Capacity for Anticipating, Planning and Managing Operations

To be able to do more than react to daily events, United Nations offices in the peace and security field need the ability to scan their environment; absorb, analyze, and share information; anticipate the direction of new work; and collaborate in the planning and execution of tasks that span the expertise of more than one department or agency. There have to be enough well-managed, well-trained people to get the job done when the work surges, and effective use of information and communications technologies. This section examines the implementation of the Brahimi Report’s recommendations in these vital areas.

3.1 Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Management

Any organization attempting to function in a global environment must be continuously aware of that environment to function effectively. The United Nations functions globally and its many constituent parts generate reporting streams from their slices of the environment on a daily or weekly basis. Information also floods in from the news media, think tanks, and private voluntary organizations working in areas that the United Nations cares about, including human rights, humanitarian relief, and political, social, and economic development. Many of these organizations operate in areas of recent, ongoing, or potential conflict.

Parts of the UN system collect and post valuable information on the World Wide Web. OCHA’s Internet site, Relief Web, provides outstanding service in that regard, as do its online information services for Afghanistan, Iraq, and other regions with humanitarian emergencies. Moreover, parts of the UN system produce very good—even courageous—analyses. Some of these are updated annually, like the UN Development Program’s Human Development Report, which indexes and rank-orders states’ achievements on a wide range of social and economic development measures. Others are one-time efforts, such as Secretary-General’s 1998 report on the causes of conflict and promotion of peace in Africa—which laid much responsibility at the feet of the region’s

1 UN OCHA Relief Web, see: www.reliefweb.int; Afghanistan Information Management System, see: www.hic.org.pk; and the Humanitarian Information Center for Iraq, see: www.agoodplacetostart.org.
national leaders—or the 2002 Arab Development Report, which addressed politically sensitive issues hindering human development in the Arab world.\(^2\)

Still, the political and security-focused elements of UN headquarters are not structured or equipped to rapidly and routinely meld, exploit, and learn from the social, economic, political, and other data that flow into the system. This is not for want of earlier attempts to do so, however. In the late 1980s, Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar created a small (fewer than six-person) Office for Research and Collection of Information, which had limited resources and rapidly withered. In the mid-1990s, the new Situation Center within DPKO had a small Intelligence and Research unit, staffed by gratis military officers, but it went away when the gratis officers left DPKO. In 1997, a report on reform of the Secretariat by Under-Secretary-General Marrack Goulding proposed an information unit much like what the Brahimi Panel would later propose, but his concept was not implemented.\(^3\)

### 3.1.1 The Arc of EISAS

To support UN conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts, to correlate and channel information to desk officers, and to extend the planning horizon for peace operations, the Brahimi Panel recommended the creation of a new office—the ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS). It was also intended to improve the Secretariat’s ability to provide well-grounded advice to the Security Council.

The Secretary-General supported this recommendation and detailed the structure and functions of EISAS in his first implementation report, proposing to hire 16 new staff and transfer 37 others to EISAS from elsewhere in the UN system. The staff as proposed would have had three primary functions: strategic planning and analysis; information management; and peacebuilding support.\(^4\)


The Security Council welcomed this innovation but the Special Committee reacted coolly, arguing to defer implementation and to use “existing resources” instead, resources that the Panel had characterized as wholly inadequate.  

The Secretariat tried a second time in 2001, halving the size of the proposed analytical staff. The Special Committee still counseled delay. Moreover, it urged that any existing in-house analytic capacity be used only to support current field missions as tasked by “mission leadership”—restrictions designed to cripple look-ahead planning and analysis.

EISAS drew suspicions, especially among members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Some may have feared that it would function as a selective conduit for national intelligence. Others may have worried that analyses highlighting risks of internal conflict or instability might raise the risk of military intervention or other threats to their sovereignty, even if EISAS based its work only on open-source materials. In any event, member states agreed to support only the element that would support the meetings of the ECPS (one Director-level post, one professional staff member, and one support post), reporting to the Under-Secretary-General of DPA.

Thus, the United Nations still has no single, co-located team dedicated to managing information, tracking multiple crisis and conflict trends, recommending preventive action based on those trends, or anticipating global UN requirements for either peacekeeping or peacebuilding. Without an effort from member states, status quo political interests will easily block formation of so visible an analytic capability. Yet the proliferation of information networks, the evolution of DPKO’s Best Practices Unit and its Situation Center as information resource hubs, outreach efforts by DPA (see section 3.3.2.4), and the growing number of headquarters personnel with field experience may permit

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5 A/55/305, paras. 65-74; A/C.4/55/6, para. 13; and S/RES/1327 (2000), para. 3a. In general, developed states tended to favor EISAS while developing states’ reactions were mixed.


7 There is a long and not very glorious history of some member states using their nationals within the Secretariat during the Cold War to collect intelligence on one another, giving characterizations of the UN as a “glass house” more than architectural meaning, and notwithstanding the effective prohibition on such activities contained in Article 100 of the UN Charter. The UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) had access to member state intelligence and allegations of its co-optation for intelligence-gathering purposes may have reinforced concerns in some quarters about how EISAS might function. For discussion, see Susan Wright, “The hijacking of UNSCOM,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, v. 55, no. 4 (July/August 1999). Available online at: www.thebulletin.org/issues/1999/mj99/mj99wright.html
some of the objectives of EISAS to be met in a virtual form, with widely-dispersed people using a few common data libraries and common reporting and analysis criteria to share operations-relevant data and analyses that are timely and useful to decision makers and implementers alike.

