This paper is the result of research conducted for the Stimson Center’s project on *Operational Capacity for Civilian Protection*, which was supported with a grant from the Responsibility to Protect Unit, Foreign Affairs Canada.

Research and editing assistance was provided by Toby C. Berkman, research assistant, Henry L. Stimson Center. This paper is intended for discussion purposes, and will be published by the Stimson Center in 2005.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. **Introduction & Background**
   Why Look at Civilian Protection?
   - Increased Operations and Mandates for Civilian Protection
   - The ICISS Commission and *Responsibility to Protect* concept
   - Increased Engagement in Peace and Stability Operations
   Challenges and Opportunities

2. **Operational Challenges & Willing Actors: Capacity and Mandates**
   Some Operational Requirements
   Multinational Capacity for Missions Involving Use of Force and Intervention
   - NATO/European Union
   - The United Nations
   - The African Union
   - ECOWAS

3. **Concept of Operations**
   No Neat Category
   Clarity on Definitions of Civilian Protection
   Mission or Tasks?

4. **Doctrine**
   Existing Doctrine
   Action Without Doctrine: The AU and ECOWAS

5. **Training, Simulations, and Gaming**
   United Nations
   Multinational Training Programs
   United States
   Exercises and Simulations


7. **Preliminary Findings**
   Recognition of Gaps
   Filling Gaps
   Time is Right

ANNEXES

1: Chart of UN-Authorized Missions with Aspects of Civilian Protection (PDF)
2: Sample Task List for Peace Support Operations (UK Doctrine, JWP 3-50)
3: US Joint Doctrine Hierarchy chart
4: Additional Operational Considerations Arising from the Report’s Criteria
1. **Introduction & Background**

Ten years after the failure of the outside world to intervene during the genocide in Rwanda, the images of burned villages and displaced persons in Darfur, Sudan again challenge the international community to respond and to prevent more killings. While the African Union has deployed ceasefire monitors to the region, the question of how to protect civilians from continuing violence remains. What should be done? What *can* be done?

The debate over action in Darfur exemplifies the basic concern of this paper: the operational capacity within the international community to conduct missions to protect civilians in non-permissive environments. The central question is: *What current doctrines, training programs, simulation exercises, rules of engagement or other tools prepare forces to intervene and protect civilians from mass killings, ethnic cleansing or genocide in non-permissive, Chapter VII environments?* Further, when countries and multinational organizations are willing to act, are they prepared to conduct such operations? Are preparations for civilian protection a component of current mission planning?

This paper is based on dozens of interviews with international civilian and military experts on peace and stability operations, both within governments and international organizations, at research centers and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), asking about the usual tools for preparing forces for missions. The response was surprising and nearly universal: *I don’t believe there is much that addresses that type of mission.* Many people generously offered insights and leads, however, to help consider the components of capacity that exist, which are the basis for this analysis.¹ This paper surveys traditional tools used to prepare militaries for missions and considers if they are being used to prepare forces for stability, peace or humanitarian operations involving civilian protection. Specific questions included:

- Who is willing and able to conduct such missions?
- What are the operational challenges that need to be met for such missions?
- Does current doctrine address the conduct of such missions?
- Do training, simulations and gaming exercises deal with such missions?
- Do rules of engagement for such operations address civilian protection scenarios?
- Where are the gaps? How can they be addressed?

This analysis is informed primarily by a review of current practices and the expert knowledge in this field, not by exhaustive survey of military capacity or the literature on humanitarian intervention. There may be more capacity for and understanding of civilian protection than discussed here, perhaps revealing a gap between existing tools and broader knowledge of those tools. Terminology may also affect these findings. The definition of civilian protection is still being worked out, and its use varies across and within civilian and military communities.

**Why Look at Civilian Protection?**

A few important trends motivate this analysis. First, there has been a dramatic increase in troops deployed in stabilization operations, United Nations (UN) peace operations and humanitarian interventions since the end of the Cold War, especially since 1999. In addition, multinational organizations have authorized more operations to use force and are planning to develop greater capacities to intervene. Second, and most importantly, military personnel in these missions are increasingly directed to provide protection to civilian populations under threat of imminent violence. Some missions have explicit “civilian protection” mandates, such as MONUC, the UN peace operation in the Democratic

---

¹ For a list of individuals and organizations interviewed, please contact the author. To encourage candor, interviews were generally conducted as not for attribution.
Republic of the Congo (DRC); others have implicit goals of protection, such as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Third, concern with threats to vulnerable populations in conflict has grown beyond the human rights and relief communities, emerging as a political and normative force among international leaders, policymakers and NGOs. Shifting some resources and support toward protecting civilians in conflicts, these efforts have show results, such as inclusion of “protection of civilians” language in Security Council mandates for UN-led peace operations. At the national level, for example, Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin reportedly raised the “responsibility to protect” with US President George Bush in November 2004.

Fourth, there is evidence of a gap between the normative interest in civilian protection and the military actors who may be asked to support missions involving such protection. Development of explicit military understanding of and capacities for such efforts has not run parallel to policy discussions. Fifth and finally, the increased demand for stability and peace operations, including the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, is driving numerous reviews and reconsiderations of national and international abilities and capacities for peace and stability operations at many levels (e.g., personnel, funding, organization, doctrine, and training). These reviews may offer opportunities to identify gaps in capacity and ways for national and multinational organizations to prepare for and conduct operations. This gives room for considering how the concept of civilian protection could be better incorporated into preparing forces for future deployments.

Changing Times: Increased Operations and Mandates for Civilian Protection
The sheer scope of new and current operations is dramatic. The United Nations is leading 16 peace operations with more than 60,000 forces from 100 countries. Upcoming missions in Sudan and elsewhere are likely to increase those totals. Western forces are deployed across a wide variety of missions, including operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Forces that can serve under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the European Union (EU) are also wearing national, UN and coalition-of-the-willing hats. They are operating in Afghanistan with the US-led multinational force (MNF), the ISAF and the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). Some nations have led shorter-term interventions, such as the French in Cote d’Ivoire and the DRC, and the US to Haiti. In Iraq, many such forces are currently deployed with the US-led coalition. Still others serve with the Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) and in various non-UN peace operations. The African Union has deployed a force to Darfur after completing its first peacekeeping mission in Burundi; troops from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) recently completed missions in Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire, handing over control to the United Nations.

Many of these operations involve authority to use force beyond self-defense. Traditionally the UN has not led operations requiring peace enforcement, often equated with Chapter VII authority under the Charter. Since 1999, however, the UN has increased its use of Chapter VII authority for UN-led missions, many of which are hand-offs from an intervention or peace operation led by a multinational force or regional organization. The mandates are frequently complex and multidimensional, invoking Chapter VII more to reflect intrusiveness into the local governance than a requirement to use peace enforcement. But a line is being crossed with these new missions, and the UN is expecting that when needed, force will be employed to uphold mandates.

While the UN authorized humanitarian interventions in Somalia, Rwanda, the Balkans and East Timor in the 1990s, these operations were initially led by a multinational force, individual nation, or NATO. The

---

2 This total does not include the UNAMA peacebuilding mission in Afghanistan managed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Other peacebuilding missions are run by the Department of Political Affairs.

3 This is true for recent UN-led missions in East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Haiti and Burundi. Most previous UN-led Chapter VII missions also came after an intervening force handed an operation over to UN leadership (e.g., Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo), often itself having replaced a UN-led mission without Chapter VII in the first place.
troops in these operations belonged to sophisticated militaries and were expected to use enforcement to accomplish their mission. The UN has also recently authorized operations led by individual nations and regional organizations to protect civilians, such as the Australian-led intervention in East Timor in 1999 and the European Union mission Artemis, led by France, to the DRC in the summer of 2003. In all cases, protecting civilians was part of the goal, but the language used in Security Council mandates was no more (and often less) explicit than that used today by the Council even for UN-led peace operations to protect civilians.

Indeed, the Security Council has increasingly added language calling for “protection of civilians” to its mandates for UN-led peace operations, as it first did explicitly in 1999 for Sierra Leone. Since then, the Council has included a reference to protection of civilians “under imminent threat of physical violence” regularly. All new UN peace operations – for Liberia, Haiti, Burundi, and Cote d’Ivoire – were established with mandates providing for protection to civilians “under imminent threat of physical violence.” Mandates for on-going peace operations in the DRC and Sierra Leone also include such language. None of these operations, however, are explicitly designed as humanitarian interventions; civilian protection seems to be listed as one task among many, on par with activities such as demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR). Even with Chapter VII and the inclusion of civilian protection language in the mandates, it is not clear if peacekeepers deployed in these operations view the defense of civilians as a primary mission or as a task. [For a full list of UN resolutions with components of civilian protection authorizations, see Annex I.]

The lack of understanding regarding the UN role in civilian protection is not surprising. Despite growth in Chapter VII and civilian protection mandates, formal UN guidance or discussion of what these operations require is very thin. Even for UN-led missions, there is little direction given for how peacekeepers should meet their requirements to provide civilian protection. In 2003, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) released its Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations to let field personnel know what to expect. On the question of force, it suggests that “Self-defense includes the right to protect oneself, other UN personnel, UN property and any other persons under UN protection.” The Handbook further elaborates, only to say that:

In specific circumstances, the mandate of a peacekeeping operation may include the need to protect vulnerable civilian populations from imminent attack. The military component may be asked to provide such protection in its area of deployment only if it has the capacity to do so.

The Handbook cites the examples of UN missions in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the DRC (MONUC) as mandated to afford protection to civilians under physical threat “within their capabilities and areas of deployment.” The premise, it seems, is that operations with this mandate are overtly dependent on capacity. Forces are not presumed to have the ability to act in support of the mandate. So, even when the UN includes civilian protection in its Council resolutions, additional factors – actual capacity, perceived capacity and location – determine whether it is carried out. While one phrase in UN mandates recurs, “protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence,” it is highly likely that interpretation of this language varies in practice, as does the preparation of peacekeepers, commanders, and the political leadership for such operations.

---

4 Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI), Burundi (ONUB), Haiti (MUNUSTAH), and Liberia (UNMIL).
5 Resolutions for DRC mission, MONUC, (1291/1493) and Sierra Leone mission, UNAMSIL, (1270).
6 Case studies of the exercise of these mandates on the ground will illuminate how protection is working – or not. The Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria, South Africa) is developing case studies of African peace operations with civilian protection mandates. The UN Best Practices office in DPKO is also working on lesson learned studies of recent missions.
8 Handbook, page 64 (includes footnote 8).
A Shift in Normative Language and Operational Goals: The Responsibility to Protect

In response to a challenge by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to “forge unity” on the matter of humanitarian intervention and to identify a basis for preventing catastrophes such as the genocide in Rwanda, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) published a report entitled *The Responsibility to Protect* in December 2001. The Commission concluded that there are limits to the general rule of non-intervention for certain kinds of emergencies, namely, those involving a breakdown within a state such that “civil conflict and repression are so violent that civilians are threatened with massacre, genocide or ethnic cleansing on a large scale.” In particular:

> Sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoiding catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from starvation – but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states. The nature and dimensions of that responsibility are argued out, as are all the questions that must be answered about who should exercise it, under whose authority, and when, where and how.9

The Report argued for shifting the basis for action from the “right of humanitarian intervention” to the “responsibility to protect” civilians when the state failed to offer that protection and there was the risk of *large-scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing*. The Commission offered six specific principles justifying and compelling the use of military force to intervene to protect civilians: *right authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means,* and *reasonable prospects*. It added that any intervention must be both “defensible in principle” and “workable and acceptable in practice.”

By crystallizing the thinking that had been developed within various government and non-governmental circles, the Commission introduced the idea of civilian protection to a broader audience. Three years after its report, there is growing acceptance of the *Responsibility to Protect* concept (“R2P” for short). The Commission’s analysis and conclusions have helped spur governments, non-governmental organizations and scholars to consider its framework. International NGOs and individuals have pressed for its recommendations to be endorsed further. Some have urged that the UN explicitly adopt the R2P framework.10 NGOs often employ the language of *responsibility to protect* in their efforts to bring support and security to vulnerable populations.

This shift suggests that in the future, civilian protection may be a specific objective of military interventions led by individual nations, coalitions of the willing, or multinational organizations. Indeed, such language has already been employed to debate the purposes of the African Union-led mission in Darfur, as well as to frame the discussion of offers by the United Kingdom and Australia to provide troops for a humanitarian operation there. Yet those discussions appear disconnected from how forces in Africa, the United Kingdom and most states have been prepared to act, even in peace and stability operations. As a result, there seems to be gap between the thinking of the normative/policy community to press for civilian protection policies and the understanding of the military and peace operations community who are likely to be asked to take the action to protect civilians.

**Increased Engagement in Peace and Stability Operations**

Nearly all major multinational organizations capable of conducting peace operations are examining their capacities, evaluating their goals, and developing more tools to prepare for missions. NATO, the

---


10 Numerous conferences, institutes and coalitions are working on aspects of adopting the responsibility to protect framework and pressing capacity for humanitarian interventions. The December 2004 report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,” addressed the question of use of force and endorsed the R2P concept.
European Union, the African Union, ECOWAS and the UN have such efforts underway. Individual countries are also considering their capacities and reviewing capability nationally and through bilateral initiatives. In light of experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, for example, the US military is re-evaluating its own capacity and preparation for peace and stability operations. In the summer of 2004, the Pentagon’s Defense Science Board reported that such operations were here to stay, and that the US needed to be more prepared for them:

The U.S. military lacks sufficient troops for post-combat ‘stability and reconstruction’ operations, and should consider adding ‘significant’ numbers… The Pentagon must treat these operations as ‘an explicit mission in force planning and not as a lesser-included case.’

The Defense Science Board urged that the Secretary of Defense direct the military services “to reshape and rebalance their forces to provide a stabilization and reconstruction capability, meeting as well as possible the criteria we have proposed for an effective S&R [stabilization and reconstruction] capability.” Interviews suggest that military organizations are being tasked to reconsider the scenarios, training programs, and doctrine for operations including peace and stability missions, presenting an opportunity for re-evaluation of US preparation for such missions. Similar reviews are underway within Europe and Africa.

Challenges and Opportunities

Whether militaries are deployed by the United Nations, other multinational organizations, “coalitions of the willing,” or by an individual country, the ability to carry out a mission with a protection mandate requires basic capacities and willingness. First, only a few multinational organizations authorize peace operations to intervene and employ force for more than self-defense: NATO, the European Union (EU), the UN, the African Union (AU), and ECOWAS. Others may assist their missions, such as the multinational SHIRBRIG. Except for NATO, however, none has both willingness and capacity to authorize, organize, provide and manage capable and effective military forces to conduct operations in non-permissive environments. Leading a peace operation is difficult for many reasons, and countries with the most capable militaries are often reluctant to lead or commit their contingents to such missions. Conversely, some nations that are willing to provide forces to deploy rapidly are often resource poor and lack the logistical and force projection capacity to sustain themselves in the field. Nevertheless, developing and developed states are busy today in operations from Iraq to Haiti, Afghanistan to the Balkans, and Liberia to Burundi.

