the others. That is still an interesting question.

**Tatsumi:** Any more questions? The mic’s not working apparently. If you can –

**Audel Shokohzadeh:** I’ll speak loudly. My name is Audel and I’m here with the Stimson. My question goes back to rush-to-rescue. So, let’s say there’s a situation where someone uses rush-to-rescue and it wasn’t proportional or it wasn’t impartial, or there was a situation where rush-to-rescue wasn’t used and it was supposed to. What is the enforcement or accountability for rush-to-rescue look like now that it’s been promoted?

**Fujishige:** [Inaudible]?

**Tatsumi:** In other words, do you mean kind of in the hypothetical case?

**Shokohzadeh:** Yeah, let’s say that there’s a situation where there’s civilians that need rescue and you know, peacekeepers go in, they provide rescue, but their response isn’t proportional or there’s a situation that maybe didn’t require rush-to-rescue. What does enforcement look like, or what does accountability look like in that situation, to say that you shouldn’t have gone into that situation, why
did you do it? And to kind of send a message to other peacekeepers. What is acceptable use of rush-to-rescue and what is not acceptable?

**Fujishige:** That’s a very good question and I don’t think that Japanese, as far as I know, I don’t think that Japanese has a process for that.

**Tatsumi:** That is – so you – I don’t know for a fact that whether they have a formal process for after-action review when something like that happens, but what you laid out is entirely possible. So I think that is why one of the reasons even though this new legislation technically allows this rush-to-rescue, it is unlikely that that will lead Japan to contribute infantry to this peacekeeping operation, because this whole idea of rush-to-rescue is based on the assumption that we primarily contribute non-infantry, like engineering battalion. And as they transition from their base to where they’re supposed to be working on the project, and if they see something and there is a local residence that needs their protection, then they can invoke that. But I think that is why even if this new law technically makes it possible, until they have a chance to think through the situation like what you just laid out, they will not be in reality quite ready to contribute the infantry. But that’s a very good question though, because those are the things – those are the elements that really need to be considered as, you know, the steps to make sure – and then you’re right, what the after-action review happens and how people are held accountable sends a message not only to the peacekeepers of the other countries but then also sets a precedent for Japanese peacekeepers that goes on the future missions. It is often the case that precedent often carries so much weight in Japan in terms of what’s permissible, what’s allowable. So that is a very good question.

**Fujishige:** I don’t know exactly, just let me go back to my slides if I can – that might be possible when they have something done and confidential. What had happened is that they actually send the troops for the *kaketsuke-keigo* mission. This is my imagination, but I could imagine these kinds of duties are actually designed for the Japanese peacekeepers, so I can see the quite high danger of escalation. According to Japanese law, people in danger and Japanese peacekeepers are allowed to act to this extent, right? But in reality, it’s actually impossible to draw clear line in everything, to say what they’re allowed to do. But once they’re in combat-like situations, they cannot stop fighting. So if they continue fighting and they shoot somebody and they’re killed, it could be a political disaster. That is why I really don’t think the Japanese government would actually want to send infantry units. But that is a very, very difficult situation. And actually, this kind of escalation actually happened in the case of Cambodia. Because Cambodia case for Japanese peacekeepers was the first case for them, right? They really did not know what was going to happen. The Cambodian peacekeeping operation itself was quite disastrous, right? Almost anything they did was prescribed by the U.N. peacekeeping resolutions, so that was the case with the peacekeepers, not only Japanese peacekeepers but other countries’ peacekeepers as well. Always do something at their bases, and so even though they’re not as essential to those areas because there’s no need and demand to [inaudible]. We cannot escape from the reality. That is a very tricky case.

**Tatsumi:** There’s no microphone so if you can just belt out – sorry.

**Sho Morimoto:** Sho Morimoto, also from the U.S. Department of State actually. I was wondering if – getting back to the political level, Japan now has a seat at the Security Council as the president of the Security Council next month and will continue to be on the Council until the end of next year. What do you think Japan will be able to do given its position on the Council in terms of enhancing peacekeeping?
Tatsumi: Even if peacebuilding as the priority mission, right? So –

Fujishige: [inaudible]. I’m sorry, we don’t know exactly what they are doing at the U.N. or what they’re doing in New York, but one of the examples I could remember is the case of Slovenia. Slovenia was a prominent Security Council member in 2007 or 2008, and when they were a member of the Security Council they were very, very eager to pursue and incorporate the security-related [inaudible] as one of the main contributions to the Security Council. Even though Slovenia is not a big and powerful country they were very active and they were actually successful to persuade the Security Council and Secretary General to pay more attention to the SSR and after Slovenia, SSR began to be more frequently part of the U.N. resolution about peacekeeping operations. So this is a good example. Yes, we are not a permanent member, but we can do something as a temporary member. In this sense, Japan has been most recently elected as a member so we should do something positive during our time on the Security Council.

Tatsumi: Are there any more questions? If not, there’s only five minutes left, so I don’t see why not. We can all release you to the early lunch hour. Thank you again, and thank you all for joining us.

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