### 3.1.2 Peacekeeping Best Practices

Upgrading and revitalizing DPKO’s ability to learn from its field experience, to retain that knowledge in its institutional memory, and to make use of it to improve doctrine, planning, procedures, and operations, was a low-key but essential recommendation of the Brahimi Report.\(^8\) The activities of DPKO’s small “lessons learned” unit had been funded since the mid-1990s largely by outside money (e.g., voluntary state contributions or foundation grants). Its mission reports were largely written long after the fact and there was no mechanism to capture and share best practices within DPKO, or within missions, let alone between headquarters and field, or between missions directly.

The rapid advance of information technology offered an opportunity to change that situation radically, if (a) the proper tools were developed to record, compile, share and, as needed, shield the source(s) of contributions to the system, and (b) management were committed to turning DPKO and its operations into learning organizations. These tasks are not easy for a private company and even harder for an international bureaucracy, because best practices have their counterpart in worst practices, some of which can be laid at the feet of troop contributing countries and the personnel they have contributed to UN operations. It is very difficult for the Secretariat to criticize member states by name (though not impossible).\(^9\) Despite the intense interest of DPKO Under-Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the effort to revolutionize the work of the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit (PBPU) took more than two years and several rotations in staff.

By early 2003, however, the unit was under newly appointed and field-experienced leadership, and is to have nine professional staff, including advisers on DDR and on gender issues in conflict and peace operations.\(^10\) In 2003, the

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\(^8\) A/55/305, paras. 229-230.

\(^9\) Good examples of naming names include Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35: The fall of Srebrenica, A/54/549, 15 November 1999; Report of the independent inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, 15 December 1999; and Note by the President of the Security Council, Final report of the monitoring mechanism on Angola sanctions, S/2000/1225, 21 December 2000.

\(^10\) UN General Assembly, Budget for the support account for peacekeeping operations for 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004, Report of the [ACABQ], A/57/776, 4 April 2003, para. 31.
PBPU began to build the kind of knowledge network for peace operations that the Brahimi Report advocated, within the larger UN framework for information and communications technology and applications. Objectives included compilation of lessons learned case studies from missions in Sierra Leone, Bosnia, Timor Leste, and Ethiopia-Eritrea; compilation of best practices in key functional areas (corrections, police, rule of law, military planning, and mission evacuation); completion of a *Handbook on Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations*; creation of a reference guide for desk officers in the Office of Operations (still the most traditionalist element of DPKO); and training modules for DDR and gender mainstreaming.\(^{11}\)

The PBPU will assemble these best practices documents, together with other resource materials (for example, standard operating procedures, briefing materials, seminar reports, and country studies), into a searchable electronic database that will serve, along with a library of hardcopy materials, as a Resource Center for headquarters, field missions, member states, other UN agencies, regional organizations, and academic and training institutions worldwide. The database will also contain contact information—searchable by name, region, activities, or keyword—for field missions and DPKO’s various “peacekeeping partners,” and for research and training organizations with interests in peacekeeping, giving background information on each.\(^{12}\)

When operational, the Resource Center will represent a major step toward the global information connectivity that the Brahimi Report strongly emphasized.

### 3.1.3 Information Networks

The Brahimi Report urged the UN to address serious gaps in strategies, policies and practices regarding information technology (IT) for peace operations. More effective use of IT, the Panel argued, would be crucial to efficient implementation of many of the Report’s other recommendations. Key elements included the creation of IT responsibility centers within DPKO and in the missions; common headquarters and field access to information (such as databases, analyses and lessons learned) through a global Peace Operations

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\(^{11}\) “Gender mainstreaming is a strategy that emphasizes the importance of considering the contributions of both women and men, as well as the differential impact of activities on women and men, in all sectors, including peace support activities.” The emphasis derives from “the significant contributions of women to peace processes and the ways in which women and men, and girls and boys are affected differently by armed conflict and its aftermath.” UN General Assembly, *Gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping activities*, Report of the Secretary-General, A/57/731, 13 February 2003.

Extranet; more extensive use of geographic information systems (GIS) technology; and co-management of mission websites by headquarters and field missions (co-management has since been implemented).

### 3.1.3.1 Responsibility Centers for IT Strategy

Although DPKO had developed and fielded cutting edge systems for global communications and did reasonably well at wiring up field missions, DPKO software applications served the IT and logistics support community almost exclusively. The support services had enough people and energy to define and support their own needs but not enough to survey or support the needs of the substantive/policy offices, either at headquarters or in the field. Nor did the substantive offices have much sense of what IT could or should do for them. Thus the Report recommended that a headquarters-based responsibility center—a chief information officer (CIO)—supervise the development and implementation of IT strategy and user standards, and that counterpart positions be established in the head offices of each mission, to oversee implementation of these standards.

DPKO has taken up this recommendation and its new director of change management will also serve as chief information officer for the department, identifying IT needs and setting priorities for meeting them. The Communications and Information Technology Service (CITS) in the Office of Mission Support is the focal point for developing and implementing DPKO’s Information Technology Strategic Plan, and for building and maintaining the information and communications networks that link headquarters and field offices. DPKO’s IT plan is part of a larger UN effort to devise and implement a global IT strategy, with common equipment standards and protocols that will enable information sharing and collaboration throughout the system.

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13 A/55/305, paras. 246-263.
14 A/55/305, paras. 247-251.
15 A/C.5/55/46/Add.1, paras. 5.3 and 5.7. ACABQ would like to review this post in 2004, on the grounds that management changes ought to be complete by then, while the Special Committee supports a permanent post. A/56/478, paras. 25-28; and A/56/863, para. 62.
16 A/C.5/55/46/Add. 1, paras. 5.91-5.93; and A/56/478, para. 52.
Results regarding the recommendation to create leadership-level IT responsibility centers in each field mission are muddier. Every operation has had electronics and communications technical staff in its administrative branch but it is unclear whether missions also have the sort of high-level direction that the Report envisioned to guide substantive applications of IT (to DDR program tracking, human rights investigations, police records, census-taking, or voter registration, for example, as opposed to budget and finance, personnel management, logistics, and property management).

