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Yuki Tatsumi: Good afternoon. Thank you very much for coming to seminar – discussion on Japan’s policy towards Africa. Today’s discussion is going to focus a little bit on what Japan has been doing in Africa in the area of peacebuilding. My name is Yuki Tatsumi. I’m a senior associate here at Stimson’s East Asia Program.

Today I am very pleased to have Ms. Rie Takezawa. She is a research fellow at the International Institute for Peace and Security, which is a non-profit think tank in Japan. Previously, she has worked on short-term assignment at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and she is currently also a PhD candidate at the Hitotsubashi University. She will talk about fifteen minutes or so, and then open up the floor to question and answer, and comments. So without further ado –

Rie Takezawa: Thank you very much, Ms. Tatsumi. I am very honored today to be given the chance to speak at this wonderful session. So, the topic of my presentation is “Japan’s Africa Policy: From TICAD to PKO.” So, Japan’s Africa relations – it is often said that, due to the geographical distance and the weak historical link, Japan has a psychological distance to Africa. Now, however, more and more Japanese companies are doing business in Africa over the years, and the amount of trade has increased. Also, the amount of development assistance has increased, especially since the 1990s. And today, Japan is contributing to PKO in Africa as well.

Today, I am going to focus mainly on Japan’s peacebuilding policy toward Africa, peacebuilding policy in Africa. And here is the main focus of my research. So, Japan’s policy to contribute proactively to the peace, stability, and prosperity of Africa emphasizes peacebuilding through economic development. Now this is going to be a key idea through my presentation today. And since the launch of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development, which is the first major Japanese initiative on the African continent, Japan’s peacebuilding policy towards Africa has evolved to focus on quality growth, and principles such as sustainability. However, challenges still remain in defining and implementing such policy. So how can Japan refine its policy to better assist Africa’s peacebuilding? This will be the main focus of my presentation today, and I will wrap up the presentation by addressing challenges and some policy recommendations.

So, what is Japan’s peacebuilding policy in Africa? Well, first of all, Japan’s contribution to peace-building has restrictions, such as military activities outside Japanese territory and in unstable areas. Therefore, Japan has developed a unique peacebuilding policy over the years. This is why Japan has come to emphasize peacebuilding through economic development.
As I mentioned early on, I would now like to focus on TICAD, the Tokyo International Conference on African Development, as this has been the center of Japan’s policy towards Africa and also for Japan’s peacebuilding policy in Africa. And this was the first major Japanese initiative on the African continent, and it was launched in 1993. Now, why was it launched in 1993? There are two main reasons. One is that Japan came to realize that the global interest in Africa had faded since the end of the Cold War. The second point is that the Hosakawa Administration at the time was promoting proactive diplomacy and increasing Japan’s role as a nation committed to peace, and expanding its ODA. With regard to the first point, as one of the efforts, the administration launched TICAD.

Now I would like to take a close look at how TICAD and peacebuilding policy evolved over the years. So these are some of the key points:

The first TICAD, here, peacebuilding was not directly mentioned. However, stability and security are prerequisites to sustainable development. This was one of the main points that was addressed in the meeting – in the conference. The first two TICAD conferences, the main focus was development assistance. In TICAD Three, in 2003, the “consolidation of peace” concept first appears. Now this is a Japanese concept of peacebuilding. The reason why Japan was not so keen on using the term “peacebuilding” is that Japan has restrictions to contributing to peacebuilding, especially to military activities outside the Japanese territory. So Japan was promoting its own concept: “consolidation of peace.” So through TICAD Three to TICAD Five, the consolidation of peace and strengthening the economic basis of development was the key focus.

The most recent TICAD conference was held this August, and here, continuation of previous TICAD policies, have been valid, but also, it is interesting to see that more direct peacebuilding related areas and strategies were addressed. For example, contribution towards capacity-building, and border management, and peacekeeping operations – this was one of the key strategies that was addressed. It is also interesting to see that the Foreign Minister mentioned – emphasized in his speech that the importance of human resource development as one of the key factors for the future of peacebuilding in Africa. So Japan has addressed that it will support – it will contribute more to the capacity-building, the human resources development, as – in order to promote peacebuilding.

Now although the Japanese peacebuilding policy in Africa has evolved and shifted over the years, at the policy implementation level, still, a wide range of areas and sectors are subject to peacebuilding, and therefore, the areas that fall under peacebuilding still remain very wide. Japan refers to this as a diverse array of efforts. JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) which is responsible for implementing Japan’s ODA projects, states that assistance for peacebuilding shares the same objectives with conventional development assistance, such as education, health, agriculture, infrastructure. So mainly they have focused on the more long-term issues for peacebuilding. And this comes to link with the current Japan’s ODA policy: quality growth and poverty reduction through economic development.