13 Other organizations can intervene diplomatically or politically, such as the Organization of American States, the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, which can provide observers for a peace operation, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, which has supported political missions to negotiate peace in the Sudan and Somalia. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) operates under a non-interventionist framework without capacity for peace operations, but Indonesia recently called for the formation of a regional ASEAN peacekeeping force by 2012 (“Indonesia Proposes ASEAN Peacekeeping Force,” in Laksamana.Net, 21 February 2004.)
14 According to Brig. Gen. Sten Edholm, SHIRBRIG undertook a study of peacekeeping in a robust environment two years ago; others suggest that SHIRBRIG could soon move toward engaging in more robust operations. SHIRBRIG provides support to establish UN peace operations with Chapter VI mandates, although it has provided planning support for missions authorized under Chapter VII, such as the transition from the ECOWAS-led mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) to a UN operation (UNMIL).
15 The UN is still trying to fill its authorized personnel levels for current operations, which require upwards of 70,000 peacekeepers.
Considering operational gaps requires identifying the capabilities needed for a protection mandate, recognizing missing links between such mandates and the ability to carry them out, and finally, looking at strategies to close these gaps. Fundamental questions include:

- What is the operational capacity of the United Nations and other international and regional organizations (e.g. NATO, ECOWAS, AU) to carry out missions that involve protection of civilians? What is the capacity of leading Western militaries? Do they have clear guidance on how civilian protection should be conducted and the chain of command such missions should utilize?

- Are national militaries recognizing their potential requirement to deploy troops, either as units or as part of a broader peace operation, prepared to carry out mandates that include civilian protection? How should they think about these operations? Are there specialized equipment or logistical needs that arise from a protection mandate?

- What is the state of military doctrine and training provided for forces to carry out a civilian protection mandate? Do training programs include protection scenarios in their courses and exercises? How are the operational aspects of civilian protection treated by staff at military training centers and war colleges, and in scenario-planning and war-gaming? How are missions affected by individual nations’ rules of engagement (ROE)?

- What are the steps forward?

In considering civilian protection, this paper will next sketch the basic operational challenges and likely central actors in such operations (Section 2). After analyzing these basic capacities, the paper reviews the important question of the concept of operations: What is meant by civilian protection (Section 3)? Following this consideration, key areas of military preparation are reviewed: doctrine (Section 4), training, simulations and gaming (Section 5), and mandates and ROE (Section 6). Finally, preliminary findings and areas for further investigation are suggested (Section 7). By identifying these gaps, this paper attempts to determine where modest initiatives could have an impact in enhancing the capacities of militaries to successfully discharge their responsibilities in such operations.

To shed light on these questions, this paper includes consideration of the post-Cold War UN Security Council resolutions authorizing missions with civilian protection provisions (Annex 1). Additional annexes include a sample “task list” for a peacekeeping mission, a Joint Doctrine Hierarchy chart of US military publications, and commentary on the additional operational considerations based on criteria within the ICISS report.
2. Operational Challenges & Willing Actors: Capacity and Mandates

No country can self-deploy easily in Africa, except South Africa. It is not an unwillingness to go, it’s just that there is no capacity to send in troops and sustain them.16 Deploying forces effectively is just one of the many challenges facing traditional military and peacekeeping missions – as well as efforts to provide civilian protection. Before moving to analyze the capacity for operations involving civilian protection, this section describes general operational challenges that affect all peace operations, as well as challenges specific to those involving protection of civilians. It also considers the structure of the multinational organizations most likely to conduct these operations.

There are many operational issues for missions. Examples include difficulties in securing authorization, the willingness of countries to contribute effective troops and personnel, the institutional capacities of the responsible organizations (e.g., UN, AU, and ECOWAS), logistical support, mission leadership, and rapid reaction capabilities. Also important may be analytic and intelligence data, planning capacities, and public information. The UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Jean-Marie Guéhenno recently presented the basic challenges facing UN peace operations:

Off the 17 current operations, five had yet to reach their mandated troop strength, and there were key gaps where the United Nations lacked critical enabling and niche capabilities, including in the maritime, helicopter, communications and special forces fields. Rapid deployment of capable military forces was needed to help in the start-up of new missions and to assist when existing missions were significantly challenged. The current United Nations standby arrangements did not provide for any such strategic reserve. The mere existence of such a capacity could deter spoilers in the first place, besides allowing for more certain risk management regarding the size of missions.17

With the recent increase in “complex” peace operations, there is an important emphasis on militaries honing skills to support development, reconstruction and longer-term peacebuilding tasks, taking them further into post-conflict reconstruction. While these skills are needed for many peace operations, the working premise here is that well-equipped, well-trained military forces are needed for missions involving use of force and civilian protection, even as forces and the funding for them have decreased with the end of the Cold War.

Some Operational Requirements

Contingent Size. General Roméo Dallaire has argued that the addition of 5,000 more men to reinforce his mission in Rwanda in 1994 could have sustained a successful effort to protect more people from the genocide. Others are skeptical that this number could have significantly altered the course of the genocide.18 Estimating effective force sizing is an area of study itself, certainly. The question of tasks and strategy (e.g., mere presence versus comprehensive control of a region) may make the difference in determining force requirements. Civilian protection may require large or highly mobile forces to

---

effectively protect individuals dispersed over large, ill-defined areas.\textsuperscript{19} A lack of forces could hinder assistance to civilians outside specific identifiable areas – a camp, for example – or exclude those in a neighboring town. Size is one challenge, but as seen in the eastern DRC in 2003, the French-led force provided robust protection within a relatively small area of intense conflict that MONUC could ably protect.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Box 1}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\textbf{The Responsibility to Protect Concept: the How of Intervention?}
\end{center}

The ICISS Commission analyzed the challenges behind its proposed \textit{Responsibility to Protect} concept, identifying the responsibilities in three areas:

\begin{itemize}
\item to prevent such violent action (mass death) if possible,
\item to react if such violence appears imminent or takes place (identifying the principles for taking military intervention), and
\item to rebuild following any such intervention.
\end{itemize}

Calls for protection of civilians, however, such as in Sudan, raise a question beyond the Commission’s reach: the \textit{how} of intervention. The main report includes little discussion about the intervention proposed between reacting and rebuilding – and how it achieves protection. There is a missing chapter on the \textit{responsibility of intervention}, therefore, that considers who can conduct such missions, with what authority, when, where and how. \textit{Reacting} requires an analysis of actors available, prepared, and capable of carrying out the “reaction,” and how the reactors hand off to the rebuilders.

Within its supplementary volume (“Conduct and Capacity”), the Commission considered operational questions of intervention broadly. A few operational questions arise from the Commission’s criteria themselves, including the capacity of the UN to handle transitional administration.

\textit{For a fuller discussion, see Annex 4.}

\textbf{Effective, Available Forces.} Presumably NATO is most able to organize and fund a sizeable, coherent force with proper and sufficient equipment, logistics and lift capacity to deploy and sustain an operation. The primary capacity question is likely to be the availability of the moving parts that make up a NATO force. Military force levels alone can be misleading, since militaries are organized with assumptions about troop readiness and training. For every US troop in the field, for example, one troop is expected to be returning from a mission to retrain and another is preparing to deploy. But few active militaries have sustained this three-to-one ratio; Ghana and the US are both reportedly overworked at two-to-one ratios.\textsuperscript{20} Thus, even when there is political will, forces capable of humanitarian intervention missions might not be available. Limits on troop availability may result in trade-offs between sending forces to one mission and training them for another.

\textsuperscript{19} Darfur, the size of France, for example, had more than 1.2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), with another half million in Chad in late 2004. Even a mission aimed at protecting IDP camps alone would be looking at more than 30 camps in a region with poor roads, few airports, and little local capacity to sustain deployed forces in an area where villages are not all identified on maps.

\textsuperscript{20} Data is from conversations with US and Ghanaian military officers.
In the last decade, the top troop contributors to UN-led peace operations have shifted to developing nations.\(^{21}\) European military spending and force structure have not increased with the expansion of peacekeeping demands. Increases in capacity within regional and sub-regional organizations have not kept pace with the call for peacekeepers. Nor have sufficient military forces filled the slots for multinational force missions such as ISAF; UN peace operations also face delays in the deployment of recruited troops in order to meet the authorized force levels.

National decisions also depend on variables such as other military and political commitments, funding, political leadership and the perception of the last mission. Because participation in peace support operations outside the United Nations is not usually reimbursed, many nations are less willing or unable to provide contingents. Some countries take national pride, however, in their military role in humanitarian missions, peace operations, and other efforts to act in a cosmopolitan manner.\(^{22}\) When UN operations explicitly require civilian protection, it adds a potential deterrent: some troop contributing countries are not eager to provide contingents for missions beyond traditional operations in permissive environments.\(^{23}\)

Moreover, UN operations have rarely had what they need: capable forces that deploy rapidly and effectively and match the requirements of the mission upon arrival. In general, the United Nations can not assume that the forces offered by member states will have trained or operated together before being deployed within an operation. Such brigades are designed to provide the UN with coherent forces for deployments. There has been limited progress in regionally-based advance training of brigades from varied troop contributing countries, with the clear exception of SHIRBRIG. Further, an increased awareness of the forces required for more challenging, robust UN operations is shifting DPKO needs for effective deployment. One US military instructor of peace operations summed up the problem:

> What do you do when you tell a soldier on patrol to protect a victim of crime, and he doesn’t know what to do? At the UN things are changing – they are saying, ‘forget infantry battalions, we want to know who’s got helicopter gunships, APC’s, artillery.’ In order to do it right they’d need intelligence, satellites, unmanned vehicles; the UN isn’t going to put blue helmets in the field if they can’t protect them.\(^{24}\)

**Rapid Response.** Certainly many situations requiring civilian protection may also require a rapid response. The UN, even with its ability to draw on a variety of resources, has yet to truly meet its own 30- to 90-day deployment goals for traditional and complex operations, goals that are intended to help establish operations faster and more effectively. The one recent exception is Cote d’Ivoire, which went from a UN political mission to a UN peace operation with re-hatted Nigerian forces already on the ground. But even if the UN fully met its deployment goals, forces might still be too late to prevent a large-scale genocide or ethnic cleansing campaign: in Rwanda, for example, 800,000 civilians were killed in a mere 100 days.

---

\(^{21}\) The top ten UN troop contributors are all from developing countries, including Pakistan, India, Nigeria, Ghana, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, South Africa, Uruguay, Jordan and Kenya (as of July 2004). See the forthcoming *Human Security Report*, Canadian Consortium on Human Security (CCHS), the Liu Institute, University of British Columbia.

\(^{22}\) See Lorraine Elliott and Graeme Cheeseman, editors, *Force for Good: Cosmopolitan Militaries in the 21st Century*, Manchester University Press, November 2004 (www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk). Some countries have cultural norms that embrace their national military involvement in peace operations.

\(^{23}\) When a developed country such as the United Kingdom takes the lead, other countries may be more willing to offer troops.

\(^{24}\) Interview, official from US Defense Institute for International Legal Studies (Newport, RI), May 2004.
As the UN moves towards more rapid deployment, it faces a number of challenges. DPKO’s Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS), for example, aims to provide the UN Secretariat with information about military resources that member states are likely to provide for peace operations. While dozens of nations participate, only two countries are at the most ready Rapid Deployment Level, having signed Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) and having agreed to deploy within an established timeframe. DPKO regularly calls on member states to provide more enabling units, a linchpin for peace operations. In the UN’s effort to implement recommendations of the 2000 Brahimi Report\textsuperscript{25}, its greater challenges are building an in-house capacity that can organize and manage operations, and recruiting and deploying forces rapidly and effectively.

Other Considerations. The use of force in situations short of war, where violence is sanctioned to bring about a humanitarian result, involves the potential of doing physical damage to people and property, and may include killing individuals. To remain within the boundaries of humanitarian intervention, one must harm fewer people than one saves, one must injure fewer than one protects, and one must not destroy an area to save it. Thus, the question of use of force being stretched beyond self-defense must remain within the realm of defending something, such as a group of people that can be defined in advance. Those on the other side, however, will likely see this as a war-like attack. Controlling the continuum of violence and the reaction of those on the receiving end (as well as the perception of those who are to be “saved”) is difficult, heightening the importance of political leadership and public information.

Not surprisingly, the humanitarian NGO community diverges on its views of collaboration with the military at many levels. They debate whether military forces should provide broader security to help support peacebuilding in a post-conflict environment (e.g., expand the ISAF peacekeeping forces to sites beyond Kabul throughout Afghanistan), provide direct security to protect food convoys and major transit routes used by NGOs, or intervene directly when civilians are threatened.\textsuperscript{26}

While UN peace operations may be designed to support UN peacebuilding and relief efforts that serve endangered or displaced civilians, impartiality and neutrality in humanitarian efforts are different than in peace operations. Humanitarian staff may neutrally provide food to all members of a needy population, regardless of their previous actions. Military forces within a peace operation will forgo neutrality to uphold their mandate, however, yet still be impartial in its actions, including use of force, against spoilers who act outside of a political agreement or undermine security. The \textit{UN Handbook} recognizes the inherent contradictions and implicit challenge as UN operations and agencies act differently:

\begin{center}
\textbf{On one hand is the need for a coherent UN response, one that assists in finding a lasting solution to a crisis, and other on the other hand is the need to ensure that however long a conflict lasts, civilians are provided basic protection, including humanitarian aid.}\textsuperscript{27}
\end{center}


\textsuperscript{26} Views also differ, for example, on the role of military actors within Afghanistan, including the US-led provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) that combine civilian affairs units with special operations forces. Originally presented as groups that survey community infrastructure needs and help organize that work, PRTs also implied back-up forces if conflict erupted. Some NGOs believed that PRTs provided useful services and offered security through their presence in insecure regions. Others viewed them as dangerously blurring the lines between military and humanitarian aid workers, endangering the perceived neutrality of NGOs. See, for example, “CARE says ISAF Expansion Must Meet Security Challenges in Afghanistan,” at InterAction website, \url{www.interaction.org/newswire/detail.php?id=2300}.

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Handbook}, page 168.
Multinational Capacity for Missions Involving Use of Force and Intervention

Multinational organizations’ ability to carry out missions successfully depends on the strength of the national contingents supplied by their members. Countries have national guidelines that determine the conditions under which they will provide forces to lead or participate in operations. Nations such as Japan are constrained from providing troops to any Chapter VII operation. Others require UN authorization. Some national contingents are prohibited from using force beyond self-defense, which can affect their participation in operations with civilian protection mandates.

A number of multinational organizations can potentially take the lead in civilian protection missions. Each, however, has a unique structure and capacity that affect its willingness to intervene.

**NATO/European Union.** As a collective defense organization, NATO is designed to intervene and can do so at the direction of its member states. It has the military capacity for humanitarian interventions, and prefers but does not require a Security Council mandate to operate. In April 1999, the NATO Strategic Concept was updated and approved to commit members of the Alliance to defend not just its members, but peace and stability in its region and periphery. Thus, it provided for NATO to undertake military operations as “non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (CRO).” Peace support operations are within the CRO category, and are intended to deal with complex emergencies; these are usually in support of the UN or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The range of operations NATO will undertake in this category includes peace enforcement, peacekeeping, conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacebuilding and humanitarian relief.

The European Union now has authority to organize its members to provide forces and participate in missions defined as "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacekeeping." Even with agreement by EU leaders to develop a capability to undertake humanitarian and crisis management tasks, the focus is on missions within Europe. Development of the EU’s proposed 60,000-strong Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) could help to expand its capacity. Because many countries provide forces to both the EU and NATO, a natural question is whether the development of the RRF and the NATO Response Force will complement each other or compete.