3.1.3.2 Enhanced Intranet/Extranet Connectivity

The UN Department of Management’s Information Technology Services Division (ITSD) will develop and manage a UN-wide Extranet in consultation with users (including DPKO) and will connect it to the existing UN intranet. Six new posts within ITSD were approved to support connection of peacekeeping missions to this network.\(^18\)

Connecting peacekeeping missions to the UN’s Integrated Management Information System (IMIS) has been a priority, and IMIS itself is undergoing major re-engineering that is long overdue. Development of the system began in the late 1980s, under contract to the U.S. accounting firm Price-Waterhouse, to handle personnel, pay, procurement, and financial data for the Secretariat. As a “batch-processing” system, it could not update its records in real time; instead, this was done overnight. Since IMIS servers are situated in New York and Geneva, UN offices worldwide that did have access to IMIS could conduct business with it only during New York or Geneva office hours, depending on which servers they used. Until 2002, peace operations lacked access to IMIS altogether, meaning that DPKO of necessity developed its own personnel and financial applications for use in the field, connected them to headquarters via Lotus Notes, and eventually re-keyed the data into IMIS. Other UN offices did the same, keeping books in more efficient software and manually transferring it to IMIS when necessary, making IMIS the software that UN staff loved to hate.\(^19\)

Major changes in IMIS are in train, however, with the current UN information and communications technology strategy. Changes include a new database architecture and a re-engineered user interface with Web-based access,

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\(^{18}\) A/55/780, paras. 33-34 and 50; A/56/885, paras. 106-07; A/56/941, paras. 37 and 39; and A/RES/56/293, para. 4. An Extranet is a data network to which multiple, widely dispersed user nodes are connected and that all users can access in common via password or comparable security measure. An Extranet may join together several intranets—self-contained, access-controlled local networks.

\(^{19}\) Interviews, UN offices, New York and Geneva, April-May 2000; and A/57/620, table 1.1.
which, when completed, will leave only the name of the system unaltered. Global, 24-hour, Web-based access to IMIS, as presently planned, would remedy the system’s most costly limitations and give UN missions and offices around the world as-needed, when-needed access to the system.

By the end of 2002, IMIS had been made available to five peace operations (Cyprus, Lebanon, Kosovo, Guatemala, and the UN Truce Supervisory Organization) and to the UN Logistics Base (UNLB) at Brindisi, Italy, via virtual private network (VPN), a two-way encrypted data link that allows a remote user to interact with a centrally-located program as though they were a local user. 20 Next steps include 24-hour remote access to IMIS by UN offices worldwide and secure, Web-based access via the extranet. Web access will make things easier for technicians and users alike because there is no need to construct a special communications link, as is the case with VPN. Because the Web sends images together with text, users will require much greater data transmission capacity (or “bandwidth”) than with VPN. 21 Extending IMIS Web access to the field may therefore require greater investment in satellite transponders and ground links. 22

Beyond IMIS, field missions will be able to connect to a wide variety of data and applications via the extranet, and to each other. UN and departmental guidelines and procedures manuals, posted to the extranet, will facilitate delegation of authority to the field in hiring, personnel management, and procurement (the manual of standard operating procedures for personnel, for example, went online in mid-January 2003). 23 The online best practices resource center will give UN personnel access not only to historical lessons learned but also to colleagues doing the same jobs in other missions, for peer advice on common problems in near-real-time.

In late 2001, the General Assembly significantly reduced funding for IT projects in the 2002-2003 UN regular budget, delaying many of the above


21 Interview, UN Information and Communications Technology Board, 17 March 2003.

22 DPKO maintains a satellite antenna farm at Brindisi, Italy, that can link UN headquarters in New York with far-flung peacekeeping missions, via line of sight communications to satellites over the Atlantic, Africa, and the Indian Ocean that in turn have line of sight links to UN field missions in Latin America, Africa, and Central, South, and Southeast Asia.

improvements. The 2004-2005 budget request, to be considered by the General Assembly at its 58th session in fall 2003, seeks a substantial increase for information technology support to make up the shortfall. Even with that boost, the UN would be spending, proportionately, only about half as much on IT as a comparable institution such as the World Bank.  

3.1.3.3 Better Use of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Technology

GIS allows information from a large number of sources to be mixed with geographic data to create maps that are powerful tools for peace operations. Specific field applications of GIS include border monitoring, demobilization, civilian policing, voter registration, human rights monitoring, refugee return, and reconstruction. Although the Secretariat and UN inter-governmental bodies embraced better use of GIS, they disagreed on specific staffing and restructuring needs.

In the first round of implementation, the S-G proposed that the Cartographic Section—purveyor of maps and producer of GIS products for the UN system—be moved out of the Department of Public Information (DPI) into EISAS. With EISAS unimplemented, the decision was made to move the section into DPKO’s Situation Center. The General Assembly approved the move in December 2002.

DPKO has also sought to establish a geographic information system Unit within its Engineering Service that would tailor GIS applications for peace operations; coordinate geographic analysis requirements in DPKO; collect, evaluate and disseminate geographic information on peace operations; and prepare GIS-related elements of policies, guidelines and standard operating procedures. The ACABQ put the request on hold, however, pending the outcome of GIS pilot programs underway in UNMEE, UNAMSIL, and MONUC that were to be completed by the end of 2002.

24 UN General Assembly, Proposed programme budget for the biennium 2004-2005, Section 29D, Office of Central Support Services, A/58/6 (Sect. 29D), 18 March 2003, table 29D.11; and A/57/620, paras. 87-90. The Secretariat spends about five percent of its regular budget on IT. The World Bank spends about 11 percent.