Now I would like to take a close look at the case of South Sudan. Now, this is a unique case where Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, are contributing to the U.N. PKO mission, and also where JICA is implementing ODA projects. So regarding Japan’s Self-Defense Forces contribution, the engineering unit has been engaged in constructing roads and other infrastructure projects. Contributing to the protection of civilians’ activities is through such infrastructure-building activities.

So what is JICA doing? The aim of Japan’s ODA project in South Sudan is to contribute to the consolidation of peace in the country. Strategically, it is focused mainly on contributing to the long-term development of the country, so this is in line with what I mentioned earlier. So, for example, it is
infrastructure and social and economic development – diversification of industry and so on. The Self-Defense Forces have collaborated with ODA, and this is in order to maximize the impact of Japan’s foreign assistance. However, the current collaboration is driven at the on-the-ground level – the field level – and it is said to lack policy-level collaboration. For example, the kind of collaboration that is being carried on at the moment is that the SDF will repair the community road or construct the community road using materials that have been granted under the ODA scheme. So this is the kind of collaboration that is taking place right now. So there is need for more collaboration in the future.

I would like to address three main challenges. The first one is for Japan to balance [inaudible] in Japan’s unique style of peacebuilding and Japan’s contribution to the international peacebuilding efforts. The second point is Japan’s too comprehensive policy and implementation strategy. The third point is Japan’s interests and strategy in Africa remains unclear. Now, according to Japan’s NSS guiding principles for 2013, ODA should be used strategically to pursue national interests and objectives. However, if we take a look at Japan’s ODA figures, the blue figure is the total amount of Japan’s ODA; the red line shows the amount of ODA towards Africa – ODA in Africa. When looking at this graph, it is evident that the proportion of ODA in Africa is still limited compared to the overall ODA. So, still, Japan’s ODA policy towards Africa is not necessarily at the center of interest in Japan’s – allocating Japan’s ODA.

I have three policy recommendations today. So, related to the challenges that I have just addressed, Japan needs to establish main focus and objectives of Japan’s peacebuilding in Africa, including addressing or emphasizing the uniqueness of Japan’s policies, such as quality growth, which was mentioned in the development cooperation charter that was revised last year. Secondly, in order to maximize the effect of Japan’s development assistance and Japan’s contribution towards peacebuilding, Japan should consider an “all Japan” approach for peace-building. Thirdly, Japan could promote the private sector to set up operations in Africa, which could help accelerate economic development, which links to the point which Japan is addressing, which is peacebuilding through economic development.

Thank you very much for listening. That’s my presentation – that is all. Thank you.

**Tatsumi:** So what you see here is actually an initial concept. She is working eventually to write a short paper that consists of all these components, and you will see a more refined version of that in next spring, when she and three other authors gathers – comes back here in Washington to release their final publication. And this “Japan Policy toward Africa” is one chapter of that report, later on early next year. So with that, I would like to open the floor for the – any questions, feedback, clarification you may want to see. This is definitely her first time to meeting all of you, so when you do ask, please do identify yourself, and with that, I’d like to open. Sir.

**Doug Brooks:** Hi, thank you for the presentation. My name is Doug Brooks. I’m with the International Stability Operations Association. It is an association of private sector companies that work in peacekeeping and stability operations. I think Japan’s role, in terms of African peacekeeping and stability operations, has been improving over the years; however, as we see in South Sudan, where Japan has a military unit on the ground, what happens when the military unit is caught up in some of the problems, some of the combat that is happening? Are they running into the same problems that the other U.N. units have run into in South Sudan?

**Takezawa:** Thank you very much for your comments and questions. Regarding the Self-Defense Forces in South Sudan, currently, the dispatched unit is the engineering unit in South Sudan, in Juba. Have they been caught up in problems that other forces are facing? Well, with regard to the clashes that took place in this summer, according to the Japanese government, the Japanese forces have not been directly
involved, therefore Japan is not planning on leaving the mission, and Japan will continue its contribution towards the PKO mission. Does that answer your question?

**Brooks:** What happens if they do get caught up?

**Takezawa:** Okay, what happens if they do get caught up? Well, I think the Japanese government is focusing on sustainable dispatch of the forces at the moment, so I think that what happens to the forces depend on the political will. So I think they are likely to continue their mission, but it’s difficult to define what will happen at this stage.

**Tatsumi:** You’ve identified actually the very hot political button issue of today, because I think the Japanese Diet are essentially bickering over whether to add additional mission to the Japanese contingent in South Sudan, as we speak. The Defense Ministry got caught up in middle of the debate as well.