**The United Nations.** The UN has a broad mandate to act against threats to international peace and security, and the Security Council can authorize military action led by the UN, a lead nation, a coalition of the willing, or a regional organization. The Security Council, however, primarily has authorized peace enforcement interventions led by multinational forces or regional organizations, not by the United Nations itself. While the UN Security Council and the General Assembly have not adopted the Commission’s normative responsibility to protect framework, the Council has increasingly recognized and included civilian protection as a component of UN-led peace operations. The Security Council explicitly authorized civilian protection in Resolution 1270 for the peacekeeping force in Sierra Leone in 1999, stating that the mission

\[\ldots\text{may take necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under}\]

---


29 A notable exception is the EU mission, led by France, to the DRC in 2003.
imminent threat of physical violence, taking into account the responsibilities of the Government of Sierra Leone and ECOMOG.\textsuperscript{30}

Since then, the UN Security Council has explicitly referenced protection of civilians “under imminent threat of physical violence” in resolutions authorizing actions under Chapter VII for UN-led peace operations.\textsuperscript{31} In terms of the potential use of force by UN personnel, such missions come close to peace enforcement operations. None is cast as humanitarian intervention, however. As noted earlier, many derive their Chapter VII mandates from the complexity of the multidimensional tasks involved and the potential need to use force to uphold the mandate, rather than any desire to operate with civilian protection as a primary task.\textsuperscript{32}

The UN has used similar language in authorizing the use of force by MNFs. For the Australian-led intervention in East Timor, the UN authorized the mission to “ensure the protection of civilians at risk.”\textsuperscript{33} For the French-led, EU mission \textit{Artemis} to the DRC in the summer of 2003, the UN resolution authorized “all necessary measures… to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia, and if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population.”\textsuperscript{34}

While one phrase recurs, “protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence,” it is highly likely that its interpretation varies in practice. In the original 2000 mandate establishing MONUC, the Council provided a mandate with numerous provisions without reference to Chapter VII, making the operation a \textit{de facto} Chapter VI operation. At the end, however, it added:

\textit{Acting under chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council also decided that MONUC may take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions and as it deems it within its capabilities, to protect United Nations and co-located JMC personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.}\textsuperscript{35}

The authorization for civilian protection is clear, but the Council’s resolution leaves the decision to protect civilians up to the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), the force commander or another actor further down the chain to “deem” it to be within the scope of “its capabilities.” What is not clear is if the capabilities, from the beginning, were deemed sufficient to protect civilians or were planned to be so. This hedge has since been dropped from the MONUC mandate, which in UN resolution 1293 (2003) was updated “to protect civilians and humanitarian workers under imminent threat of physical violence.” It is not clear, however, if the “deeming” is still present as an organic part of the military leadership’s decision-making.

In contrast, the Council’s mandate for the UN mission in Burundi (ONUB) in 2004 stated without exception that the operation would use “all necessary means; without prejudice to the responsibility of the transitional Government of Burundi, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.”\textsuperscript{36}


\textsuperscript{31} This includes operations in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI), Burundi (ONUB), Haiti (MUNUSTAH), Liberia (UNMIL), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC).

\textsuperscript{32} Case studies of the actual experience with these mandates on the ground will illuminate how protection is working -- or not.

\textsuperscript{33} UNSC resolution 1264 (1999).

\textsuperscript{34} UNSC resolution 1484 (2003).


\textsuperscript{36} UNSC resolution 1545 (2004).
While the AU Constitutive Act affirms its principle of non-interference by member states in the internal affairs of others and bans using or threatening force against other member states, it makes a major exception “to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.” The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) is to have “an operational structure for the effective implementation of the decisions taken in the areas of conflict prevention, peace-making, peace support operations and intervention, as well as peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction…” It shall “anticipate and prevent disputes and conflicts, as well as policies that may lead to genocide and crimes against humanity” and “recommend to the Assembly, pursuant to Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act, intervention, on behalf of the Union, in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, as defined in relevant international conventions and instruments.” They will also support and facilitate humanitarian action in situations of armed conflicts or major natural disasters.

In December 2003, the AU moved beyond declarations when its PSC entered into force. The PSC includes operational components, including a Continental Early Warning System and an African Standby Force (ASF). The ASF is to be the means of intervention, with multidisciplinary civilian and military components on-call from their own countries and ready for rapid deployment. With troop contingents provided by member states, the ASF is to have the capacity to engage in a range of mission types, from observation to peace support to interventions in response to genocide. Cooperation with the UN and its agencies is encouraged, but the Security Council’s authorization is not required. The chain of command for the ASF shall be through the Chairperson, the Africa Union Commission’s appointment of a Special Representative, and a Force Commander.

There is no discussion of doctrine, but the Protocol suggests that the Commission provide guidelines for training of the national standby contingents at both the operational and tactical levels, including training guidelines for International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law. Further, the Commission plans to develop and circulate Standing Operating Procedures to support the standardization of training doctrines, manuals and programs for national and regional schools of excellence. It also plans to coordinate the ASF training courses, command and staff exercises, and field training. The Commission is also to collaborate with the UN to periodically assess African peace support capacities, and to consult with the UN Secretariat to assist in coordination of external initiatives in support of ASF capacity-building in training, logistics, equipment, communications, and funding. Member states are expected to provide well-equipped contingents rapidly, and to provide “all forms of assistance and support” to their troops once deployed. The AU also plans to equip the ASF to undertake “humanitarian activities,” and to establish regional mechanisms in the form of five regional peacekeeping brigades.

The African Union, however, recognizes its dependence on support from the United Nations:

Where necessary, recourse will be made to the UN to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the African Union’s activities in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, in keeping with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN

---

38 Protocol, page 3. Specifically, its functions include peace support operations and intervention “pursuant to article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act.”
40 A military staff committee will also be established to advise the Peace and Security Council.
41 Assessing peace support capacities in Africa is delicate for the United Nations, since it can not evaluate troops per se. The UN can advise on pre-deployment training and national participation in the Stand-by Arrangements System.
43 Protocol, Article 15.
Charter on the role of Regional Organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security.\textsuperscript{44}

This relationship is fundamental since the AU has neither its own forces nor forces on call prepared to deploy rapidly and effectively. The AU also lacks a robust headquarters management and planning capacity (there are few military personnel on the Commission staff), logistics and enabling units, airlift, ground transportation, mobile communications system, and teams of AU civilian experts and advisors that can deploy to the mission on short notice.

The AU has declared that the African Stand-by Force will be operational by 2010, with some regional capacity to be in place by 2005. Currently, few sub-regional groups have existing capacity and desire to organize such stand-by forces, although ECOWAS represents a clear exception. Most sub-regional organizations in Africa were established for economic purposes, and those with a peace and security mandate are still a far cry from offering more than diplomatic or early warning functions.\textsuperscript{45} There is likely to be growing attention on their developing capacity for peace operations, with the ASF in the lead.

\textit{ECOWAS.} The Economic Community of West African States is a West African sub-regional organization composed of 15 member states. Its security-related responsibilities were outlined in the 1999 \textit{Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.} The Mechanism seeks to, among numerous objectives, resolve internal and inter-state conflicts, strengthen conflict prevention, and support the deployment of peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief missions.

The ability to invoke the powers of the Mechanism lies primarily with the Mediation and Security Council (MSC). The MSC, along with the Executive Secretary and the supporting elements of the Defence and Security Commission, Council of Elders and the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), apply the principles of the Mechanism at their discretion in the following situations:

- aggression or conflict in a Member State;
- conflict between Member States;
- internal conflicts that threaten to trigger a humanitarian disaster or poses a serious threat to peace and security in the sub region;
- serious and massive violation of human rights and the rule of law; and
- overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government.

A response to one of the above situations can be initiated by the MSC, a member state, the Executive Secretary, the UN or the African Union, and can be in the form of a peacekeeping or observer mission. In addition, ECOWAS has included humanitarian assistance as an integral part of its Protocol. According to the Protocol, ECOWAS will “intervene to alleviate the suffering of the populations and restore life to normalcy in the event of crises, conflict and disaster.”

This review of the willingness and structure of organizations to act helps bound consideration of the actors most likely to be asked to protect civilians. Yet how are national and multinational forces to interpret references to protection of civilians in UN resolutions? What is the concept of operations for civilian protection, and is there an understanding within various military and civilian circles of its meaning? This is the subject of the next section.

\textsuperscript{44} Protocol, Article 17.
\textsuperscript{45} Including ECCAS, IGAD, SADC, EAC, SEN-SAD, The Arab-Maghreb Union, COMESA.
3. **Concept of Operations**

“Humanitarian intervention” is more than just robust peacekeeping – it is a mission area that may be placed between “peace enforcement” in UN terms and “enforcement” considered as warfighting. In recent years, the growth in complex, multidimensional peace operations has moved militaries toward improving their preparation for tasks relating to development, reconstruction and longer-term peacebuilding. At the same time, there has not been a corresponding focus on determining the appropriate levels of force that militaries should employ to provide security, protect civilians, and support transitions from a limited peace to a more stabilized self-sustaining peace. Modifying traditional peacekeeping operations appears to be an inadequate answer for dealing with protection mandates generally and certainly in extreme circumstances such as a large-scale genocide.

**No Neat Category**

Missions that involve civilian protection in a non-permissive environment do not fit into any neat categories. Humanitarian intervention is one term often used to describe militarily-led acts to stop human-caused disasters, including prevention of mass killing, ethnic cleansing or genocide. It is also employed to describe the use of armed forces for missions that are not considered traditional military operations, for which protecting civilians can be a component.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has authorized action by individual nations, coalitions of the willing, or by regional organizations, most of which had humanitarian goals. Often referred to as “peace enforcement,” these included the US-led operation into Somalia in 1992, NATO’s interventions in the Balkans in the 1990s, and the French-led European Union mission into the DRC in 2003. Other interventions have had humanitarian components, such as ECOWAS forces going into Liberia in early 1990s and the Australian-led force intervening in East Timor in 1999. Actions without clear UN authorization included NATO’s initial role in Kosovo and the US and British maintenance of a “no fly zone” over Iraq. The language used to describe the mission will depend on who writes the mandate and runs the operation.

Consideration of the capacity to conduct civilian protection missions requires a vocabulary to connect the language developed within the NGO humanitarian and relief communities with that of military organizations. Even within the United Nations, “civilian protection” appears to mean different things to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, both of which are engaged in designing and operating missions in the field. Military organizations and NATO use different language; peace operations can take on different meanings depending on which terms are adopted. Without more clarity regarding the meaning of civilian protection mandates, the ways in which Chapter VI or VII mandates should be applied, and the ways we should use language to describe humanitarian intervention in general, it is difficult to identify the appropriate tools from the traditional military and peace operations toolboxes to make such interventions successful.

**Clarity on Definitions of Civilian Protection**

What, exactly, do civilian protection mandates mean? As described earlier, there is no single answer. There appear to be three broad approaches to civilian protection mandates. First, civilian protection could be the primary goal of an operation, where the central purpose is to stop or prevent mass killings, ethnic cleansing or genocide. Second, civilian protection can be considered as a component of a multidimensional peace or stability operation, where there are threats to civilians (presumably, not at a

---

46 A retrospective review of past military interventions could be analyzed as to the degree to which the protection of civilians was a primary or secondary goal.

47 Given the high level of force likely required, such interventions are unlikely to be led by the UN.
level of mass killings.) For example, some believe that protection is primarily a policing issue, bound closely to the functions of rule of law. Finally, civilian protection can be viewed broadly, part of the overall mission of peacekeepers to collaborate with relief and development efforts in their support for the safety of internally displaced persons, refugees and civilians in the local environment. In this view, military forces or peacekeepers provide the “humanitarian space” for activities that result in civilian protection.

For purposes here, however, civilian protection refers primarily to actions that involve the prevention of mass killings or ethnic cleansing, presumably or primarily in a non-permissive environment where the use of force is likely to have Chapter VII authority.

Mission or Tasks?
Civilian protection, as a concept, can be construed in a number of ways. Should civilian protection be considered a set of tasks that can be applied as needed to operations, regardless of who leads the mission, and scaled to the level of force allowed? Or should civilian protection be considered a specific mission, which requires specialized planning and support? The answer is not obvious; both views may be used to look more closely at the requirement and preparation for civilian protection missions.

For military forces, one UN official pointed out, civilian protection is not a new situation per se: there is not much difference between protecting a military convoy and a civilian convoy, for example. Likewise, providing security to a clearly defined area is a similar task, whether for a camp of IDPs or a compound of military personnel. But providing security to an undefined area, such as a group of civilians dispersed over an area, is much more difficult. Defending a population is more challenging than defending a specific convoy, building, or area with a perimeter, especially if those from whom you are protecting civilians are interspersed in the area, difficult to identify, and free to move around. One UN official suggested that the question is really how contingents appreciate the tasks when they get on the ground, and how they see the scope of their area of responsibility. How do you protect someone who is three blocks beyond the peacekeeper’s line of responsibility?

Views on the definition of civilian protection as a mission or set of tasks depend also on who is expected to carry out the protection mission. Numerous military people consider protection as first and foremost a police or civil affairs role, or one for military police are like infantry forces with arrest powers. They can escort convoys, operate in non-permissive environments, and carry weapons. What differs, perhaps, is that military police more regularly define their mission as restoring and maintaining civil order than do traditional military forces. One US Army officer suggested he used the same operational principles wherever his deployment; the rules of engagement were the difference.

---

49 Some may argue that civilian protection can be upheld without Chapter VII authorization. For a thoughtful analysis of the question of force in peacekeeping, see Trevor Finlay’s The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations (SIPRI, Oxford University Press, 2002.) He points out that the variance of actual use of force by peacekeepers even within Chapter VI operations is broad, as well as interpretations of the definition of self-defense.
50 There is a broader application of civilian protection when sovereignty is transferred. In cases where there is a failed state or a transitional administration, civilian protection is the implicit requirement of the governing power. In Iraq, the United States replaced the government and initially had the job of protecting civilians as the occupying power.
51 Interview, DPKO, October 2003.
52 Interview, professor, US Military Academy (West Point), 2004.
53 For example, he cited the principles of mass, synchronization, command and control.
One expert in simulation and training suggests that civilian protection is unlikely to be defined as a new mission type, although he too recognizes the problem of protecting an area versus an individual. Mission planning focuses on the goals of the operation. Protection of large areas, such as Darfur, may be “too hard” suggests one analyst. If the operation is approached as a guard duty, there are tasks for that operation (within NATO too).

There are a number of unique considerations for civilian protection scenarios that do not easily fall within the generic tasks associated with other types of missions. Because civilian protection is likely to take place in an operational environment between all-out combat and more traditional peacekeeping, troops will need preparation for making hard decisions regarding the appropriate level of force to employ. Other considerations include the timing of the use of force and the scale of the mission. Making appropriate judgments, therefore, may require approaching civilian protection as a mission, not just as a set of tasks.

Another difficulty relates to the nature of protection itself. If a force charged with protection reacts to an attack on civilians after the fact, it will already have failed in its goal of providing protection. As a result, success will often require taking aggressive action prior to any attack. This shifts the burden from reacting to a defined state (e.g., an attack) to reacting to a threat for which there may not be a clear trigger or definition. This challenge raises the need for a concept of operations that defines the kinds of mission scenarios likely to be involved in civilian protection and the tasks that would presumably be employed. Protection may include, for example, escorting individuals and protecting camps, safe areas, key roads. It could also require direct action to target bad actors or prevent such actors from operating.