UNMEE, for example, has a Geographic Cell that supports the mission as well as the local Mine Action Coordination Center. The Coordination Center in turn has used GIS to conduct landmine impact surveys, document de-mining, plan transport routes for food and water supply for returning refugees, and to support UNMEE itself.27

This project has given impetus to the concept of mission headquarters-based “Joint GeoCells” that would draw on geographic information resources from UN headquarters in New York and in the field, interacting with the proposed Geographic Information System Unit at DPKO, as well as other providers and users of geographic-based information. As conceived in the UNMEE pilot project, the Joint GeoCell is the field-based focal point for all geographic information needs of the peacekeeping mission, providing data to troops, military observers and CivPol and training peacekeepers to use GIS for their daily duties. Such a cell could also support Humanitarian Information Centers comparable to the center set up in Kosovo in conjunction with UNMIK, as well as other UN agencies and NGOs in a mission area. Future plans include locating a GIS center in a Rapid Deployment Facility such as UNLB.28

3.1.3.4 Better IT Planning and Support for CivPol and Human Rights

Recognizing that certain mission components, such as CivPol, criminal justice units and human rights investigators have special needs for secure information technology, the Panel recommended that more attention be paid to meeting those needs.29 Some headway has been made. The Civilian Police Division now has an information management and roster development officer who will develop the unique IT policies and tools needed by CivPol, and will put together the stand-by arrangements and roster system to enable rapid deployment of CivPol (see section 4.5).30 However, OHCHR failed to get the


29 A/55/305, para. 257.

30 UN General Assembly, Resource requirements for implementation of the report of the Panel on United
personnel that it sought to implement a standardized knowledge management system and extranet access for human rights data gathered in peace operations.31

### 3.2 Integrated Mission Task Forces

UN offices outside DPKO interviewed by Brahimi Panel staff often felt excluded from planning for peace operations, consulted at the margins. Within DPKO, the logisticians, communication and transport planners in the Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD) complained that desk officers in the Office of Operations—who drafted the mandates for Security Council approval—provided too few details for FALD to build a mission and had only the haziest notion of what was involved in sending people, vehicles, food, water, communications equipment and computers to a mission area and making it all work. The desk officers in turn argued they were too stretched for such excursions into the “weeds.” DPKO’s capable Military Planning Service knew that complex UN field operations needed heavy civil-military cooperation, but saw little high-end civilian planning capacity to cooperate with. Thus, what DPKO called mission task forces, pre-Brahimi, were generally ad hoc groupings that met infrequently, and were used as sounding boards by desk officers, not as joint decision-making teams. Contact points for the field in substantive areas were, moreover, scattered around DPKO, the Secretariat, and the larger UN system.

The Brahimi Report argued that missions needed one place that answered all their questions, an “entity that includes all of the backstopping people and expertise for the mission, drawn from an array of headquarters elements that mirrors the functions of the mission itself. The Panel would call that entity an Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF).” Indeed, “the notion of integrated, one-stop support for United Nations peace-and-security field activities should extend across the whole range of peace operations,” to include political and peacebuilding missions, “with the size, substantive composition, meeting venue and leadership matching the needs of the operation.”32 The notion was that task force members from different parts of DPKO, DPA, and OCHA, as well as the

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31 That data would have been linked with the HURICANE (Human Rights Computerized Analysis Environment) information system. A/55/507/Add.1, paras. 22.8-22.23; A/55/676, paras. 78 and 80; A/C.5/55/46/Add. 1, paras. 22.2, 22.10-13, 22.31, and 22.34; and A/56/478, paras. 67-72.

UN’s family of humanitarian and development agencies, would be brought together when an operation seemed imminent to begin advance planning. They would work together, be joined by a new mission’s senior leadership, make critical decisions on behalf of their departments and agencies, and be the initial central point of contact for a new field mission once it began to deploy. The IMTF would be a one-stop shop for strategic guidance, operational plans, and field queries on all mission-related subjects.

The concept proved popular and the SG’s implementation reports endorsed it. The 2001 comprehensive review endorsed it. The Special Committee and Security Council both endorsed it. Implementation has proven to be at least as difficult as anticipated, however, as illustrated by the work of the IMTF for the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA; see sidebar 6) in late 2001-early 2002. An IMTF for Liberia that was formed in the summer of 2003 attracted a large number of participants (too many: upwards of 50), but again devolved into a briefing and discussion format.

DPKO instead chaired a Liberia Working Group that shared many of the participants and attributes of an IMTF, but not the label. Participants from DPKO, UNHCR, UNDP, OCHA, and the office of the SRSG for West Africa participated in daily afternoon meetings of the working group. Although efforts to draft a joint “strategy” for Liberia failed to produce an integrated product, the group fared better in laying out a concept of operations for UNMIL and working out differences between military and police division concepts. Chaired at the Director level with membership from the upper level professional staff, the working group fed into daily meetings of DPKO senior management and decisions taken by the Assistant Secretary-General who runs DPKO’s Office of Operations. As such, the working group is an augmented version of the old concept of cooperation, helping DPKO rather than managing UN-wide contributions to mission planning. If used consistently, however, with multi-agency participation, it will at least increase the flow of current information to UN elements outside DPKO who contribute to or work closely in parallel with DPKO, but in the end it works to reinforce the primacy of traditional decision-making channels. It may be that the updated “lead department” concept—the UN equivalent of “lead nation” in coalition military operations—used by the Liberia Working Group is as good as it gets in terms of systemwide UN mission planning. On the other hand, an IMTF for a looming UN peace operation in Sudan, chaired by DPA, had just been set up as this study went to press, suggesting that the Panel’s concept has life in it yet.
DPKO has also experienced problems internally with its departmental Integrated Mission Planning Process, which was to promote a common mission planning effort among political desk officers, military and police planners, and logisticians. The same problem that afflicted the Afghanistan and later IMTFs besets this DPKO initiative: how to resolve issues upward in a system that traditionally does so through a single chain of decision makers rather than collective decision-making at successively higher levels.