**Brooks:** So there’s been no decision made at this point?

**Tatsumi:** No, they’re still arguing, like our Congress. Sir.

**David Shinn:** David Shinn, George Washington University. You didn’t make any mention of the Japanese military base in Djibouti, and I’m wondering if you could explain how that factors in to this broader policy of engagement that Japan has in Africa, in terms of peacebuilding, because it seems to be something of an outlier from what you’ve just explained.

**Takezawa:** Thank you very much for your comment and question. Yes, Japan has a base in Djibouti since the year 2011, and Japan’s main mission in Djibouti is the anti-piracy mission – contribution towards the anti-piracy operation. Currently, there are an average of five hundred to six hundred personnel, I think, and, with regard to Japan’s broader peacebuilding policy, I think this shows that Japan is trying to strengthen more of its contribution towards the international efforts of peacebuilding. Focusing on Japan’s genuine interests of having a base in Djibouti, between 1,500 and 2,000 ships are sent to use the Gulf of Aden – Japanese ships – so it is also in the Japanese genuine interests to contribute to this anti-piracy international effort.

**Shinn:** If I could just follow up very quickly, though, there haven’t been any successful pirate attacks in two years. I realize that in 2011, that was the reason for going into Djibouti, but, like China, which is also setting up a base in Djibouti, it seems that the continuation of the project there goes well beyond anti-piracy.

**Takezawa:** Thank you very much. Actually, there’s been some discussion in the Japanese Diet, and the discussion is still being carried on, but the Djibouti base is about to have another objective, and that is to contribute to evacuating the Japanese if there is a security matter in the African region. So this is about to become another focus for Japan to have a base in Djibouti: because it is trying to promote more contribution towards the African region.

**Tatsumi:** Ellen, thank you.

**Ellen Frost:** Hi, Yuki. Ellen Frost, East-West Center. I’m also on the board of Relief International, which is a development and humanitarian organization with operations in South Sudan. So I have a question and a comment. The question is, China has just come up, and its wondering and wondering if there’s some harder-edged foreign policy issues here. Japan has come up with a Partnership for Quality Infrastructure in partial response to the AIIB – I mean, on the surface everybody loves everybody and wants to get
along, but underneath, there’s clearly some rivalry, so I wonder if you see that as one of the motives of Japanese foreign policy, in addition to the benign, you know, development ones, to what extent China plays in Japan’s thinking.

The comment is, very quickly – well, it’s a question really – Japanese NGOs and perhaps even Japanese companies might find themselves in a somewhat analogous position to the U.S. NGOs; specifically, it’s in the U.S. NGOs’ interests not to be identified very strongly with the military, or with even the U.S. government, and yet, sometimes the military gets advance notice if an attack is going to occur, so there’s sort of a delicate balancing act when it comes to U.S.-based, or even UK-based NGOs. I wonder if maybe Japan is a little freer in that respect, if NGOs are in fact operating in Africa, and if they are, do they do so sort of hand-in-hand with the government, or is a distance there between them?

**Takezawa:** Thank you very much for your informative comment and questions. I would like to answer your second point first. So, is there a distance between Japanese NGOs and the government? A short answer will be, I think, yes. And, having talked to Japanese NGOs who are operating in the African region, I wouldn’t say all of them, but quite a few of them have a strong reaction towards cooperating or collaborating with the Japanese government and especially with regard to the South Sudan case. NGOs are very often careful in how they collaborate with the Self-Defense Forces – especially with the Self-Defense Forces. So even if the Self-Defense Forces or the government is outreaching to the NGO, the NGO side often takes a very careful, sensitive reaction.

And the first point that you addressed – thank you very much. The China issue definitely has been discussed very much in Japan as well. How – what extent does China play in Japan’s policy? Now, how does the Japanese government think of China’s commitment, contribution in Africa? Well, I think that the government is cautious of China’s increasing commitment to Africa; however, this is not the only key aspect which is currently driving Japan’s policy. There are other, many other, much more other genuine interests of Japan that actually make Japan’s policy. However, Japan is, I think – this is how I view it, but – the Japanese government is conscious of China’s increasing commitment, and therefore, this is why, as you mentioned, Japan is emphasizing quality, and, especially in the ODA charter that was revised last year, quality was one of the key words that appears. So quality growth – Japan is going to be promoting this concept – but I view it that Japan is trying to emphasize its strength, with regard to the sort of competing nature with China. So Japan’s infrastructure project is of high quality, so this is the kind of, I think, quality that Japan is going to emphasize, and also, Japan is saying that it will follow up carefully on their infrastructure project, and also it will provide technical assistance, so capacity-building assistance, in order to, for example, how to mentor these infrastructure projects or how to utilize these infrastructure projects effectively. So this is the kind of quality that Japan will probably emphasize more in the future.