There are dozens of tasks and missions for which militaries prepare. The challenge is to identify the subset of actions most likely needed for protection operations. In the next sections, this analysis turns to look at current planning for operations, and examines the selected doctrine, training, mandates and ROE for their guidance on the conduct of operations for the protection of civilians.
4. Doctrine

The Challenges discussions underlined that there are many different, and sometimes overlapping, opinions about doctrine for complex peace operations – but as yet no clear UN guidance on the subject... There should be a multinational and inclusive effort to define the meaning and scope of doctrine applicable to UN peace operations; troop contributing countries should then take steps to build common doctrinal statements into their national doctrines; led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, specific efforts should be made to apply lessons learned in the formation of peace operations doctrine, paying particular attention to the need to enhance military, police and civilian coordination.54

Doctrine is the guidance for how military forces should operate in differing environments. Doctrine applies to many levels: the supranational (e.g., the UN Charter), the national (e.g., policy guidelines), the operational (specific to missions) and the tactical (instruction, training, commander level).55 As pointed out by a former military officer involved in developing doctrine in Africa, doctrine provides the written-down, “big picture” description of a potential operation, the manner in which it should be conducted, and the types of situations that forces should anticipate and plan for. From doctrine come policy and training goals, which lead to tactics, techniques and procedures and standard operating procedures.56 Doctrine is also the basis for mission-specific training and task lists.

At the same time, doctrine is not a silver bullet to ensure development of capacity for a mission type. Military experts point out that not all doctrine is created equal. Much of it is frequently ignored. Mere development of doctrine does not make personnel aware of it nor ensure that they will follow it. The content of doctrine is important, but it also matters whether and how doctrine is used.

Overall, developing doctrine helps establish an institutional basis for preparing forces in advance to conduct particular types of missions. As a result, once doctrine is written for a specific type of mission, it becomes more likely that the military will be asked to conduct such a mission. Perhaps that is one reason that the United States has resisted developing military doctrine for “humanitarian interventions” that involve protecting populations at risk.57 Anecdotal evidence suggests that the American experience in Somalia led to a decision not to write down doctrine for such interventions.58 The problem with writing doctrine, suggested more than one officer, is that we would be called on to do that kind of mission again.

Not surprisingly, doctrine is not well-developed or well-known for operations authorized to use force to protect civilians. There is little specific, agreed-upon terminology to identify the mission or to describe that tasks that it would likely entail. To find descriptions of activities relevant to civilian protection, one must embark on a search of doctrine designed for other, related scenarios such as combat, peace support, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, operations other than war, humanitarian missions, non-combatant evacuation (NEO), small wars, and civil-military relations. From this search, doctrinal principles and

55 Observation by Mark Malan, quoted in Concluding Report, the Challenges Project, p. 91. Mark Malan is currently with the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in Accra, Ghana.
56 This list reflects US military thinking and terms; most Western countries have organizational doctrine and components that are derived from it, but the terminology will differ. Discussions with Dr. Charles Grimm, US advisor to ECOWAS; Col. Mike Smith (US Army, retired); and Col. Tim Parks (UK).
57 Army War College discussion, 2004.
58 Some military officers point out that US forces can still do humanitarian interventions, and just draw on doctrine that is not labeled as such.
applicable elements emerge, though they do not equate to a roadmap for militaries faced with preventing deadly violence against civilian populations. Rather, what does exist in doctrine demonstrates a baseline of preparation for peace operations involving use of force, or combat missions with tasks that could be applicable to civilian protection.

**Existing Doctrine**

Despite the increase in UN missions with protection mandates, the UN is hampered in its efforts to provide doctrinal guidance to troop contingents. There is no coherent UN doctrine for peace operations, let alone for missions involving civilian protection. DPKO recently published a *Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations*, which has doctrinal aspects. It focuses on peacekeeping, not UN-led peace enforcement operations (nor, understandably, missions that are authorized but not led by the United Nations.) The 2000 *Brahimi Report* only touched on UN doctrine, urging that deployed forces in peace operations be capable of carrying out the requirements of their UN mandates and that robust rules of engagement be employed when necessary to support the mission.

Changes are underway at the United Nations, however. DPKO is looking at how to improve troops’ preparation for missions involving the use of force. It has developed a handbook, which will address civilian protection, and has created a small working group on the subject. An assessment of the Ituri crisis in the DRC last year was recently completed and DPKO’s Best Practices Unit is exploring the civilian protection/use-of-force question. Within the Military Advisor’s office, operational procedures for military units are being drafted to address tactical questions about how forces can operate effectively with IDP protection mandates. The goals of such procedures and publications approximate those of doctrine.

Despite these changes, the United Nations must in general rely on the doctrine developed by member states. Many countries now have sophisticated doctrine for peace support operations. Among the various doctrines reviewed for this publication, Canadian and British military doctrines are the closest to directly recognizing missions with civilian protection. As presented in the 2002 publication *Peace Support Operations*, Canadian joint doctrine describes protection of civilians as a military task, and references the framework proposed by *Responsibility to Protect*. The doctrine provides a definition of intervention, for example, that includes the use of force by the military to protect populations at risk of deadly violence:

> Humanitarian interventions are launched to gain access to an at risk population when the responsible actors refuse to take action to alleviate human suffering or are incapable of doing so and where actors internal to a state are engaging in gross abuses of human rights. Intervention is a combat operation intended to provide protection to the at risk population and aid workers by imposing stable security conditions that permit humanitarian access. These operations can be precursors to complex peacekeeping operations.

Further, the Canadian doctrine states that the role of intervening forces includes re-establishing security in a mission area and, depending on the compliance of parties, suppressing well-armed and violent groups. Interestingly, this doctrine discards the traditional use of Chapter VI and VII to frame use of force,

---

59 UN member states have objected to the development of “doctrine” by the United Nations.  
62 Interview, DPKO, October 2004.  
64 B-GJ-005-307/FP-030, p. 2-5.
arguing that this is an unimportant distinction in considering the actions of military forces in the field. In Canadian doctrine, the relevant distinction is between “traditional” peacekeeping operations, which have been in existence since the 1956 Suez Crisis, and more modern, “complex” peace operations that may include civilian protection mandates. An Ottawa workshop report in 2003 suggests that this doctrine is a “base” for developing further doctrine, strategy and tactics, including a new manual on humanitarian operations.65

The United Kingdom’s Peace Support Operations (Joint Warfare Publication 3-50) includes tactical, operational and strategic considerations for a range of missions that come close to civilian protection. A section on “humanitarian operations and human rights,” for example, outlines a concept of operations in which

The foremost task for the military force may be to restore the peace and create a stable and secure environment in which aid can run freely and human rights abuses are curtailed. Specific protection tasks may include Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs) but will more normally apply to the protection of convoys, depots, equipment and those workers responsible for their operation. Conditions of widespread banditry and genocide may exist, and when aid operations are being consistently interrupted there may be a requirement to use force in large measure to prevent the genocide and achieve the mission.66

Here, despite references to genocide, a subtle rhetorical turn of phrase reveals the caution with which British doctrine approaches civilian protection. If the doctrine is taken literally, “widespread banditry and genocide” cannot by themselves equate to any “requirement to use force.” Preventing genocide is a tool for accomplishing an entirely separate mission: halting the interruption of aid operations. To be fair, however, the overall goal “to create a stable and secure environment” can be understood as a means of protecting civilians. Indeed, some in the military argue that this is the proper terminology to use when describing civilian protection missions, and the proper framework through which to measure such missions’ success. Additional tasks in this section range from conflict containment, forcible separation of belligerent parties, establishment of protected or safe areas, guarantee and denial of movement and sanctions enforcement.

The United Kingdom recently issued a revised version of its doctrine, The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations (Joint Warfare Publication 3-50, Second Edition, June 2004), aimed at the operational level. A focus of the publication is promotion of the British “one doctrine” concept for peace support operations. Rather than dividing peace support operations into a variety of separate mission-types, each with its own set of guidelines, the “one doctrine” concept argues that all peace support operations should follow the same basic principles and abide by the same single doctrine. Peace support operations encompass a wide variety of activities undertaken across a spectrum between war and peace, all with the goal of promoting long-term peace and stability. In such operations, adaptability and multifunctionality are keys to success. Forces should be prepared to engage in any and all tasks necessary to achieve the desired effect, namely, “to uphold international peace and security by resolving conflicts.”67

Because U.K. doctrine defines peace support operations broadly, it includes descriptions for a wide array of activities, including some activities that fall within this paper’s concept of civilian protection. Yet the doctrine provides few details. For example, in an extensive section on “Control Measures,” the doctrine provides two sentences of guidance on how the military should engage in the “Provision of Protection.”

66 JWP 3-50, pp. 6-11 through 6-12.
It states, “Protective tasks include protection and safeguarding of individuals, communities and installations. Commanders should be aware of the need to balance protective tasks against the need for more active operational measures.”\(^68\) Further elaboration on the nature of either “protective tasks” or “more active operational measures” is not provided.

Other tasks from U.K. doctrine with relevance to civilian protection include the establishment of “Restricted areas,” which can include “Centres of population;” “Crowd Control;” “Interposition” as a “short-term emergency response to forestall or manage a local crisis;” and the establishment of “Protected or Safe Areas;” among others. In no section does the U.K. bundle relevant tasks under a single civilian protection heading.\(^69\) Indeed, the doctrine explicitly points out the need for further guidance on the civilian protection concept, using language that echoes the ICISS *The Responsibility to Protect* report:

> There are occasions when a national government or sub-national organs of government fail to uphold international norms. They may be unable, or unwilling, to prevent abuse, or perhaps prove to be the sponsors of abuse; they may be unable or unwilling to prevent a faction or group being subject to, or threatened with, significant harm.... Consequently, a responsibility to provide protection may fall upon the international community.... To respond to these changes, and the associated responsibilities, those who are tasked with, or choose to assist with, upholding, renewing or restoring acceptable governance need an expansion of the concepts and doctrine that guide their actions.\(^70\)

In NATO doctrine, there is also no specific section dedicated to civilian protection. *Peace Support Operations* (AJP-3.4.1) includes one reference to genocide in the two-paragraph section on “Protection of Humanitarian Operations.” Peace support operations:

> are increasingly conducted in situations in which there are wide spread and ongoing abuses to basic human rights, ethnic cleansing and genocide. Such abuses frequently occur in collapsed or collapsing states in which the rule of law has ceased to exist. Only a PSF [peace support force] prepared for combat can operate in such an environment, curtail human rights abuses, and create a secure environment in which civilian agencies can redress the underlying causes of the conflict and address the requirements of peace building.\(^71\)

While not tailored for humanitarian intervention missions *per se*, NATO doctrine covers operations from peace support to full combat. Its emphasis is the opposite of that offered by the UN and other organizations that walk toward the use of force with great caution. In contrast to such organizations, NATO is guarded in its approach to civilian-oriented peacebuilding efforts. This is understandable given NATO’s historical roots as a defensive organization.

NATO doctrine argues for a clear separation between peacekeeping, which implies non-use of force except in self-defense and full consent of the local parties, and peace enforcement, in which full consent may be lacking and force may be used in an impartial manner to uphold the mission mandate. Any peace support force must be correctly tailored to its operational environment. A force outfitted for peacekeeping should not attempt peace enforcement, and vice versa. Therefore, if a force outfitted for peacekeeping were to witness a loss of local consent and a rapid escalation of violence against civilians, the doctrine would recommend either that the force be withdrawn or fully replaced. Given that genocide and ethnic cleansing often emerge suddenly in regions of conflict, NATO doctrine suggests that forces

---

\(^68\) JWP 3-50 (revised, 2004), p. 5-22.
\(^69\) Discussion with official from the UK Centre for Doctrinal Development.
may withdraw in the face of mass slaughter if reinforcements cannot arrive in time or if political will is lacking.

NATO doctrine includes various mission tasks that are potentially applicable to civilian protection. These include the imposition of no-fly zones, the forcible separation of belligerent parties, the establishment and supervision of protected or safe areas, and the creation of “safe corridors” for the passage of civilians and aid flows. In NATO’s *Peace Support Operations Techniques and Procedures* (August 2001), many of the operational missions and tasks outlined also have clear applicability to protecting civilians. This includes “Humanitarian Relief,” “Restoration of Law and Order Operations,” “Protection of Humanitarian Operations and Human Rights,” “Conflict Containment,” “Establishment of Protected or Safe Areas,” and “Guarantee and Denial of Movement Operations.” Few of these tasks make protection the explicit purpose, however. The section on “Denial of Movement Operations” comes close, presuming that a force capable of peace enforcement and escalation may be tasked with preventing “harassment of an unprotected population.”

The United States has extensive doctrine at many levels (tactical, operational, service-oriented, and joint) for peace support operations. Much of this doctrine was first developed in the 1990s, and some has been updated to reflect changes since then. The Army, which is organized to take part in long-term missions, is perhaps the branch of the US military most prepared for peace and stability operations. In contrast, given its expeditionary nature, the Marine Corps is often the first branch of the military to arrive at the site of a crisis. As a result, civilian protection tasks might, in fact, be most relevant to Marine Corps doctrine, as a large-scale genocidal or ethnic cleansing campaign is likely to require a rapid, responsive intervention. In a section devoted to Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), the Marine Corps doctrine, MCDP 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations*, explains that Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) “are usually the first forces to reach the scene and are often the precursor to larger Marine and joint forces.” If large-scale violence was to break out, therefore, forward-deployed, quick-reacting MAGTFs could play a significant role in organizing an immediate response.

In a chapter entitled “MAGTF Reconnaissance and Security Operations,” MCDP 1-0 acknowledges that the protection of civilians will be a necessary component of many MOOTWs: “Security operations in MOOTW are complicated by the requirement to extend the protection of the force to include civilians and other nongovernmental organizations.” In this context, civilian protection is construed as a “requirement” imposed on the military from the outside and as a complication rather than a goal. It is something for the military to overcome as it pursues other mission goals, rather than something it will actively pursue. Likewise, it is not clear whether the civilians referenced in this passage are local civilians, or those with NGOs or international organizations as part of the mission.

MCDP 1-0 also includes a recognition that, in a situation where a local government is incapable of providing “the necessary security and law and order for itself or its population,” the MAGTF could be called on to uphold the rule of law. Although military police remain the preferred forces for such “law-and-order missions,” the MAGTF can be used “to maintain general law and order, establish a civil defense effort, and protect the government infrastructure.”

The US Marine Corps’ doctrine for *Expeditionary Operations* (MCDP 3) of 1998 describes a hypothetical intervention into a chaotic West Africa in 2017 to defeat forces that led a coup and launched genocide.

---

72 ATP-3.4.1.1.
74 MCDP 1-0, p. 11-17.
75 MCDP 1-0, p. 10-19.
76 MCDP 1-0, p. 10-19. A large-scale break down in law and order could be a contributing factor to genocide or ethnic cleansing, as during the Rwanda genocide of 1994.
The goal is to defeat those forces and to “stop the tribal slaughter.”77 The scenario reflects a Marine Corps recognition that it could engage in a large-scale intervention in the face of genocide in the not-so-distant future. Such a scenario would clearly require a mix of war-fighting and civilian protection capacity, reflecting the Marine Corps preparation to respond to a wide range of crises. The doctrine does not, however, go into detail about the tasks and training necessary for such an operation.