Finally, working mission leadership into the planning process at an early stage has proven difficult. When it has happened, it has suffered from the same tendency to channel all decisions through the designated leader rather than to delegate authority for solving pieces of the problem. Without such delegation, a
new SRSG cannot lead mission planning and stay engaged in the larger peace process and engage potential contributors to the operation simultaneously. He or she must be willing to trust one or more of these areas to others most of the time. The more dynamic the SRSG (good for gaining and maintaining an edge on the ground), the more easily frustrated with joint planning and more likely to circumvent the formal process with ad hoc fixes drawing on personal networks and relationships. What looks and feels tactically effective to the leader can, however, make the larger tasks of mission set-up that much harder to accomplish.

To be a more authoritative decision-maker or the universal point of contact at headquarters for the field, as the Panel envisaged, IMTFs need more senior representation and access to an appeals process that engages UN decision-makers collectively, at successively higher levels, for authoritative choices and to resolve disagreements that rise up from the working level. Without such backup, any serious point of disagreement within an IMTF could dissolve into a fight over whose higher-ups get to be the stovepipe of last resort.

3.3 REBUILDING THE UN SECRETARIAT

Brilliant folks can make a dysfunctional system work. Average people can make a well-structured system work. We have to aim to enable average folks to do good jobs under trying circumstances by giving them support structures and procedures that help them do their jobs.33

From the late 1940s through the mid-1990s, UN headquarters support for peacekeeping operations was the job of a relative handful of bright and increasingly hardworking people. The job of planning and support became more complex along with the operations themselves. There was never quite enough time in between fighting fires to compile the guidelines, set down the lessons, find the best people, or design the best structures and processes in which to work. Old tasks and priorities (keeping member states’ New York missions happy and tending to the wants and needs of the intergovernmental bodies) tended to overshadow new ones (like meeting field missions’ needs). For too long as well, field mission personnel were treated like “temps” by the permanent staff. Rarely did headquarters seek their advice on policy matters or consult them on how missions ought to be structured or run. A cable to missions during the research phase of the Brahimi process, which asked them to relate the three best and three worst things about their situations and what they would change to

33 Interview, UN, New York, 19 April 2000.
make things better, was the first time that headquarters had ever solicited field input in such a concerted and open-ended manner.

Since then, the interaction between field and headquarters has become much more two-way, with field leaders brought in periodically for consultation and training, and with desk officers and field managers swapping duties for three months in order to experience each other’s problems first-hand. Now more field-experienced people are serving in headquarters posts, and the restructuring and growth underway for nearly three years have enabled DPKO in particular to strive for the kind of excellence and efficiency that might eventually allow it to effectively plan and support field operations with relatively fewer people: Good
people working in a well-managed environment with increasing help from smart technology.

In this section, we look at how the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has been restructured and expanded since the Brahimi Report was released. We then look more briefly at the Department of Political Affairs before addressing the issues of management culture and long-term sustainability of the headquarters capacity that has been built, post-Brahimi.

### 3.3.1 Building Up the Department of Peacekeeping Operations

One of the greatest challenges is to develop and sustain a sufficiently large, highly professional headquarters staff for peacekeeping operations. In early 1999, with UN peacekeeping operations at one-fourth the level of their mid-nineties peaks, member states argued that the number of support staff in New York should shrink proportionately. DPKO had only partially convinced the ACABQ to fill the voids left by departing gratis officers when the new missions began to arrive in mid-1999 and two of them (Kosovo and East Timor) had a higher ratio of civilians to troops and many more police than UN peace operations of the past. Recruiting and deploying civilians is headquarters labor-intensive, as they are hired, transported, trained, paid, and rotated out one at a time by DPKO. While paramilitary police come as national units, the bulk of UN police components are built a few officers at a time. Staffing and supporting these two missions alone argued for more people in DPKO and, in December 1999, the General Assembly approved 67 new support account posts for DPKO. In the spring and summer of 2000, as the Brahimi Report was being written, most of these posts were still being filled.

The Panel recommended a substantial increase in UN headquarters support for peacekeeping operations, urging the SG to submit proposals to the General Assembly for both emergency funding and longer-term support. *Table 4* summarizes five years of changes in headquarters staff support for peace operations. Numbers are broken out by department and, within DPKO, by office. DPKO has undergone some degree of reorganization every year since 1997, especially in the areas of lessons learned/best practices, in administrative and logistical support, and in military and civilian police planning and support, as reflected in the changing titles of those offices. (For an organizational diagram, see Appendix E). Overall, DPKO gained 191 posts.
Table 4: UN Secretariat Personnel Changes, 1997-2003

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<td>Exec Ofc of the Secretary-General</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Service</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


2 Planning Division (1997-98); Military and Civilian Police Division (1999-00), Military Division (2001+)

3 Civilian Police Unit (thru 2000); Civilian Police Division (2001+)
3.3.1.1 The Office of Operations

DPKO’s Office of Operations is home to the desk officers who are the department’s primary mission managers once an operation has deployed. They field political queries and provide guidance in return. When the Brahimi Report was written, Operations had 19 desk officers to cover 15 operations and virtually all worked without backup. One of the puzzles at the time was why DPKO desk officers could not or did not draw more upon the expertise of counterparts in the Department of Political Affairs. Interviews suggested that DPKO personnel viewed their DPA counterparts as slow to respond or insufficiently versed in up to the minute details on the country of interest. DPA officers found their DPKO counterparts unreceptive to advice, protective of turf, and thus unwilling to share the load.