**Leon Weintraub:** Thanks, I’m Leon Weintraub, formerly of the U.S. foreign service, now retired. Unless I missed something in your presentation, it seemed like you define contributions to peacekeeping so broadly as to be hardly very different from, for example, the infrastructure projects being supported by the MCC of the United States – the Millennium Challenge Corporation – which is heavily on infrastructure. Unless you have something like helping to train engineering battalions perhaps, I just don’t see how this is really peacekeeping or peacebuilding without stretching such a definition so broadly.

**Takezawa:** Thank you very much, that certainly is an important point. So, in my presentation today, I defined peacebuilding very broadly. As far as I know, there are still different definitions among governments and international organizations on how to define – what the definition of peacebuilding is.
Therefore, in my presentation, my definition is that: peacebuilding provides seamless support in various phases, from conflict resolution to reconstruction and development. So this is my definition, and I understand your point very well, and I certainly think it’s an important point.

Now, why Japan’s contributions are very wide and why it doesn’t seem much different to the ordinary official development assistance that is being carried out, now this is one of the key points to my research. So Japan resulted in taking such policy because it has regulations – it is limited – on what it can actually do, how it can actually contribute to peace-building. So especially there is a limited role of the military that Japan can use. Therefore, Japan had to rely very much on the ODA schemes. So Japan addressed that through economic development, the country is likely to become more stable – this is the basis of peacebuilding; this is the basis for a country to stabilize. So this is the sort of concept that Japan has developed over the years. However, since the ODA charter has been revised last year, Japan will be, in the future, able to provide training to the military sector, so I think that in the near future, Japan’s contributions will be sort of more direct to the peacebuilding sectors.

**Mary Francis:** Hi, I’m Mary Francis from the Department of Labor, and I have a question about quality growth. So the United States has a trade preference program with Africa; it’s called the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). And under AGOA, the U.S. government takes strong efforts, like the Japanese are, to promote American private sector to set up operations in Africa, but we too are concerned about quality growth. We want to make sure the growth brought by American firms is quality and sustainable, so we don’t end up with a situation like we have in Bangladesh. So through that, we’re really increasing our engagement on labor standards to ensure that the companies moving into Africa are adhering to internationally-recognized labor standards, but also that the government is taking efforts to improve those standards. I’m wondering if Japan is doing anything similar to that under their efforts to promote quality growth.

**Takezawa:** Thank you very much. That definitely is one of the key issues that must be considered when promoting growth, especially in Africa. Japan, since it focuses mainly on the long term aims of development assistance, as one of the capacity-building programs, it focuses on building stable economic development plans with the government. So it is committing to developing the development plan with the government, so that it can experience steady, stable growth. And also so the capacity-building effort is going on in many sectors, related sectors as well. So also, for example, as part of Japan’s focus to stabilize the country, it is focusing on the governance sector as well, so how the governance sector is going to relate to the economic development. And also it is providing assistance to the legislation area as well. So, Japan, I think, is concerned and is aware of the challenges that is likely to come when the African nation is experiencing rapid economic growth, and they are taking – Japan is assisting measures to overcome those challenges.

**Elor Nkereuwem:** Hi, my name is Elor. I’m a visiting fellow here at the Center. So I just want to push back on your third policy recommendation, and the reason I’m asking this is because you are defining this in terms of peacekeeping, so which means that, in nations in Africa you are speaking about are unstable, which is accompanied by weak states or problem of legitimacy. So my question then is, if you say you want to encourage Japanese companies – private sector – in this region, how is this practical? How does this play out in reality?

**Takezawa:** Okay, thank you very much. That’s a very good question. Well, this point relates to a question that was raised earlier on how I defined peacebuilding. So my third policy recommendation not only focuses on post-conflict nations but on nations that are currently stable or is not experiencing conflict, but have the risk of experiencing conflict. But maybe there is no such risk at the moment, but in
the future there is a possibility that it will do so. Now Japan thinks that economic development or economic stability relates, or is a very important aspect, of a nation’s stability. So therefore, enhancing economic growth is an important focus for Japan. So to this end, I have made the third policy recommendation promoting Japanese private sector to set up operations in Africa. So since this is a genuine interest for Japan as well, it is likely that the effort will be sustainable. So I think addressing this third recommendation is important, thank you.

Frost: I don’t mean to talk too much, but picking up on that last comment and the question of governance, some of these countries have terrible governance, and our own record on trying to improve governments from the outside is really poor, and I’m not sure that Japan’s will be any better. I think I understood you to say that the Japanese are looking at the different countries in terms of the potential for stable economic development, but, you know, economic development has, in much of the world including here, has been good in terms of averages and GDP growth and all this kind of stuff, but really bad in terms of increasing inequality, especially when you have big man dictator in Africa who rewards his family and impoverishes people who are not in his ethnic group and so forth – we all know about these things. So if you would distinguish between governance and economic development, and sort of, healthy economic development, I would feel a little more reassured about your third bullet. I do think private companies are important, but if they just contribute to inequality, it’s not going to be the result that Japan is looking for.