US Army doctrine for Stability Operations and Support Operations (FM 3-07) of February 2003 also touches on civilian protection issues. Like NATO doctrine, US Army doctrine divides peace operations into peacekeeping and peace enforcement, separating these missions based on the level of consent among local parties. Likewise, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations are distinct from war-fighting based on their impartial application of force.

The doctrine identifies various subordinate tasks within peace enforcement, many of which are applicable to civilian protection scenarios. These include “Forcible separation of belligerents,” “Establishment and supervision of protected areas,” “Sanction and exclusion zone enforcement,” “Movement denial and guarantee,” “Restoration and Maintenance of Order,” and “Protection of humanitarian assistance.” The goal of these tasks is to “establish a safe and secure environment.”78

Other types of military operations described in US Army doctrine also touch on civilian protection issues, but none fully addresses the scenario of an intervention in a non-permissive environment to halt ongoing abuses. For example, the doctrine categorizes “Relief Operations” as a type of “Support Operation” in which troops “respond to and mitigate the effects of natural or man-made disasters.” While the focus of such operations is to “mitigate damage, loss, hardship, or suffering,” they are undertaken “[t]o support the efforts of local authorities or the lead agency.”79 Such a precondition presumes that the “local authorities” are not themselves responsible for abuses against civilians, and that the operational environment is sufficiently calm such that a “lead agency” other than the military effectively intervene.

The task “Support to Civil Law Enforcement” in response to “Civil Disturbances” similarly touches on, but does not encompass civilian protection. While the actions necessary to halt genocide in Rwanda in 1994 could be conceived of as efforts to quell extreme “civil disturbances,” US Army doctrine focuses on domestic disturbances where local law enforcement agencies are, by and large, cooperative and desirous of an end to violence:

In extreme cases, civil disturbances may include criminal acts of terrorism and violence.... The Army has a role in assisting civil authorities to restore law and order when local and state law enforcement agencies are unable to quell civil disturbances. Under provisions of the Constitution and selected federal statutes, the president may order federal armed forces to aid local and state civil authorities to protect the Constitutional rights of citizens.80

The relevant case for such operations is the Los Angeles riots of 1992, not the Bosnia of the early 1990s, the Rwanda of 1994, or the present situation in Darfur, Sudan. Nevertheless, if one were to apply this concept of operation to the most egregious situations in foreign states, the result might be something quite close to a civilian protection mission.

An appendix in US Army Stability Operations and Support Operations doctrine on “Refugees and Displaced Persons” addresses some protection issues of concern to humanitarian actors and relief organizations. The focus is on protection in mostly-permissive environments stable enough for civilian

79 FM 3-07, p. 6-9.
80 FM 3-07, p. 6-21.
organizations to operate effectively, rather than on the high-end protection necessary in cases of ongoing genocide or ethnic cleansing:

Military forces have been called on to secure displaced persons within their country of origin. Support for IDPs can take several forms. Often, relief convoys need military security. At times, military forces must insulate internally displaced groups from the population at large. Safe areas may be established to ensure the safety of the targeted group. As with military support to refugee operations, the military forces operate with their civilian partners.81

Such tasks, which are often referred to as “civilian protection” by both military actors and civilian humanitarians,82 could be important for saving lives in a non-permissive environment with large-scale violence against civilians. By themselves, however, protection of IDP camps, relief convoys and safe areas would be unlikely to halt genocide or ethnic cleansing.

Even without explicit US doctrine for civilian protection missions, one military expert was optimistic. “It’s not that bad,” he suggested, saying that “you can draft all the doctrine you would need.” Even without relevant doctrine, militaries have a certain degree of flexibility and can “train up” for specific missions when necessary.83

**Action Without Doctrine: The AU and ECOWAS**

No doctrine yet exists for the military operations of the African Union. Nor is there much evidence of written doctrines at the national level by the lead countries within Africa for peace operations, let alone for civilian protection missions. Yet the AU’s plan to develop the African Stand-by Force by 2010 as an intervention force will require doctrine.

The Policy Framework for establishing the ASF, adopted by the African Chiefs of Defense Staff in May 2003, sets forth six potential conflict scenarios, escalating in intensity and use of force from *Scenario 1* (military advice to a political mission) to *Scenario 4* (regional peacekeeping force under Chapter VI), *Scenario 5* (AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping mission – low level spoilers) and *Scenario 6* (AU intervention, e.g., genocide situations where international community does not act promptly).84 Scenario 6 is the only one in which the AU suggests a nation take the lead:

Based on the level of coherence required at the field HQ level for an intervention mission, particularly those involving an opposed early deployment, such operations are best conducted by a coalition under a lead nation. The initial entry may best be undertaken by the lead nation with rapid follow-up by the other nations in the coalition. This would mean that the lead nation HQ would need to deploy “as is,” with limited change to its existing structure to cater for multinational representation. For this reason a proposed structure for a mission HQ for Scenario 6 (intervention) is not shown. As a long term goal, the ASF should be capable of conducting such interventions without reliance on lead nations. This would require a standing AU Multinational military HQ at above brigade level, plus the capability to assemble and deploy rapidly will prepared and capable military contingents.85

---

81 FM 3-07, p. F-3.
82 For example, see the OCHA website “Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict” at http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha Ol/civilians/.
83 Interview, October 2004. While the opportunity to “train up” certainly exists, as discussed later, US commanders are reportedly not asking for such training for troops deploying from the United States to Iraq and Afghanistan.
In addition to listing scenarios, the AU needs to work with the sub-regional Africa groups to identify which scenarios will be conducted by whom, or what the terms of reference/areas of responsibility are. The ASF is an extremely ambitious concept which could drive development of standardized doctrine and procedures for forces, equipment lists, recognition of capacity gaps, and policy standardization. If the AU wants sub-regional forces to intervene to stop crimes against humanity and genocide, then the sub-regional organizations must first adopt frameworks that include such missions. Yet African sub-regional organizations have not all aligned with the AU Policy Framework or defined the specific types of missions in which they will engage. The AU mandate’s interventionist principles contradicts those of SADC, for one, which is non-interventionist.\textsuperscript{86}

ECOWAS Secretariat staff (DES-PADS) is developing a concept paper on the ECOWAS regional standby force, which it is calling a task force. The task force concept goes hand-in-hand with an effort to develop written doctrine, which ECOWAS does not yet have.\textsuperscript{87} Yet efforts to develop an ECOWAS doctrine are unlikely to start with scenarios that include civilian protection. According to one ECOWAS advisor involved in this project, he was “not aware of anything that meets the definitions and scenarios” of civilian protection.\textsuperscript{88} The current efforts by ECOWAS to develop its doctrine and the concept for its task force, however, offer possible avenues for the organization to consider civilian protection as one of its potential missions.

\textsuperscript{86} SADC’s interventions in the DRC and Lesotho, however, challenge this view.

\textsuperscript{87} Data from discussions with officials at ECOWAS Secretariat, June 2004. With the support of Canada, ECOWAS was to have additional staff seconded from its member states by late 2004, in part to support the development of ECOWAS doctrine.

\textsuperscript{88} Discussion at ECOWAS Secretariat, June 2004.
5. **Training, Simulations and Gaming**

Training is regularly emphasized as a necessary component of civilian protection operations. What are the tasks most likely to require use of force on behalf of civilians in a peace support operation or an intervention? What are the techniques, tactics and strategies to be employed for providing protection or compelling compliance? These questions are a few that doctrines usually address, and from which training programs, including simulations and gaming, build their objectives.

Without clear doctrine for civilian protection, however, traditional military training programs, simulations and gaming exercises are unlikely to be designed to prepare forces specifically for this type of mission. Training programs for peace operations are more likely to address some aspects of civilian protection, as contingents and leaders acknowledge that they may face scenarios involving civilians at risk. Moreover, militaries may be able to tailor pre-deployment training to the specific mission tasks, including civilian protection. But on the whole, the need generated by increased UN peace operations with civilian protection mandates far exceeds current training efforts. Civilian protection “is on the radar screens,” one US military training expert said, pointing to the UN mandates. Yet there is “not really” any training to prepare for upholding these mandates.

As current military deployments in complex missions find a place between traditional peacekeeping and war-fighting operations, a shift in training may precede doctrinal development for these operations. For example, troops involved in the US-sponsored multinational *Cobra Gold* exercise organized by US Pacific Command (PACOM) will face a Chapter VII scenario involving a hand-off from an intervention force to a UN force in 2005. The forces will be challenged to work with a transitional administration and will likely engage in civilian protection. In addition, US Marines in Iraq are reportedly using the Internet to share ideas about doctrine and scenarios they currently face on the ground, creating new guidance in real-time. Websites such as platoonleader.army.mil and www.companycommander.com offer an opportunity for company commanders and platoon leaders to share information about present day operations. Finally, the US Military Academy at West Point is designing a new class to look at “winning the peace” in a post-conflict scenario. The class will include a simulation and has the potential to be used more broadly, outside the classroom.

Additional training, however, is not universally seen as the key to successful civilian protection operations. One DPKO official suggested that protection missions required troops with basic military skills and good command and control in the operation, not specific training for civilian protection. This emphasis on leadership was also expressed many times. A US military training expert suggested that civilian protection missions are defined by the threat facing the mission, and therefore, the question was the intensity at which troops would fight or operate, not specialized skills.

**United Nations**

The training of military and civilian personnel is primarily the responsibility of individual countries. UN troop contributing countries are urged to provide skilled and capable peacekeepers. Numerous bilateral, multinational and UN efforts, however, try to help increase the training and skills of peacekeepers before they deploy to a mission. Civilian protection is gaining increased attention as a potential role for UN peacekeepers, though training programs have yet to integrate it fully. The United Nations Institute for

---

90 Interview, October 2004.
91 Interview, intelligence consultant to US Marine Corps.
92 Interview, August 2004, the United Nations.
93 Interview, August 2004, Washington, DC.
Training and Research (UNITAR), for example, does not offer training modules that deal with the questions of intervention for civilian protection, according to its director. 94

The DPKO’s Training and Evaluation Service (TES) provides, in principle, training support for troop contributing countries prior to deployment (unless the troops are highly-experienced). One aspect of training is to teach the rules of engagement for the mission. 95 TES can offer teams for “train the trainer” workshops and assistance to regional centers for training. TES does not train soldiers directly, however, with the exception of staff and senior staff in pre-deployment sessions. 96 The UN also has the ability to send out assessment teams to identify areas where troops are not meeting UN standards.

The UN has developed Standard Generic Training Modules (SGTMs), put forward by TES, which focus on tactical-level, individual training. They include lessons on human rights and humanitarian assistance with references to civilian protection. They do not, however, explicitly discuss the tasks or circumstances that peacekeepers or peace enforcers are likely to encounter during civilian protection missions. In an introductory SGTM lesson on the UN Charter, international law and rules of engagement, a section on ROE explains the concept of using force to defend civilians, preferably with a commander’s permission and when competent local authorities are absent. 97 The UN community is now developing Standard Training Modules (STM) for more senior mission leadership, which will reportedly have civilian protection components.

With the dramatic increase in UN peace operations, UN member states are beginning to recognize the need to improve the coordination and depth of UN training. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping reported in March 2004 that:

In the area of training, the Committee supports enhancing the coordination of the DPKO’s military, civilian police and civilian training activities, and requests that the Secretary-General report, at the next session, on ways to further improve this coordination, including the feasibility of establishing a single multidimensional training unit, closely linked to the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit. The Committee, therefore, encourage [sic] the strengthening of training coordination at United Nations Headquarters. It also fully endorses the establishment of mission training cells and would welcome more detailed information on how these will function. It supports the Department’s new focus on providing national and regional peacekeeping training centres with the necessary guidance for training peacekeeping personnel. Also welcome was the introduction of Standardized Generic Training Modules.”98

Much of the work developing the conceptual framework for civilian protection is based in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which sees the protection of civilians as a core element of its role. In developing a policy framework for protection in collaboration with other UN departments, humanitarian agencies and interested countries, OCHA is working to focus more attention on this issue within the Security Council and key Secretariat departments. Linking the protection of civilians to operational results is still in the early stages, it appears. In working with DPKO, OCHA is likely to face challenges between its humanitarian role and the more security-oriented, peacekeeping goals of DPKO.

94 Interview with Harvey Langholtz, Director, UNITAR Programme of Correspondence Instruction in Peacekeeping Operations, June 2004. He welcomes a contribution of such a course, however.
95 Interview, TES, August 2004.
96 One challenge for the UN in providing training is the language barrier present between the UN personnel and the member states’ troops.
97 SGTM 1.1@30June03, Slide 18, page 16, point 1.8 under “Options of each ROE.”
If the UN’s training efforts on civilian protection are still in their infancy, what other training programs for peace operations, whether operational, tactical or strategic, address civilian protection? What is the nature of pre-deployment training for UN missions with civilian protection mandates? Unfortunately, the UN does not coordinate directly with many national training programs or training centers. Even TES has difficulty getting information on which nations are receiving or offering bilateral training explicitly designed for peace operations.99

**Multinational Training Programs**

NATO has the Working Group on Training and Education for Peace Support Operations (TEPSO), which is designed to help coordinate national training and education programs, assist with standardization, and identify new training objectives based on lessons learned.100 The Lester Pearson Center in Canada has been a leader in training and education on all aspects of peace operations. According to a senior official there, however, he was not aware of any courses that address civilian protection specifically.101 Nor was he or others interviewed aware of these issues being addressed within the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC).102

Numerous countries run peace operations training programs for foreign militaries. For African nations, for example, programs include those of the United Kingdom (British Military Advisory and Training Team, BMATT), France (Reinforcement of African Peace-keeping Capacities, RECAMP) and the United States (African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance, ACOTA). Although these training programs are designed to improve capacity for peacekeeping, knowledgeable military officers from Britain, France and the US involved in these programs were not aware of any attempts to train for civilian protection operations.103 The ACOTA program, for one, uses modular segments that are based on a DPKO-sanctioned Program of Instruction (POI). This POI includes human rights, refugee protection, force protection, and lethal training for combat situations in peace enforcement missions. The program also includes command and staff training through computer simulations. The instruction list from ACOTA’s predecessor, the African Crisis Response Initiative, included general tasks that could have applied to protection missions (e.g., protect non-combatants, conduct patrols, defend a convoy, control civilian movement).104

The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC), newly opened in Ghana, is designed to serve multiple audiences, including Ecowas, the African Union, the UN and the international community. KAIPTC plans to be the West African center that focuses on operational issues for civilian and military personnel (the Nigerian War College handles strategic training and the Center in Koulikaro, Mali handles tactical training). It hosts a wide range of meetings, conferences and training programs. Recent programming involved both RECAMP and IAPTC, and included sessions to develop Standardized Teaching Modules. Employees of KAIPTC could help design programs that address specific peace operations scenarios and are interested in questions of doctrine, scenarios, and research.