With 17 new posts now assigned to its regional divisions, effectively doubling the number of desk officers, Operations has been able to create sub-regional teams whose members can, to some extent, back each other up. Plans to move DPKO and DPA regional offices physically closer to one another have run afoul of the Secretariat’s office space constraints and, at the top, Operations remains reluctant to participate fully in the program of reform underway within DPKO, especially as it relates to changing the management culture of the department, an issue to which we return shortly.

3.3.1.2 The Office of Mission Support

The Office of Mission Support (OMS) contains the Administrative Support Division and the Logistics Support Division, the dividends from splitting the old Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD), as recommended in the Brahimi Report. In March 1998, FALD had 135 professional staff (69 UN and 66 gratis) plus 111 support staff. In July 1999, it had 100 UN professional staff and no gratis, for a net loss of 35 percent over 15 months despite hiring. By mid-2002, FALD’s two successor divisions in OMS had 198 professional staff and 155 support staff, 43 percent larger than at the start of the gratis purge and able to better handle their workloads within normal office hours. Within OMS, the Administrative Support Division had new elements to manage online recruiting of personnel, civilian training, and career development, while the Logistics Support Division had an upgraded communications and information technology service, enhanced support for geographic information systems, and had embarked upon building the Strategic Deployment Stocks at Brindisi. The Panel had also recommended more extensive use of the UN Office for Project Services
(UNOPS)\textsuperscript{34} to support smaller peacebuilding missions and to relieve demand on the FALD and DPA. While discussions were reported by the SG, there is little evidence of efforts to implement this idea, which may have been overtaken by other measures, such as FALD and DPKO reorganization and the agreement between DPA and DPKO on management of complex and political missions.\textsuperscript{35}

### 3.3.1.3 The Military and Civilian Police Divisions

Civilian police personnel were, until 2001, in the same division as most of DPKO’s military officers, but for clarity table 5 counts them separately in all years. The military staff has grown the most in percentage terms, from seven UN professional staff and 25 gratis officers in 1998, to 42 UN professionals in 2000 (32 of them serving military officers but on the UN payroll), and 63 professionals in 2002. Funded CivPol staff have similarly increased from one professional in 1998, to nine in 2000, to twenty in 2002, now in their own division, together with the two-person Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Unit. The Brahimi Report recommendation for a rule of law unit in DPKO contemplated more than two persons and the SG’s initial implementation report sought six posts: four professional and two support.

### Table 5: Comparisons of DPKO Military and Civilian Police Staffing in 2000 and 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Respective Strengths in mid-2000 (Brahimi Report, Table 4.2)*</th>
<th>Respective Strengths as of 30 September 2003</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military personnel</td>
<td>Civilian police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In peacekeeping operations</td>
<td>27,365</td>
<td>8,641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorized at headquarters</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters-to-field ratio</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Authorized military strength as of 15 June 2000 and civilian police as of 1 August 2000.

\textsuperscript{34} A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 241. UNOPS is a self-supporting spin-off of the UN Development Program with a business model more like the private sector than the typical international organization that provided considerable support to UNTAET in East Timor.

\textsuperscript{35} A/55/977, annex C, 65.
3.3.1.4 A Third Assistant Secretary-General for DPKO

The Report recommended that the General Assembly consider the appointment of a third Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) for DPKO. The S-G’s first and second implementation reports both proposed this new position to oversee and coordinate the work of the military and civilian police divisions, which otherwise report directly to an Under-Secretary-General who has many responsibilities other than divisional management. The Special Committee reacted coolly, however, “unconvinced of the exact role of new ASG” (although that role was plain enough) and not wanting “to see the role of the Military Advisor or of the Civilian Police Advisor diminished.”

Troop and police contributors, in other words, wished to maintain direct access to the Under-Secretary-General of DPKO through the directors of these divisions. The S-G subsequently dropped the third ASG from his August 2001 request for posts.

The Panel’s proposed designation of a “principal ASG” within DPKO who could “function as deputy to the Under-Secretary-General” was intended as a compromise between those who wanted to appoint a “Deputy Under-Secretary-General” (the United States) or a “Chief of Staff” for the department (the United Kingdom), and others leery of a possible attempt to wrest day-to-day control of DPKO away from its French Under-Secretary-General. Although, within UN headquarters, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has a “Deputy to the Under-Secretary-General,” and such positions are common in other UN agencies, funds, and programs, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations had for some months been pressing other member states to support the concept of a Deputy in DPKO. The U.S. officials had an American in mind for the post, and this generated lasting political resistance. In the end, the ASG for Operations, a long-serving, senior, and non-American official was named “principal ASG,” but for the first time an American was named ASG for Mission Support, overseeing 60 percent of DPKO’s personnel, financial, personnel, logistics, and communications support functions. That job has now transitioned to a second American, establishing a trend and defining it, in the time-honored UN tradition, as an “American post.”

3.3.2 Revitalizing the Department of Political Affairs

As part of then-Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali’s first attempt at structural reform of the UN Secretariat, DPA was assembled in 1993 from bits of the Secretariat that had been set up years, even decades earlier to cater to niche interests of various blocs of states. Although many of these offices were disestablished in the merger that produced DPA, the political sensitivity of the

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process was highlighted by the initial appointment of two Under-Secretaries-General to run it: one to manage Africa-focused work and the other to deal with the rest of the world. The department’s political heritage also shows in the continued allocation of 16 professional posts to the Division of Palestinian Rights, more than are assigned to any of its four regional divisions, which have 50 professionals altogether. DPA also manages the Security Council Affairs Division, which has 50 interpreters, translators, meeting managers, and archivists to support the work of the Council and to maintain its records. In short, DPA operates on several different political and functional levels simultaneously, making it harder to promote the kind of unity of effort that DPKO is trying to achieve in planning and supporting peace operations.