Takezawa: Thank you. That is a very difficult – very important but very difficult question to answer. Well, I will answer to the best of my knowledge. So, why is – well, I have written this as a policy recommendation, but it is actually one of the policies that Japan has actually addressed in TICAD Six, which was the TICAD that took in August. So the link between the good governance economic development and the increase of inequality – now, increase in – the inequality problem is a problem that most of the nations in Africa that have experienced economic growth – in other words, successfully, that have been successful in economic development – is experiencing. So why is Japan addressing this private sector, going out to Africa? So, I think there are several reasons, but I would like to focus on two. One is that the Japanese private companies, if they go out to Africa, they may be able to contribute – there will be more jobs – I think that’s one point. So there is a risk, if there are too many jobless people, they may be, you know, recruited to, for example, terrorist groups. Maybe. Well, this is one possibility. So creating jobs is one, I think, aspect. And another aspect is also, through Japanese companies, I think the Japanese government is aiming to provide a sort of capacity development aspect as well. So not only is it for the short term economic interests, but it’s also for the capacity development aspect I think, so of course Japan needs to be careful and also it must take into consideration this problem of inequality. So they will need to address this point through ODA but at the same time promoting this Japanese public sector in Africa I think is, you know, something that can be pursued both at the same time.

Ken Meyercord: Hi, I’m Ken Meyercord. So when we’re talking official development assistance, are we talking loans or grants? And does Japan place any conditions on its assistance that benefits Japanese industry, like the United States does on its foreign aid?

Takezawa: Thank you very much. When I refer to Japanese ODA, it consists of loans, grants, and technical assistance – this is capacity building – and also contribution towards international organizations, such as the U.N. and the World Bank. And does Japan have any conditions? So yes, Japan’s ODA is sometimes criticized to be tied to the Japanese public sector, but from the viewpoint of Japan, this better promotes Japan’s ODA policy and better promotes Japan’s aim.

Frost: Are you talking tied aid?
Takezawa: Yes.

Frost: Well, there is an OECD agreement against tied aid, and I gather everyone’s included in that. You’re not supposed to tie aid.

Unidentified speaker: Since when was that?

Frost: Since 1990-something.

Shinn: U.S. aid is generally not tied.

Meyercord: Well, I’ve been out of touch for quite a few years.

Shinn: It used to be. There’s political conditionality but not economic tying.

Frost: In the ADB there’s conditionality, and it’s a Japanese quota for a Japanese bank.

Hideaki Tonooka: Hello, my name is Hideaki Tonooka. I work in a Japanese IT company right now, but before, I worked in Japanese government for twenty years, and during 1999 to 2001, I worked in the peacekeeping office of the government, which is responsible for dispatching self-defense forces or peacekeeping policy. And at that time, I participated in policy planning for dispatching a Self-Defense Force engineer battalion to East Timor, so it’s not Africa, but it’s Asia, so I have some experience there. So first of all, I came from the Ministry of Defense, and I felt how, you know, especially the Ground Self-Defense Forces, Japanese army, were inclined, or they were very passive, or they didn’t want to go to Africa actually, and at that time, within the Japanese government, we discussed if we could dispatch Self-Defense Forces into a conflict, but the Self-Defense Forces said, “No. No, no, no. No Africa. Why Africa?” Such kind of sentiment there fifteen years ago, and still I think that kind of sentiment there. And they understand, you known, peacekeeping operations are pretty important, and some years ago, the law changed – the Self-Defense Forces law changed – and before, peacekeeping operations is not the main mission, but that changed to what the main mission is with self-defense. So they can’t complain, but they complain.

So, why Africa is pretty important for the Self-Defense Forces? How to convince them it’s pretty important? So, then, twenty years ago, there were very strong politicians who promote “help Africa,” like Mr. Muneo Suzuki or the Kantei, Prime Minister’s Office, was pretty supportive of, you know, how to help Africa. But right now I don’t see it, so I think we, Japan, need some kind of good supporter in a political level; otherwise, it’s so hard for us to be more supportive to Africa. And plus, right now, I’m working, you know, at a private company, and as a person who is working at a private company, we need some kind of benefit coming from Africa if we dispatch some people or we set up a factory and we may find some resources. So such kind of things I think we need consider them. Thank you.