What is the vision for where training is to take soldiers? How is training designed if you don’t know the gap between where you want soldiers to be and where they are today? Still, training goals are derived from doctrine, but doctrine for use by training centers such as KAIPTC is not clearly identified. There is no evidence that there has been a harmonization effort for doctrines used by African troops working together. Nor has there been a harmonization of the doctrines underlying the bilateral training programs

99 Interview, DPKO, August 2004.
100 We were unable to access information on whether TEPSO addresses training for civilian protection missions.
101 Interview, June 2004.
102 This reflects multiple interviews with training experts, in June 2004, but this research did not include direct discussions with the training centers within IAPTC. Individual centers may address civilian protection issues.
103 Interviews, May and June 2004.
104 African Crisis Response Initiative POI Index, Course Summary Sheets.
of the French, British and the United States in Africa (and elsewhere) despite talks about this at the “P-3” level. Thus, developments in training may actually precede doctrinal advances.

In some regions, it is a challenge to get fully formed units for training purposes – and to have those trained groups also deploy together. Units are often formed specifically for a mission, with positions “filled in” with troops from other units to complete a battalion, for example. About 80 percent of African forces are not self-sustaining, with newly created units the most challenged. Thus, even when formed units are deployed to the field, they may receive unfamiliar equipment, which they are not prepared to operate, creating a “hidden training problem.”

United States

A fundamental tension arises over whether current US training programs truly prepare American armed forces for complex peace and stability operations – let alone for specific civilian protection tasks. This goes back to doctrine, in part. “If it is not in doctrine,” one US military official pointed out, “they won’t teach it.” Some officials at training institutions felt that neither US Army nor joint military training programs focused sufficiently on likely scenarios for US armed forces. One suggested that while 80 percent of military missions are civilian-related, 80 percent of training is for combat.

The Pentagon, however, is reportedly re-evaluating US preparation for peace and stability operations, with an effort to increase capacity for such operations in 2005. Given the breadth of US training programs, it is likely that some programs will address aspects of civilian protection, although identifying these areas is difficult without a common language.

Pre-deployment training is more likely than general training to address the specific challenges expected to face contingents. Contingent leaders (e.g., battalion, brigade) can help design the tactical training for their soldiers. Three major US centers for pre-deployment training provide at least some scenarios involving civilians: the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA; the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, LA; and Hohenfels Combat Maneuver Training Center in Germany.

Fort Irwin focuses on more traditional combat operations. One NGO participant in a recent training session there described it as “a waste of time” since the exercise did not realistically incorporate NGOs and emphasized more force-on-force operations. An Army major who had served in Sarajevo found the NTC training “stifling” in its concentration on heavy forces, and did not reflect “the way it works” in stability operations. Hohenfels, which focuses on force maneuver training for all USAREUR Combat Battalions, includes support for NATO training with Germany, France, Canada, and the Netherlands and training for peace operations prior to deployments such as Kosovo. Reportedly its training includes role-playing by civilians.

Fort Polk is considered the site most likely to train US troops in realistic scenarios prior to deployment in stability or peace operations. In three week mission readiness exercises, training includes civilians

---

105 Data from interviews at the Kofi Annan Center, June 2004, Accra, Ghana.
106 Interview, October 2004.
107 Interview, military civ-mil training expert, October 2004.
108 Interview, representative of CARE, October 2004.
109 Interview, October 2004.
110 From Global Security.org: “Civilians on the Battlefield, or COBs… have been used at CMTC since the early 1990s to portray civilian ethnic groups and organizations that Army units might encounter when deployed. The COB’s mission is to add realism to situations where units might have to deal with civilian populations while conducting military operations.”
111 From Global Security.org: “The combined-arms nature of most contingency missions has drawn heavy armored units into JRTC training. Contingency and special operations soldiers – including paratroopers, air assault soldiers, Special Forces and Rangers – are among the first called in a military crisis. They must deploy on short notice and be prepared to fight upon arrival. In most situations, however, they can expect to operate with heavy armored units.
posing as inhabitants of the future deployment area. One official at the JRTC at Fort Polk, however, bluntly stated that Center failed to make the training sessions realistic enough or to provide enough training for the scenarios likely to prepare the forces for peace and stability operations.\textsuperscript{112}

The last time one expert could remember the US preparing for an intervention with a training package was for Haiti, when General Joseph Kinzer reportedly used the National Simulation Center to train his forces. Since then, however, this training expert said, “I don’t know of any modules that are focused on protection.”\textsuperscript{113} He expressed the view that there was increased interest, however, at looking at the role of US military police, simulations with human factors, and scenarios more reflective of current challenges. Even with these challenges, however, militaries can train up to meet the situations they will face.

The US Army’s 1998 \textit{Stability and Support Operations Training Support Package} includes a combination of classroom learning lesson plans and situational training exercises to address issues such as rules of engagement and use of force.\textsuperscript{114} While there is not explicit discussion of civilian protection, the sample ROE used in the lessons are from Operation Restore Hope, which include use of deadly force to defend the lives of persons in areas under US control. Tasks for training include delivering supplies or humanitarian aid, convoy security, controlling civilian movement and reacting to civil disturbance.

\textbf{Exercises & Simulations}

Military training exercises range widely, from the seniority of the forces and command in the exercise, to the realism of the environment, and to the kinds of tasks involved. They can include joint training, combat training centers, live fire, logistics, and tactical exercises, for example. Simulations can also provide a training alternative, and be conducted in multiple ways with varied scenarios. Are there military exercises and simulations that involve non-permissive environments in which military forces are challenged to protect civilians? While there is no clear shift to organizing simulations and gaming for operations involving peace support operations, there are likely to be more than we found. A few examples show perhaps growing interest.

The United Kingdom’s Peacekeeping Team in the Foreign Commonwealth Office is involved in a series of map-based role-playing exercises (MapEx). Their stated aim is to help implement the Brahimi Report, improve on past operations’ capacities, increase interoperability and planning experience, and help create training capacities within participating nations. Past operations include \textit{Blue Pelican} (UK, France, and ECOWAS in Nigeria), \textit{Blue Elephant} (Thailand), \textit{Blue Puma} (Argentina), \textit{Blue Lion} (Senegal), \textit{Blue Tiger} (Bangladesh), and \textit{Blue Jaguar} (Paraguay). An exercise is planned for 2005 in Romania.\textsuperscript{115} These exercises involve complex operations, civilians at risk, and mandates that mirror current UN mandates for peace operations.

As noted earlier, another established training series with possible civilian protection aspects is the US-sponsored \textit{Cobra Gold}, an annual multinational exercise developed with US Pacific Command (PACOM). In 2005, the exercise will be led by the US Marine Corps, with participation including Japan, Singapore, Thailand, India and possibly other countries, as well as multiple military, UN and civilian actors. While the exercise is still in the planning stage, those involved in its planning at the US Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance in Hawaii, which reports to PACOM, believe it is likely to involve civilian protection scenarios, including military use of force to defend UN mandates, local personnel and UN personnel.\textsuperscript{116}

equipped with tanks and armored personnel carriers. During JRTC training, heavy and light units now team up for a true-to-life training experience.”
\textsuperscript{112} Interview, October 2004.
\textsuperscript{113} Interview, October 2004.
\textsuperscript{114} Headquarters, Department of the Army, Training Circular 7-98-1.
\textsuperscript{115} Email correspondence, Peacekeeping Team, Conflict Issues Group, FCO, United Kingdom, October 2004.
\textsuperscript{116} Interview, Center for Excellence, October 2004.
Since NATO partners are preparing for non-Article V missions (e.g., peace operations, peacebuilding), the US Joint Forces Command (Norfolk, VA) is interested in developing better scenarios for simulation of likely joint operations, and is working on a task list for the crisis response missions for operations involving NATO. One Joint Forces official pointed out that the US did not have preparation for these missions “in their tool kit.” Since the focus has been on pre-deployment training, this effort could lead to more regularized training for operations likely to involve civilian protection, involving multiple services and countries.

One simulation model for peace support operations is the Deployable Exercise Support (DEXES). A project of US Southern Command, DEXES is a simulation program designed to support bilingual international training exercises in military operations other than war (MOOTW). DEXES is a computer-based simulation that attempts to chart complex factors that influence the success or failure of peace operations. It uses discrete events and player choices to influence a broad set of variables describing social interaction in the host country. Variables include the pace of economic growth, the level of civil unrest, the amount of political participation, and the level of popular support for the peacekeeping forces, among others. An event or player choice that causes a change in one variable will cause changes in other related variables. For example, if a peacekeeping convoy accidentally runs over a civilian, DEXES calculates a slight decrease in popular support for the peacekeeping forces and a potential increase in the perceived bias of the peacekeeping forces. If not addressed, these changes spur changes in other variables, such as a decrease in political participation and an increase in armed conflict.

DEXES includes variables for social conditions such as ethnic distrust, civil unrest, armed conflict, number of displaced persons, public health conditions such as daily civilian mortality rate; political conditions such as government corruption and competence; economic conditions; and the public opinion of various ethnic groups. DEXES is often used during Command Post Exercises in order to simulate the passage of time.

Finally, there is suggestion that other areas of military research – the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Air Force Research Center, and the J-9 Experiment Group (psychological operations) among others – are “playing” on some aspects of the civilian protection question.

---

117 Interview, October 2004.
118 For example, a force might train for a particular scenario typical for the early stages of a peace operation. Overnight, they might use DEXES in order to simulate the passage of a number of months. The next morning, they will be presented with an entirely new scenario, typical of a later stage of peace operations.
6. The Bottom Line? Mandates and Rules of Engagement

A suicide attacker posing as a beggar wounded three soldiers from the NATO-led peacekeeping force and killed an Afghan girl Saturday on a street popular with Western souvenir shoppers.\(^{119}\)

Reacting to immediate threats to themselves or others, military personnel face difficult choices in situations where the difference between an aggressor and a non-combatant are blurred. The rules of engagement for military forces are central to their decision-making about the use of force. Split-second decisions about appropriate action depend on a soldier’s understanding of the ROE, the mandate from which it is derived, and the goals of the operation. One US Army colonel suggested the bottom line for using force to protect civilians in operations rests with the ROE. Regardless of the wording of the mandate, the intervening force’s doctrine, and the level of troops’ training, sufficiently robust rules of engagement are necessary for civilian protection to take place.\(^{120}\)

What are the rules of engagement for missions, then, involving civilian protection, and how are they put to use? Moving authority from a Security Council mandate, to the negotiated official ROE for the mission, to the small, laminated ROE cards given to troops is not a certain path. There is room for interruptions and interpretations of the ROE, depending on how the use of force is seen by various contingents, their commanders, the force commander, the Special Representative of the Secretary General, the DPKO, and the Secretary-General. For some missions, ROE may not even exist. When Nigerian troops deployed to Liberia in 2003, the force reportedly landed on the ground without any written ROE from ECOWAS because the regional organization has “none.”\(^{121}\)

Within the United Nations, ROE derive from mandates, but there is a great deal of interpretation even within peacekeeping missions with traditional “self-defense” ROE. More challenging are missions where force is clearly to be used to compel compliance or to protect individuals. Within the UN Handbook, field personnel are told that

…use of force by the military component will depend on the mandate of the peacekeeping operation and the rules of engagement; sometimes the Security Council will authorize a peacekeeping operation to use armed force in situations other than in self-defense. The circumstances under which the operation may use armed force will then be spelt out in the relevant resolution in the Council. The rules of engagement for the peacekeeping operation will clarify the different levels of force that can be used in various circumstances, how each level of force should be used and any authorizations that may need to be obtained from commanders.\(^{122}\)

Rules of engagement are intended to instruct the forces in how to operate in the field to carry out the UN mandate. ROE are not standardized, however; while the UN has developed draft rules of engagement, they are adapted and written specifically for each operation based on the Security Council mandate of the mission. The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping approves the ROE that are drafted by Military Advisor’s office in DPKO and the UN Office of Legal Affairs and provides them to the mission’s Force Commander. The Force Commander can request changes.

---


\(^{120}\) Personal interview, June 2004. Col. Dooley served as acting director of the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, USA.

\(^{121}\) Interview, ECOWAS, June 2004.

Actual rules of engagement for specific UN operations are not public, making it difficult to analyze how contingents operated. Even in Chapter VI missions, peacekeepers have protected civilians while operating under mandates allowing force only in “self-defense.” In his memoir *Shake Hands With the Devil*, Lt. General Dallaire of Canada explains how he instructed his troops within the under-manned and overwhelmed Chapter VI UNAMIR mission during the Rwanda genocide to stand guard in front of a stadium and protect the civilians inside it. The troops managed to successfully defend the stadium without bullets, through their sheer presence.

Troop actions may also be affected by other agreements between the troop contributing country (TCC), the UN, and the host country. For example, Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) between the receiving country and the UN may constrain how troops are deployed within a mission. Nations may negotiate separate *Memoranda of Understanding* (MOU) ordering that their forces not engage in certain types of behavior. In such cases, troops may be prohibited from acting in more volatile regions, or in roles for which they are not prepared. In many multilateral operations, even if robust, effective ROE are negotiated for the mission, individual nations can often order their forces to follow separate, more restrictive ROE.

In the DRC, for example, both Morocco and Uruguay issued MOUs restricting their troops participation in the more robust aspects of the mission. The Uruguayans, in particular, were constitutionally forbidden from participating in Chapter VII UN operations, and therefore could not take part in certain types of mission tasks.\(^\text{123}\)

Troop contingents may also be constrained by their own standard ROE. ROE are more likely to reduce, rather than increase, the use of force, but this can have just as deleterious an impact as the use of too much force.\(^\text{124}\) Consider, for example, the United States view of the legal aspects of ROE:

 ROE provide restraints on a commander’s action consistent with both domestic and international law and may, under certain circumstances, impose greater restrictions on action than those required by the law. For many contemporary missions, particularly peace operations, the mission is stated in a document such as a UN Security Council Resolution, e.g., UNSCR 940 in Haiti or UNSCR 1031 in Bosnia. These Security Council Resolutions also detail the scope of force authorized to accomplish the purpose stated therein.\(^\text{125}\)

ROE depend on the authorization of the military leadership of a contingent, and the extent to which the contributing nation has its own constraints on using force.\(^\text{126}\) Japan, for example, sent troops to Somalia and Iraq, but these troops are not to use force except in self-defense.\(^\text{127}\) In addition, the willingness of individual states to use force during military operations does not necessarily translate into such willingness on the part of the multinational organizations to which these states belong. Many countries

\(^{123}\) Noteworthy is the Uruguayans honorable effort to defend civilians in Ituri in 2003 after forces prepared for guard duty were deployed into a dangerous, non-permissive environment. They were not the right force for that mission, which was eventually taken on by the EU-authorized French-led forces, and then followed by more combat-ready UN forces.


\(^{125}\) US Army, “Chapter Five,” www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETInternet/Homepages/AC/CLAMO-
Public.nsf/0/1af4860452f962e085256a490049856f?FILE/Chapter%205%20-
%20Rules%20of%20Engagement.htm.

\(^{126}\) Some Parliaments, such as those of the Netherlands and Italy, control authorization for militaries to be provided to peace operations. Some nations, such as Ireland, will not provide troops unless the UN authorizes the mission.

participating in SHIRBRIG provide military forces to the MNF in Iraq, but that has not meant that SHIRBRIG can shift its mandate and lead Chapter VII operations (which it currently does not run, though it provided a planning group for the UN mission in Liberia, which was established under a Chapter VII mandate).