Detailed assessment of DPA is largely absent from the Brahimi Report; lack of time precluded a more thorough analysis and recommendations, and through the entire Brahimi implementation process, 1999–2003, DPA received only two additional posts. Yet DPA’s overall workload has grown substantially over that period, supporting, for example, increased numbers of fact-finding missions, UN special representatives and special political missions. The Report did look at aspects of DPA, however, including two specific elements, the pilot Peacebuilding Unit and the Electoral Assistance Division. Subsequent efforts have spelled out more clearly the division of labor between DPA and DPKO, and offered recommendations for revitalizing the department. Even with this effort, DPA could benefit from an outside management review comparable to that given to DPKO in 2001.

3.3.2.1 The Peacebuilding Unit

As conceived in the late 1990s, a Peacebuilding Unit (PBU) in DPA would assist mission planning and support for peacekeeping operations, peacebuilding support offices, special political missions and peacemaking/diplomatic activities. It would also build and maintain a peacebuilding information system and establish contacts for the department with academic institutions and research centers. Initially denied regular budget funding in 1999, DPA elicited donations in 2000 from several member states for a pilot implementation with a director, three professional and three support staff.

37 Interview, DPA, August 2003, citing OIOS Consulting Engagement for DPA, June 1999–March 2000. The number of special envoys or representatives increased, for example, from 29 in 1997 to more than 50 in 2002; of these, DPA supported about 22.

38 A/55/977, paras. 301-302 and 306.
The Brahimi Report recommended that another effort be made to secure regular budget funding if the pilot program worked. The PBU’s launch was complicated when the S-G’s first Brahimi implementation report proposed incorporating it into EISAS. When EISAS was deferred, DPA worked to re-establish the PBU as a freestanding entity within the department, seeking the requisite ACABQ approval for an extra-budgetary, director-level (D-1) post to head it. In May 2002, the ACABQ said no. DPA continues to assess its options, with interest from some donors, to create an in-house capacity to focus on peacebuilding.

3.3.2.2 The Electoral Affairs Division

The Brahimi Panel recommended more secure funding for DPA’s Electoral Assistance Division (EAD). EAD provides technical advice on electoral matters at the request of member states. Most of its operational funding comes from a heavily earmarked trust fund (that is, donors specify how it is to be used). In 2000, owing to limited staff and its largely voluntary, largely inflexible funding, EAD had a substantial number of unmet requests for assistance and demand for its services was growing. The Panel recommended that it be enlarged and that funding be provided from the regular budget “in lieu of” voluntary contributions to provide more reliable support. The Secretary-General agreed with the Panel that EAD needed a “more secure footing” to respond to demands for electoral support, and sought two more regular budget posts for it. The ACABQ approved the posts, together with roughly $204,000 for electoral consultants and travel for use in 2000 and 2001.

EAD received no additional regular budget posts in either the 2002-2003 regular budget or proposals for 2004-2005. It estimates steady demand for its services from member states: 22-23 requests per year, with a carry-over of nine or ten per year that cannot be met. To help reduce that unmet demand, EAD sought a 26 percent increase in travel and consulting support for 2004-2005. Nevertheless, the Panel’s recommendation that regular budget support replace voluntary funding has not been implemented.

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39 A/55/502, para. 47.
40 Only eight percent of its operational funding was not earmarked. A/55/305, para. 242.
41 A/55/502, para. 143; A/55/507/Add.1, paras. 3.30-3.35; and A/55/676, para. 26.
42 A/58/6 (Sect. 3), 16-18.
3.3.2.3 DPA and DPKO

DPA, over the years, has been asked repeatedly by the General Assembly to differentiate itself more clearly from DPKO. For awhile, that became more difficult to do, as the department became more “operational,” supporting, managing, and promoting the establishment of special political missions, especially following much larger DPKO-managed operations. At the same time, DPKO guarded its role as principal political adviser to those operations and as principal UN interlocutor with member states who raised questions about them.

In a recent interdepartmental memorandum of understanding, DPA has agreed to be more political and less operational and DPKO has agreed to dial down its political role and to focus on running operations. This arrangement is reflected in the decision, announced in October 2002, that UN peacebuilding operations managed by DPA in Angola and Afghanistan would, henceforth, be managed by DPKO—despite the lack of troops or any significant number of police in either mission.43 This agreement is largely being implemented and has helped to ensure mutual support, for example, by drawing DPKO representatives into ongoing peace negotiations.

3.3.2.4 Other Structural Issues and Opportunities

DPA is the closest analog within the United Nations to a foreign affairs ministry. However, the UN lacks embassies to generate political reporting from the field, although DPA does have reporting from special political missions. DPA desk officers have too few opportunities for familiarization visits to their countries of responsibility or to serve in the field (although some have prior experience in peace operations). DPA lacks a research department and some states are, in any case, “suspicious of UN staff seeking certain types of information.”44 EISAS would have filled the role of research department but ran afoul of some of the same suspicions. DPA’s Policy Planning Unit has, however, begun to build a support network outside the UN system to enhance its capacity and meet some of these research needs.