Tatsumi: So I guess the question is, do you see anyone, a major political figure in Japan, who can be the strong supporter of Japan’s greater engagement in Africa?

Takezawa: To answer that question, I don’t have a direct answer at the moment. However, although there is – I think that, currently, the South Sudan case itself is a symbolic case in regard to the changes of the Japanese security legislations and the revision of the ODA charter. So I think the government is keen to sort of make this dispatch a kind of success, so I think that, for now, the South Sudan case will be a symbolic operation, so this itself will sort of promote Japan’s contribution towards Africa. But regarding if Japan is going to expand its contribution to other countries, I think at the current situation, it is not
highly likely, and I will continue to think about who is likely to promote Japan’s contribution to Africa. Thank you.

**Kenji Kamesato:** Hi, I’m Kamesato from Marubeni America. My headquarters, Marubeni, supported the South Sudan project, and also Djibouti and had some logistic support for Self-Defense Force. And we have some bitter or some risky experience about this business. And already we suggest the number two and number three policies, but these didn’t work. Already – under with such a precondition, I’m just interested in the fact that your definition was “all Japan” and in the word of actor, and I’m just interested in what made such “all Japan,” those actors.

**Takezawa:** Thank you very much. So, “all Japan” – how I define “all Japan.” When I say “all Japan,” of course the government agencies are included but also the NGOs. And also with regard to the third point that I had addressed, of course the public sector – sorry, the private sector is included in this “all Japan” concept. So it’s not only the government agencies but also the NGOs and also the private companies, I think.

**David Stern:** Yes, David Stern, retired Foreign Service. I’d like to back up to the broader question of the drivers for Japanese interest and policies towards Africa. Could you list a few of those? It seems that a lot of the Japanese focus is on U.N. institutions, and it’s a way of promoting Japan’s relationships with the world by working through the U.N. rather than going outside the U.N. to strictly bilateral or more geostrategic considerations – I think you mentioned the competition with China earlier – but certainly the American and Russian approaches have gone outside a lot of U.N. efforts, to advance our own interests in particular countries in Africa. Do you find that in Japanese policy towards Africa in general? That there are – you can think of the obvious economic development issues and access to raw materials that divide China from Japan. But could you list up a couple of the main drivers for Japanese foreign policy interests in Africa?

**Takezawa:** Okay, thank you very much. Japan’s main interests in Africa: so, genuine Japanese interests in Africa, I think, as you mentioned, the natural resources is definitely one of the key interests. And also, well, Japan, as you mentioned, I think is also focused on promoting its contribution to international efforts, so Japan wants to show or appeal that Japan is taking on some of the international issues and is contributing to international efforts, and Japan is willing to do more in the future, I think this is the kind of posture that Japan is trying to address. Other possible interests: I think one, there is a diplomatic sort of political interest as well. So this is often discussed related to the reform of the United Nations Security Council, and Japan wants to become a permanent member. So, in order to achieve this aim, Japan needs more support from African countries, as there are 54 countries in Africa. So this was emphasized in the 2000s actually, when Japan was promoting more contribution towards Africa. So I think this may be one interest towards Africa.

**Stern:** Is there any cooperative interest with China in developing Africa? Any initiatives by Japan or by China to engage in joint projects in Africa?

**Takezawa:** Cooperative projects – as far as I know, not yet. But regarding the anti-piracy operations in Djibouti, China is also contributing to this effort. And so Japan and China has collaborated with regard to the anti-piracy missions. So, well, no. Not that I know of at the moment.

**Weintraub:** Just looking at your second item on the list there, your “all Japan” approach to peacekeeping, is there a potential for that principle to conflict with competitive bidding requirements that occasionally are in place for development activities and development projects?
Takezawa: Thank you very much. That’s a good question – a very good question – a very difficult question to answer as well. I think that definitely will become an issue. Right now, I can’t give a precise example, but I am sure it will – there is a possibility that it will. With regard to – so, it largely depends on what the primary interest of each agency, or the NGO, or the private sector is. So it is said that there are, you know, difference in interests between government agencies and, of course, so the private sector will also need to look at what each government agency is – what their primary interests are, what they are trying to promote. So, when you think of it as an “all Japan” approach, yes, as you mentioned, I think there will be – you know, that definitely will become an issue.

Tatsumi: Can I ask a quick question? I was just looking at your quality growth and the three elements that you include – inclusiveness, sustainability, and resilience. And this inclusiveness question, I think Ellen raised that a little bit, in terms of governance, and because of the current scheme that are in place for official assistance, often needs to be generated by the government, which could have a major governance problem, like Ellen as well. How can, I guess, Japan help mitigate that to ensure this inclusiveness aspect in its, you know, as it aspires towards help facilitating quality growth?