In many cases, the explicit mandate of the mission is less important than the posture of the forces. The wording of MONUC's mandate in the DRC, for example, changed only slightly between 1999 and 2002. The willingness of the UN soldiers to use force in pursuit of this mandate changed, however, leading to attempts at civilian protection in Ituri following a sudden increase of violence in 2002. Likewise, although the mandate of ISAF in Afghanistan calls merely for the “maintenance of security,” the force has successfully protected civilians in Kabul from the violence and lawlessness endemic throughout the rest of the nation.

A recent workshop on the Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping Operations with the DPKO and former UN force commanders held by the International Peace Academy found that Council mandates do not authorize force robustly enough. Force commanders reported that protection often requires pre-emptive or preventive actions, yet they are often prohibited from acting except in response to opposing forces’ actions. In many cases, by the time they could respond, it was already too late for their actions to be effective. TCCs often had a mindset that reflected a “one-bullet-for-one-bullet” mentality, meaning that they would not act unless responding to attacks by a belligerent. While there was strong interest in the workshop topic, no consensus emerged, demonstrating the difficulty in building a consistent approach to use of force, and to civilian protection. The report also recommended increased training for peacekeeping forces. This recommendation, said the report author, was aimed at baseline capacities, however: troops needed better equipment, as well as further ROE and human rights training, for example.  

NATO also presumes a UN mandate unless Article V is invoked for defense, which requires an armed attack (a premise challenged by the Kosovo mission). Thus, UN mandates are also important for NATO forces. NATO doctrine also points to the ROE and mandates as central to their forces’ ability to protect civilians under threat:

The sensitive issues for PSF is whether to intervene in response to human rights abuses directed at civilians “on the ground.” Any authorization so to do [sic] would be found in applicable ROE. Such an intervention would only be legally permissible if authorized by applicable ROE and/or mandate. In formulating ROE, however, it should be borne in mind that a narrow and neutral concept of operations which limits itself to observation and reporting may not be appropriate in circumstances of widespread violations of human rights and ethnic cleansing even if it does reduce the risk of casualties to the PSF.

NATO doctrine also points out that contingents in the same operation may well operate under differing ROE. Moreover, even without undue restrictions on troops ROE, force commanders in multilateral operations are often beholden to political leaders at home rather than the requirements of the mission on the ground. One DPKO official recalled the frequent tendency of commanders to phone their capitals whenever the situation on the ground necessitated a robust response by peacekeepers. The commanders needed to request permission for specific types of operations, even if such operations clearly fell within the purview of their nation's ROE. Misunderstanding the ROE can also affect political decision-making. One UN official noted that political leaders would benefit from training in ROE and mandates, since they can easily misunderstand a peacekeeper’s legitimate use of force.

Trevor Findlay’s *Use of Force in Peace Operations* reviews the specific mandates for UN operations and analyzes how UN-led or UN-authorized missions actually operated in the field in regards to force, and the variance of interpretation of the rules of engagement and mandates. *Annex 1* provides a chart looking at selected UN-authorized or -led missions that involved mandates providing use of force or had civilian protection mandates. These mandates are a good starting point for analyzing the actual application of the mandates and ROE in the field.

The ROE for *Operation Restore Hope* in the long version makes explicit that troops can use force in self-defense to protect civilians, but this is not explicit in the “short” version of the ROE card given to troops. [See Box 2 below.] “Deadly force may be used to defend your life, the life of another US soldier, or the lives of persons in areas under US control,” the ROE instructs troops, “You are authorized to use deadly force in self-defense if...armed elements, mobs and/or rioters threaten human life.”

![Box 2]

---

In its Joint Publication 3-07.3 (1999), *Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Peace Operations*, the US military cites Terms of Reference (TOR) and ROE as key mechanisms to provide military leadership and troops with the rules of the road for operating within a UN peace operation, coalition, or multinational force. The TOR describe the implementation of the peace operation, and once approved by the country (the USA), they are sent from the UN or the sponsoring organizing to the Commander of the Mission when a Commander is appointed. It provides a useful list for any mission undertaking humanitarian protection in a non-permissive environment, including: Authority and purpose of the mission; the primary and secondary duties of the mission; the kind of reporting to make; information on the administrative and logistical support, relations with other UN agencies or mission, and the status of

---

negotiations with host countries; instruction on how to operate, including the use of weapons, chain of command and deployment guidance, etc.\textsuperscript{130}

Like both US Army and Joint doctrine, US Marine Corps doctrine for MOOTWs emphasizes legitimacy, restraint, avoidance of the use of deadly force, and rigorous adherence to rules of engagement that may be more restrictive than those associated with traditional wars.\textsuperscript{131}

Difficult scenarios can challenge a soldier’s understanding of the ROE and the use of force. One DPKO official described a scenario he poses to military personnel: 

\textit{Imagine a young teenage boy pointing a Kalashnikov gun at you: do you shoot or not?} The example sparks a conversation, he points out, with soldiers wondering if they will be court-martialed for a hostile act against a child or be killed themselves. As discussed earlier, there are websites used by US military personnel to share such ideas about potential situations they face in the field (e.g., Iraq). The website www.companycommander.com poses a problem similar to the one above. [See Box 3 below]

\begin{boxed quotations}
\textbf{Box 3}

\textbf{Scenario: Checkpoint ROE Trouble}

You are a company commander deployed to Iraq after ground combat has ended.

Several weeks into your deployment, one of your soldiers at the vehicle checkpoint is searching a truck when he finds what he believes to be a gun in the floor of the cab. He locks and loads his weapon and points it at the driver standing near the vehicle, screaming for him to hit the ground. The squad leader searches the vehicle only to find that the gun is really a toy and not dangerous. The civilian is obviously shaken by the scare. Your battalion commander hears of the incident and wants to do an investigation to determine if the soldier has broken the rules of engagement by his actions. What should you do? Rate the following courses of action:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Let the platoon leader take care of the matter.
  \item Give the soldier an Article 15 for excessive display of force against a friendly civilian.
  \item Review the rules of engagement with your key leaders to ensure they are correct and that everyone knows them.
  \item Award the soldier for taking the appropriate action in this case.
  \item Convince your battalion commander that there is no need for an investigation.
  \item Wait for the investigation to determine if there was an actual violation.
  \item Ask your battalion commander to allow you to conduct an informal inquiry into the situation and give your recommendation to her.
\end{itemize}

\textit{From the website companycommand.army.mil/cc.php}
\end{boxed quotations}

Answers that viewers chose are ranked, with a discussion section as well. For a question on the website about the application of ROE, the majority of more than 200 respondents selected “review the rules of

\textsuperscript{130} Joint Pub 3-07.3, Annex C to Appendix A, pages A-C-1 through A-C-4. A sample TOR is provided for the US Multinational Force Observer (MFO) deployment in the Sinai, a traditional peace operation not established by the United Nations.

\textsuperscript{131} MCDP 1-0, (10-2).
engagement” as their answer. Interestingly, one commentator wrote about the need for more ROE training for the scenarios troops face in Iraq:

If you have good discipline, good leadership, and trust in your men you won't have ROE problems…. I'd suggest using an incident where civilians were killed as a basis for your ROE training. The ROE situations the platoon commanders went over were good, but only as a start. Many of the ones from higher were simplistic and did not address real world issues and concerns of the troops. I'd say we were very successful - we did not have one Marine killed or wounded because he failed to act, or any ROE violations.\footnote{http://companycommand.army.mil/cc.php, October 2004.}

Development of common ROE associated with specific mandates could help develop better understanding of how forces can and should operate in such non-permissive environments. In turn, this could assist in development of doctrine, training for deployment, scenario-building, simulations, and better understanding by political and military leaders of the use of force in pursuit of civilian protection. Existing efforts to improve preparation could use clarification of how ROE work in the field, including training by TES and bilateral and regional training efforts.

There are developments underway that may assist this effort, including the development by the Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO) of a handbook for commanders on stability operations. Recognition of military police’s use of “rules of contact” for interacting with civilians, as opposed to ROE, could also expand this area of research.
7. Preliminary Findings

With the growing recognition that military forces can — and should — play a role in providing physical security for civilian populations threatened by genocide and ethnic cleansing, the unaddressed operational aspects of such missions take on increased importance. Militaries are being asked to carry out these operations without specific preparation for them. The requirements for such robust operations must be identified and integrated into the development of doctrine and training, as well as a common understanding of what these missions involve. One study of US Army roles in small-scale contingencies during the 1990s noted the need for “peacekeepers also to be capable of warfighting,” yet also argued that “task forces configured primarily for humanitarian missions might not be able simultaneously to conduct effective peace enforcement.”

A modern example demonstrates the challenge. In June 2004, the African Union announced plans to deploy an observer mission of 60 to 80 troops with an initial protection force of 300 to Darfur – an area roughly the size of France. The willingness of the AU to send troops (led by Nigeria and Rwanda) did not address what their mission would do and whether the troops would attempt to protect civilians. In mid-August, days before a contingent of roughly 135 Rwandan were to arrive, a BBC journalist asked the Rwandan Foreign Minister Charles Murigande about their mission. “If they came across militias attacking civilians…don’t they have a moral duty to protect the civilians under attack?” the journalist asked. The Foreign Minister responded, “Yes, they would have a moral duty.” The journalist pressed, asking if they would protect the civilians and fire on the militia. The Foreign Minister hedged. “I am not sure… Let’s allow them to go there to play out their mission,” he suggested, and see what they do given “their mandate.”

There is a huge difference between troops acting as interveners to protect civilians and operating as observers with their own force protection. How could a national leader on international radio not be “sure” of the mission of his troops in a foreign country?

The Rwandans are not the first troops to deploy without a clearly-known public mandate. The question is whether the troops themselves and their leaders understand their mission and rules of engagement, have the skills to carry the mission out, and are supported with sufficient forces and equipment to be successful. Further, the world believes that the AU forces are going to protect the people of Darfur from genocide, regardless of their primary mandate to monitor a ceasefire. It is likely that the local population thinks so as well. If the forces employed primarily to observe the situation on the ground and report back, even when civilians are endangered nearby, they will be soon be perceived as hapless and potentially complicit if they do not act. Official mandates will make little difference in such a situation.

The difficulties experienced in past interventions may now be repeated in Sudan: troops and leadership figuring out the mission after getting on the ground (e.g., ECOWAS in Liberia, 2003); civilian protection not being a clear mission goal despite mass deaths (e.g., Rwanda, Balkans); pledged troops deploying slowly (e.g., DRC, 2000); mismatched public and actual concepts of operations (e.g., Somalia, 1993);

133 Conrad Crane, Landpower and Crises: Army Roles and Missions in Smaller-Scale Contingencies During the 1990s, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, January 2001, page 17.
134 The mission’s purpose was further confused by statements by Nigerian President Obasanjo, who insisted that troops would provide civilian protection even as the force prepared to deploy as an official “observer” mission.
136 There have been competing public views of the role of the AU protection force accompanying the observers; Nigerian President Obasanjo, for one, has suggested they will do protection and intervene if forces threaten civilians. See Annex I for the (limited) language on civilian protection of the AU mandate for Darfur.
137 How the force and its leadership perceive the mandate and ROE can be as important as their actual language.
138 Peacekeepers in Haiti in the mid-1990s faced a similar situation which led to a change in their ROE.
limited or uncertain consent (e.g., East Timor, 1999) and a lack of logistics and enabling capacity, to name a few.

Recognition of Gaps
A number of gaps are evident between the mandates for civilian protection and the understanding of and preparations for such missions. Key issues include definitional language, doctrine and training, the emphasis on the military role, and the capacity for a range of scenarios.

Definitional Language. “Civilian protection” can mean many things to many people. Both Chapter VI and Chapter VII UN mandates refer to such missions, but under widely varying scenarios and capacities. The ROE, mission definitions and potential tasks within these operations should be delineated and compared, as well as the ways in which different actors (e.g., OCHA and DPKO) define them.

Humanitarian intervention falls somewhere beyond traditional peacekeeping operations (permissive environments, high consent, Chapter VI) and traditional war-fighting. Peace enforcement includes but does not define this concept; the UN can lead many Chapter VII operations, but relies on outside leadership for humanitarian intervention missions. Such UN missions are boxed-in between peace and war, with neither full consent nor a permissive environment. Thus, by their nature, they draw on both the efforts of the humanitarian community and military actions needed to provide security, but lack a common language to describe these operations and their goals.

Since the UN, regional organizations and many training programs follow the UN’s concept of peace operations, the UN plays a key role in defining civilian protection for peace and stability operations, as well as humanitarian intervention. Operations with protection requirements should be placed within a conceptual framework to clarify what is known about doctrine and training requirements, and to create a common terminology that can used universally.

Doctrine and Training. Major gaps exist in preparing forces for civilian protection. Peacekeepers are now being directed to carry out missions involving “protection of civilians under imminent threat” in six UN peace operations, yet this survey finds little evidence that member states and the UN know how to prepare them for specifically carrying out protection missions. One American military expert on peace and stability operations suggested that the only procedures for civilian protection were written 20 years ago – for VIPs. Canadian and British doctrines both recognize civilian protection as described in the ICISS report, but have yet to develop a fuller framework for protection operations. Most other doctrine reviewed here had little that addressed non-permissive environments where forces were tasked with defending civilians from violence.

Troops may have basic training for non-permissive environments, but it is unclear if they are prepared for their commander to order them to use force against belligerents who threaten civilians (e.g., “compel compliance” or “provide protection,” each with a wide-range of potential tasks). At many levels (strategic, tactical, operational) training for a military role in civilian protection is not evident. Without training, many contingents may not have learned tactics, techniques and procedures for such missions. This is not surprising, since doctrine for these missions is still to be fully developed.

TES provides pre-deployment training for troop contingents with an emphasis on the ROE, an important aspect in clarifying use of force and mission mandates, but not the whole picture. National-level training prepares many forces to be skilled in multiple environments, an important baseline for any mission. For some, the basic training is the most important, including the ability to follow the chain of command and

---

139 Additional interviews with UN force commanders and troop contributing countries would be useful to test this finding.
140 Interview, doctrine and training expert, October 2004.
understand the ROE. Others, however, argue that specialized training for civilian protection missions is crucial, since the environment and decision-making is not equivalent to either straight combat or peacekeeping scenarios.

*Emphasis Toward the Military Side Needed.* In refining the use of military force for humanitarian and peace operations, there has been more emphasis on the military’s role and expansion into support for assisting governance, development, peacebuilding and traditional humanitarian roles, rather than towards refining the discrete uses of force in non-permissive environments for humanitarian purposes (e.g., robust ROE; clear doctrine and tactics for militaries to deal with spoilers, militias and bad actors; logistical support including over-the-horizon forces that can reinforce peacekeepers on the ground; and scaling forces to respond to levels of escalating conflict. Developments in this direction perhaps reflect the dominance of the United Nations framework of peace operations, and its traditional caution about authorizing the use of force. As UN-led and UN-authorized operations shift toward more robust, Chapter VII mandates, however, UN peacekeepers may be more clearly required to put muscle into their actions on behalf of threatened civilian populations.

Gaps exist between the mandate to protect and the ability of some militaries to do so. Such gaps range from the willingness to use force to the understanding of ROE, from unity of command to resources, from doctrine to logistics. While the AU has become more active with peace operations and ECOWAS has deployed to multiple sites in West Africa, for instance, neither organization has the headquarters support and operational capacity of NATO or Western militaries. There are likely gaps in capacity for developing countries, as well as constraints on more capable forces to prepare properly.