DPA could still benefit from better internal sharing and central archiving of information, as its institutional memory now tends to rest with individual desk officers. A department-wide policy on utilization of outside information sources

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43 The dividing line between DPA and DPKO responsibility will be the “complexity” of a mission, the definition of which will be decided case by case by the two departments’ respective Under-Secretaries-General.

and experts and sharing the results of such contacts would benefit analysts who appear not to be encouraged to establish them yet are expected to function as authorities on their assigned countries.\textsuperscript{45}

In an interview-based analysis of DPA, Elizabeth Sellwood has argued that, within its current budget, structure, and mandate, DPA could also improve its day-to-day functioning by giving its analysts responsibility for maintaining the UN’s \textit{strategic} perspective on countries with major peace operations underway (which DPKO desk officers caught up in crisis management may not be able to do); by creating a “record of experts within the UN system” that desk officers would know to tap; and by bringing field staff into policy deliberations via email and the creation of a “thinking network.” Sellwood also stresses the need to deal with bureaucratic instincts that tend to fear the political ramifications of seeking knowledge more than they value the results of attaining it.\textsuperscript{46}

\textbf{3.3.3 Changing the Management Culture}

Toward the end of its report, the Brahimi Panel warned that a serious change in UN culture would be needed to sustain the reforms it had recommended. It observed that:

The United Nations is far from being a meritocracy today, and unless it takes steps to become one it will not be able to reverse the alarming trend of qualified personnel, the young among them in particular, leaving the Organization. . . . Unless managers at all levels, beginning with the Secretary-General and his senior staff, seriously address this problem on a priority basis, reward excellence and remove incompetent staff, additional resources will be wasted and lasting reform will become impossible.\textsuperscript{47}

Early in the implementation process, DPKO’s top leadership changed; thereafter, changing the management culture and how the department works and relates to field operations and other parts of the UN system became as important as adding staff and altering the organization chart. During his first two years as Under-Secretary-General, Jean Marie Guéhenno has pressed for these more fundamental changes, first within DPKO and then in the field operations themselves. After several runs at the funding bodies, he has in place a high-ranking director of change management to oversee departmental reform and

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 21-24.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 25-28.
\textsuperscript{47} A/55/305, para. 270.
renewal, a revived best practices unit with a good strategy, annual business plans and results-based budgeting that, while a work in progress, still gives his funders, the UN’s member states, a better sense of what DPKO intends to accomplish with their money and a way to measure its performance at the end of the year. He himself submits an annual business plan to the Secretary-General and his senior managers submit plans to him, and these are the basis for their respective annual performance evaluations.48

Guéhenno has surveyed the staff to find out what they like and don’t like about how the department is managed and has taken steps to correct its worst flaws. He has insisted that DPKO grade those evaluations on a bell curve like the rest of the UN, so that DPKO is no longer a kind of international Lake Woebegone where everyone is above average. Full implementation of a new management culture may have to await staff turnover in key places, however.

The requirement for performance reviews was to be applied to the field missions beginning in 2003, together with the People Management Program from OHRM, which tells managers what their role is, provides management training, and also involves anonymous, “360-degree reviews” for managers by four to five peers and four to five subordinates (chosen by the review team, not the reviewee), plus a review by their immediate boss. Results from peers and subordinates are to be consolidated into two ratings and each manager will sit down with a management consultant to discuss the results. Eight missions had completed this review process by early spring 2003.

In fall 2002, staff surveys were conducted in the field at all levels and the results were presented to mission leaders to promote awareness of managerial problems within their operations and to encourage more direct engagement with their staffs. Needed changes were to be implemented in 2003.

### 3.3.4 Sustaining Capacity

DPKO and the other elements of the UN that support and participate in peace operations face an ongoing problem of “right sizing” their support capacity. The ACABQ has already begun to question whether staffing levels prompted by the Brahimi reforms remain necessary.49

48 The rest of the Secretariat is also implementing modern management techniques. The UN’s inspectorate, the Office of Internal Oversight Services, has concluded that the system is moving in the right direction. See UN General Assembly, Implementation of all provisions of General Assembly resolution 55/258 on human resources management, A/57/726, 10 February 2003. The annex succinctly summarizes the implementation status of each element of the human resources reform effort.

49 A/57/776, para. 24.
It is a fair question.

The Brahimi Report suggested that headquarters peacekeeping support spending be tied to a five-year moving average of peacekeeping mission budgets and be pegged at five percent of total mission budget. A follow-on “comprehensive management review,” which had also been sought by the Special Committee, took up this question of the so-called “baseline budget.” The comprehensive review recommended that DPKO be routinely staffed at 650 posts, altogether. As of winter 2003, it had 593 regular budget and support account funded posts; 612 if one counts the trust fund-supported positions in the Mine Action Service. The review’s reasonable argument was that the department should have enough people to handle common workloads within a 40-hour workweek. Surge capacity could then be had not by emergency hiring but by asking current personnel to work overtime—which they had been doing for some years prior to the current round of staffing increases. If DPKO fully implemented the information technology programs now under development and boosted staff productivity to the point that fewer people could handle the workload, then the department might well get by with fewer: the Brahimi Report did argue for more people based on prevailing staff productivity. The Report, however, also stressed that the time required to hire and train personnel and make them proficient at their jobs makes staff reductions difficult to reverse if peacekeeping demand were to once again increase sharply. At roughly $112 million a year, the Peacekeeping Support Account is still only five percent of the cost of UN peacekeeping. This is very reasonable “overhead,” and a long-overdue achievement that is well worth preserving.

The Brahimi Report also recommended that peacekeeping support costs be folded into the regular biennium budget. This has been a sensitive issue, given the “no-growth” politics surrounding the regular budget. There is, however, about $118 million per year in the regular budget that funds the old observer missions UNTSO and UNMOGIP and special political missions. These funds could be shifted into a broadened, annual “peace operations mission budget,” together with other peacekeeping operations. This swap would allow the funding for headquarters staff supporting peace operations—now contained in the Peacekeeping Support Account—to be provided through the regular budget without raising the budget ceiling, thus enabling peace operations support, a core function of the Organization, to be funded from its core budget.

50 A/55/305, paras 193-194.