Takezawa: Thank you very much. That is an very important point. So, this inclusiveness factor, in order to promote quality growth: what needs to be done to mitigate these issues? Well, I think firstly – this may not be a direct answer to your question – but first of all, I think Japan needs to focus on addressing the policy that interests towards Africa. So Japan needs to clarify what its primary interests are. Now, by doing this, I think government agencies, the private sector, and, you know, including NGOs, will come to realize the difference in what their aims and interests are. So by doing this, by clarifying Japan’s interests, I think as a result the inclusiveness issue will improve.

Richard Ponzio: Richard Ponzio, here at Stimson. Sorry for my delay. Two quick questions. There’s talk now of the next Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping to be a Chinese national, under Antonio Guterres, just nominated as the next SG starting in January. And given that some argue that Japan’s approach and emphasis on peacekeeping in Africa, let alone having TICAD for the first time in Africa, is partially in response to a growing rivalry with China in Africa. I wonder if you can comment on that. But secondly, the Hiroshima Peacebuilding Center, initiated by Professor Hideaki Shinoda, a friend of Stimson, several years ago, support for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It’s a training program, as you know, to prepare the next generation of young professionals for a career track in the U.N. system, working in fragile, conflict-affected states. I’m wondering what you felt its strengths have been, but in addition, has it formed a convening role for the international community? And I’ll give you an example. I was with the peacebuilding support office when we held our first meeting of U.N. system peacebuilders from around the globe in Hiroshima, thanks to the hosting of the HPC, and it was a great interaction because we learned about Hiroshima and the support of the new training program in the Japanese government, and the young professionals got to interact with senior peacebuilders in the U.N. system. I was wondering if you felt it’s really reached full potential of what it could do both for young Japanese, career-minded officials who want to work on peacebuilding in their career, and secondly a broader role of convening power for Japan.

Takezawa: Thank you very much. They are both very important issues for Japan. So, regarding the second point that you mentioned – so, the peacebuilding, the peacebuilders initiative in Hiroshima – has it reached its full potential? I think that it is a very important effort and I think the effort in Japan is beginning to be known very widely. But I think still there’s – I think it hasn’t reached its full potential. I think there can be more that can be done. I think that – so, educating peacebuilders, I think this should be one of the key aspects that Japan needs to actually address in, say for example, TICAD, maybe, or in a
more broader peacebuilding policy. So this is an important effort and a lot of Japanese are becoming to
know this effort but the Japanese government, I think, should emphasize more – put more emphasis on
educating or training peacebuilders to meet international levels or expectations, the number itself. Why
I mention this is because there are many young Japanese currently who are willing to participate in
peacebuilding activities, you know, a lot of young Japanese actually want to take part in peacebuilding
activities, but the chances are still very limited, or Japanese youngsters still feel that the chances are
very limited. So I think Japan can address more in this aspect.

With regard to your second point, so, the rivalry issue, the broad role of the rivalry and Japan’s policy
towards Africa: yes, definitely I think Japan is conscious of, again, China’s growing commitment or
increasing commitment towards Africa. However, currently I don’t think there is a – there is a competing
nature, rivalry nature, but I don’t think there are actual – I’m not sure if problems or issues are the right
terms – but on the ground, I don’t think those things are current. Still I think the Japanese policies are
based on Japan’s genuine interests, and how Japan should contribute to the international arena. So, I
hope that answers your question.

**Doudou T. Soppi Ngoule:** My name is Soppi Ngoule. I’m a journalist from Africa [inaudible]. I come for
this conference because it was about Africa and Japan. So, first of all, I am surprised not to see enough
Africans in the room. Because [inaudible] and we have heard about Africa here. They are messy. As a
journalist, I have come here to cover a story about Africa and Japan’s policy. I’m going to take only two
examples. In Africa, we have a war going on with the Boko Haram, and I myself am from Cameroon, so
we are affected. I don’t know how far Japan is involved in this issue by solving or helping to solve the
problem, because I did enough research; I don’t really see too much of Japan in this thing, involving
Boko Haram or stuff in Cameroon. I’ve just come back from Nigeria, Cameroon. And secondly, I will be
curious to learn exactly what this program, Africa and Japan policy, have to offer to our country, our
common people in Africa. Thank you. Again, my name is journalist Soppi.

**Takezawa:** Thank you. Could you please kindly clarify your second point?

**Soppi Ngoule:** I was saying, when I see the Japan-Africa policy, I want to be curious, because I have a
story to write – what exactly this program offers, what you guys can offer? The Japan-Africa policy –
what is involved in that?

**Takezawa:** Okay, I understand. Thank you very much. Thank you very much for your questions. So, the
first point, is Japan directly involved in issues related to Boko Haram and other security issues in west
Africa? As far it’s concerned, Japan doesn’t have direct projects right now that is related to Boko Haram.
However, I think Japan does – Japan is promoting projects that – of developing security within Nigeria, I
think. So this is – and also, I think because Japan has regulations and limitations on the military
contributions that it can provide, it doesn’t – it isn’t providing direct support to counterterrorism issues.
However, Japan is focused on how to avoid or prevent people from becoming part of such groups. So for
example, providing vocational training, or some kind of training that may relate to people without jobs
to gaining jobs, or to better step up in their career. So this is a kind of – it’s not a direct effort but the
efforts that will prevent such issues or such problems from getting worse. So the second point that you
raised – so what is Japan actually going to provide through its policy towards Africa? So, the main pillar
for Japan’s policy towards Africa in the past has been official development assistance. This has definitely
been one of the main pillars. So what does Japan provide through this? Well, Japan provides loans,
grants, and capacity-building training. Also – but currently, Japan is providing, contributing to PKO
missions in South Sudan and towards anti-piracy missions. So I think Japan’s role in contributing to more
direct peacebuilding issues will increase in the near future. Thank you.
Soppi Ngoule: Thank you. May I ask, what about grants you guys give to help? Is that grant for war – for people, I guess, working in the war? What type of grant? You just speak about grants.

Takezawa: Okay, grants. So, if I was to give an example of what Japan does under grants, it would be mainly providing small scale infrastructure or small scale construction projects. So, for example, a more larger scale construction project would fall under loans. So for example, larger scale bridges, or highway roads, or large scale railways. So this would fall under loans. And why it falls under loans – well, Japan thinks that by giving loans, it enhances the motivation for African countries to – in order to pay the loans, they will make more effort, or in order to develop. And so that’s why – so this is the difference between loans and grants.

Soppi Ngoule: Okay, thank you.

Tatsumi: Ellen gets the last question.

Frost: I’m asking too many questions. On Yuki’s – Yuki Tatsumi’s point about governance and inequality: some NGOs are trying to go directly to the communities and bypass the government, but when you do that, you in fact nullify the political motivation, which might be to get the government to support the U.N., for example. So it’s a common dilemma. But the other topic I want to raise is, we haven’t talked at all about the U.S. as another outside actor. I couldn’t help but notice that the formation of TICAD coincided with Bill Clinton’s first year in office, right after the failure of the Structural Impediments Initiative, creating a huge tension, and the Clinton administration had also signaled they wanted to do more in Africa. So I find that as a positive motive. There’s nothing wrong with it. But in more recent times I’ve participated occasionally in conferences about better coordination between the U.S. and Japan in aid – Southeast Asia and elsewhere. And of course it’s almost impossible because our own aid programs – Americans here will confirm – just riddled with micromanagement and Congressional interference and all kinds of stuff. Japan would not want to be part of that by a long shot. In the field, I think there is some de facto coordination and a certain amount of lower-level dialogue, depending on the country, the U.N., UNICEF, or UNHDR, sometimes trying to coordinate not just the U.S. and Japan but other activities. I still think it could be a lot more sort of complementary projects. You mentioned follow-up work, and our typical aid contracts, some of them are really short-term, like six months to one year, and then the U.S. people pull out, but if that’s the kind of coordination, then we might be able to pursue it. And I just wondered what you thought of the U.S. as a player in this discussion.

Takezawa: Thank you very much. The U.S. certainly is a very important factor. And Japan is continually very – I’m not sure if concerned is the right word – but Japan is very focused on following what the U.S.’s policy is in Africa. So, Japan – so the U.S. policy, I think, has to some extent effect on Japan’s policy towards Africa. And the level of collaboration that is being carried out now – I think in, especially in the capacity-building projects, I think there are field-level cooperation that is being carried out, and currently I think, especially for post-conflict states or unstable states, to have very many donors or to have a large number of donors is – that itself takes a lot of effort to manage for receiving countries. So efforts to sort of minimize that kind of management problem for the receiving side I think is currently one of the discussions that is being carried out in the government. Thank you.

Tatsumi: Well, thank you very much. You certainly handled many wide-ranging questions from different corners, and I’d very much like to thank you for helping her further her thinking as she works toward the finished paper in a couple of months I hope. And you will definitely see her back here with three other authors on different angles of peacebuilding. So her piece on Africa is part of the larger compilation of the volume on what Japan has been doing in the area of peacebuilding, as its major foreign policy
priorities particularly under this current government. So with that, please stay tuned. We will send out notices for future events, and there are, I think, one more public one between now and the end of the year, and then we have a couple more coming in the early spring next year. So with that, thank you all very much for coming this afternoon.

Takezawa: Thank you very much.

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