*Capacity for a Range of Scenarios.* Civilian protection missions need to be successful at both ends of the use of force spectrum – ranging from protecting millions at risk in Sudan and stopping the slower but equally deadly mass deaths in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to managing a smaller area of conflict before it moves to large-scale violence, such as in Haiti or Cote d’Ivoire. Operational capacity should be built to address missions across this scale. Peace operations that include civilian protection and enforcement activities, for example, should also be better equipped and supported to conduct civilian protection within the frameworks of their missions – and help prevent break-out of larger-scale killing.

The “willingness” to use force is a question for every level of a mission. Within UN-led operations, this starts with the authorizing body (e.g., the United Nations) and runs through the political leadership (e.g., the UN Secretariat, the SRSG) to the force commander (in the field) to the leaders of individual sectors and troop contingents, and finally, to the individuals in the field. Willingness is also affected by the actors’ perception of the risks and level of force protection; the ability to do other tasks as part of the mission; the training and individual operational capacity of troop contingents; and the direction of the military leadership (at every level). This is not a question solely of mandates and rules of engagement, but of their interpretation.

**Filling Gaps**

This is a time of change for militaries and international organizations involved in the use of force, peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts. There are new opportunities to support improved operational capacity both within organizations and nations newly interested in taking on peace and stability operations, as well as within Western nations.

One strategy for filling the gaps is to work from the tactical, practical level upwards. Since development of tactics, techniques, and procedures frequently precede formal doctrine and training, developing those areas could be immediately beneficial (e.g., pre-deployment training, for starters), rather than waiting for training to be developed after approaching the national or multinational organizations to rewrite doctrine. That said, new reviews of doctrine – such as in the United States – offer an opportunity that should be pursued. Immediate efforts could bear fruit, such as creating draft scenarios of civilian protection.
missions; writing a generic task list for civilian protection missions; and working with those who are revising doctrinal materials at the United Nations. Developing draft doctrine would also be useful and spur discussion among different organizations, especially as the United Nations, United States, and United Kingdom work on new doctrine and the AU and ECOWAS seek to develop their own.

Doctrine is only one tool that needs improvement. Troops may have basic training for non-permissive environments, but it is unclear if they are prepared for their commander to order them to use force against belligerents who threaten civilians. UN training modules are still being developed, and use of force and civilian protection should be addressed within the STM and SGTM courses. UNITAR should develop a course as well. Developing training modules for use as UN POI or within the SGMs, for example, could be useful as well for training centers. Better analysis of and training on ROE could help both political leaders and troop contingents understand their meaning on the ground. This could help leadership to accommodate troops with different levels of comfort in use of force on the ground. Ultimately, it is the political leaders who decide the overall level of force employed; such leaders therefore need to be well-versed in ROE and the requirements of civilian protection missions.

Simulations, gaming and exercises could address the training question further, as development of likely scenarios with civilian protection could be useful for political gaming and military training. Further lessons could be drawn from analytic case studies of the on-going operations involving civilian protection requirements. Centers that can do analysis of missions and produce lessons learned studies (e.g., the Army Center for Lessons Learned, Institute for Security Studies, and the UN Best Practices Unit in DPKO) could assist by looking at the execution of these operations in the field to know how the mandates are actually being carried out.

**Time is Right**

Based on the responses in the interviews conducted for this study, there is a strong appetite for looking more deeply at the question of civilian protection operationally. For some, the interviews sparked curiosity about a topic that was new to them. Numerous people involved in aspects of peace and stability operations expressed their interest in developing better training capacity, holding workshops, assisting in curriculum development, improving doctrinal work, and designing scenarios. Others welcomed further analysis, suggesting it could be useful to their work on some area related to this question.

In cases of genocide, such as in Darfur, there is strong public debate about humanitarian intervention and how military and peacekeeping forces could try to save civilian lives. For less well-known catastrophes, such as in the DRC, there is little public debate about how UN peacekeepers face the challenge of protecting civilians in conflict. Whether in the spotlight or not, there is an immediate need to improve the operational capacity for these and other kinds of civilian protection missions. The UN is under major stress as it attempts to manage 16 peace operations, including five missions with explicit “protection of civilians” mandates. Thus, the apparent lack of clarity to define and prepare for protection missions within UN and military circles is surprising.

On the other hand, many observers feel there is a shift underway. As Iraq and Afghanistan suffer from continued instability, Western militaries such as the US are beginning to feel a strain over their capacities for complex missions and to look at developing better tools for establishing security in failed or failing states. Driven by new contingencies on the ground, leading militaries and multinational organizations are re-evaluating how they prepare for and engage in interventions. The UN, for its part, is developing more doctrine and training guidance, and looking at the use of force question. These shifts in thinking have led to a unique moment, where creative dialogue on the means of intervention is increasingly welcome. There is, perhaps, an opening for more capacity to be developed to meet the challenge of concepts like the *responsibility to protect.*
While normative frameworks for humanitarian intervention are often debated in academic circles, policy institutes, and international organizations, the how of conducting such operations is often ignored and left to militaries to figure out. Yet one senior military instructor noted that change within the military often comes from external civilian pressure to take new operations seriously, or from internal innovators who can help get civilians motivated to influence militaries. Further, he suggested that this kind of effort is needed today to prepare for all kinds of operations, whether in Iraq and Afghanistan, or for peace operations led by the United Nations.

There are timely opportunities to improve civilian and military preparation for missions where forces could provide protection to civilians. This study intends to provide the grounds for making good use of such openings, and to offer some avenues for meeting ideal goals with real operational capabilities.
# ANNEX 1: UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS FOR MISSIONS INVOLVING ASPECTS OF CIVILIAN PROTECTION

November 2004

This chart reviews Security Council resolutions providing mandates that involve or imply protection of civilians for missions led by the United Nations, multinational forces, or individual countries. The first section covers mandates with direct reference to civilian protection in Council resolution(s), such as “protect civilians” or “protection of civilians.” The second section looks at selected missions with implicit or possible civilian protection components and their Council resolutions. Both sections of the chart identify the conflict area and mission name, cite relevant UN Security Council resolutions, identify Chapter VII citations by the Council, excerpt specific language from UN resolutions, and identify mission force levels and the troop contributing countries.

This chart is meant for multiple uses: to identify which missions have explicit and implicit requirements for civilian protection; to compare the specific language of mission mandates involving the protection of civilians; to determine which countries regularly contribute troops to such operations; to look at the evolution of UN resolutions; and to compare the force size of various civilian protection missions, among other uses.

The UN Security Council did not explicitly direct peacekeepers to “protect civilians” or carry out missions for the “protection of civilians” in mandates prior to 1999. In earlier mandates, resolutions identified tasks or goals implying protection, such as creation of “safe zones,” “public safety,” and a “secure environment” which imply authority to provide some level of protection to the civilian population. Selections here include excerpts indicating authority to use force to uphold UN mandates, which impacts how missions intervene on civilians’ behalf. In trying to capture all civilian protection-mandated missions, this chart looks at operations where peacekeeping forces are authorized to take action in potentially hostile environments for civilian protection. This chart does not look at more indirect mission activities that help provide protection to civilians over time (e.g., demobilization, disarmament and reintegration activities; ceasefire monitoring; and human rights assistance). The second section includes a range of missions, including missions in hostile environments such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, and Rwanda, where civilian populations were under serious threat. Other missions in Section II, such as Operation Alba in Albania, the UN Mission in the Central African Republic, and the UN Mission in Haiti, took place in more benign environments or lacked clear Chapter VII authorization, and are included in order to provide grounds for comparing resolution language.

## CHART KEY
Data is from the United Nations unless stipulated otherwise.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Area:</th>
<th>Names the country or location of the mission.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission Name:</td>
<td>Lists the name referenced by the United Nations or used by the lead state or organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC Resolution:</td>
<td>Lists major Security Council resolutions relevant to the mission (except those extending the mission without change.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Type:</td>
<td>Identifies citation of Chapter VII authority under the UN Charter and the mission leadership e.g., the UN, multilateral organization, multinational force or lead nation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selected Language From UN Mandates:</td>
<td>Excerpts sections from UN Security Council resolutions for operation mandates, focusing on the phrases &quot;protect civilians&quot; or &quot;protection of civilians&quot; or excerpts implying potential civilian protection, such as language stipulating creation of &quot;safe zones,&quot; &quot;public safety,&quot; and a &quot;secure environment&quot; that imply some authority to provide some level of protection to the civilian population. Selections also include language that indicates the missions' authority to use force. In a few cases, such as the mandates for AMIS, IFOR, and SFOR, some language is not from Security Council Resolutions, and the alternate source is specified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Strength:</td>
<td>Identifies either the maximum number of troops authorized by the UN resolution or troops deployed at one time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop Contributing Countries:</td>
<td>Includes all the countries that have contributed civilian police, military observers, or actual troops to the mission.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## I. UN Security Council Resolutions for Missions with Direct Reference to the Protection of Civilians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Area</th>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>Relevant UNSC Resolutions</th>
<th>Mission Type</th>
<th>Selected Language From UN Mandates</th>
<th>Mission Strength authorized or reported</th>
<th>Troop Contributing Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Burundi</strong></td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)</td>
<td>1545 (2004)</td>
<td>UN-led Chapter VII</td>
<td>Resolution 1545: ...5. Authorizes ONUB to use all necessary means to carry out the following mandate, within its capacity and in the areas where its armed units are deployed, and in coordination with humanitarian and development communities: ... – to contribute to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance, and facilitate the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons, – without prejudice to the responsibility of the transitional Government of Burundi, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, – to ensure the protection of United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, as well as the security and freedom of movement of ONUB’s personnel, and to coordinate and conduct, as appropriate, mine action activities in support of its mandate....</td>
<td>Authorized strength: 5,650 military personnel, including 200 military observers; 120 civilian police personnel, 434 international civilian personnel, 170 United Nations Volunteers and 446 local civilian staff. (S/2004/210/Add.1)</td>
<td>Contributors of military personnel: Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, China, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guatemala, India, Jordan, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Romania, Russia, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Togo, Tunisia, Uruguay, Yemen and Zambia. Contributors of civilian police personnel: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Turkey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cote d’Ivoire</strong></td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI)</td>
<td>1528 (2004)</td>
<td>UN-led Chapter VII</td>
<td>Resolution 1528: ...6. Decides that the mandate of UNOCI shall be the following: (i) To protect United Nations personnel, installations and equipment, provide the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of National Reconciliation, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment....</td>
<td>Authorized strength: 6,240 military personnel, including 200 military observers; as well as 350 civilian police officers, some 435 international civilians and 529 local civilians, and 119 United Nations Volunteers. (S/2004/3/Add.2)</td>
<td>Contributors of military personnel: Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, China, Djibouti, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, India, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Moldova, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Yemen and Zambia. Contributors of civilian police personnel: Bangladesh, Benin, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Djibouti, El Salvador, France, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo, Turkey and Uruguay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cote d’Ivoire</strong></td>
<td>Operation Licorne</td>
<td>1464 (2003), 1528 (2003)</td>
<td>UN-authorized Chapter VII (France)</td>
<td>Resolution 1464: ...9. [Authorizes Member States participating in the ECOWAS forces in accordance with Chapter VII together with the French forces supporting them to take the necessary steps to guarantee the security and freedom of movement of their personnel and to ensure, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Government of National Reconciliation, the protection of civilians immediately threatened with physical violence within their zones of operation, using the means available to them.... Resolution 1528: 16. Authorizes...the French forces to use all necessary means in order to support UNOCI in accordance with the agreement to be reached between UNOCI and the French authorities, and in particular to: – Contribute to the general security of the area of activity of the international forces, – Intervene at the request of UNOCI in support of its elements whose security may be threatened, – Intervene against belligerent actions, if the security conditions so require, outside the areas directly controlled by UNOCI, – Help to protect civilians, in the deployment areas of their units....</td>
<td>Reported strength: 3800 troops3</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Area</td>
<td>Mission Name</td>
<td>Relevant UNSC Resolutions</td>
<td>Mission Type</td>
<td>Selected Language From UN Mandates</td>
<td>Mission Strength authorized or reported</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (ECOMICI)</td>
<td>1464 (2003)</td>
<td>UN-author-ized Chapter VII (Economic Community of West African States)</td>
<td>Resolution 1464: ...9. [A]uthorizes Member States participating in the ECOWAS forces in accordance with Chapter VIII together with the French forces supporting them to take the necessary steps to guarantee the security and freedom of movement of their personnel and to ensure, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Government of National Reconciliation, the protection of civilians immediately threatened with physical violence within their zones of operation, using the means available to them.</td>
<td>Reported strength: 1,369 military personnel</td>
<td>Benin, Ghana, Niger, Senegal, and Togo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darfur, Sudan</td>
<td>African Mission in the Sudan (AMIS)</td>
<td>1502 (2003), 1547 (2004), 1566 (2004), 1564 (2004)</td>
<td>UN-author-ized Chapter VII (African Union)</td>
<td>Resolution 1564: ...Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter ...2. Welcomes and supports the intention of the African Union to enhance and augment its monitoring mission in the Darfur region of Sudan, and encourages the undertaking of proactive monitoring... African Union – Communiqué of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Peace and Security Council (20 October 2004): ...4. Decides that the enhanced AMIS shall be deployed for a period of one year renewable if need be, to perform the following mandate: ...to contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief and, beyond that, the return of IDPs and refugees to their homes, in order to assist in increasing the level of compliance of all Parties with the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement and to contribute to the improvement of the security situation throughout Darfur. ...6. Decides that, within the framework of its mandate as spelt out in paragraph 4 above, AMIS shall, inter alia, perform the following tasks: ... Protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it being understood that the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the GoS...</td>
<td>Authorized strength (maximum as of 20 October 2004): 3,320 personnel, including 2,341 military personnel, among them 450 observers, up to 815 civilian police personnel, as well as the appropriate civilian personnel. Reported strength (as of 30 October 2004): 597 military personnel</td>
<td>Rwanda and Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)</td>
<td>1258 (1999), 1279 (1999), 1291 (2000), 1355 (2001), 1376 (2001), 1417 (2002), 1445 (2002), 1448 (2003), 1493 (2003), 1501 (2003), 1565 (2004)</td>
<td>UN-led Chapter VI from 1999 to 2003, with a Chapter VII clause added in 2000; full Chapter VII from 2003 to present</td>
<td>Resolution 1291: ...8. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decides that MONUC may take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions and as it deems it within its capabilities, to protect United Nations and co-located JMC personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence... Resolution 1493: ...25. Authorizes MONUC to take the necessary measures in the areas of deployment of its armed units, and as it deems it within its capabilities: --to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment; --to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, including in particular those engaged in missions of observation, verification or DDRRR; -- to protect civilians and humanitarian workers under imminent threat of physical violence; -- and to contribute to the improvement of the security conditions in which humanitarian assistance is provided; 26. Authorizes MONUC to use all necessary means to fulfill its mandate in the Ituri district and, as it deems it within its capabilities, in North and South Kivu...</td>
<td>Authorized strength (maximum as of November 2004): 10,800 military personnel including up to 10,040 troops and 760 military ob-servers; 134 Civil-ian Police person-nel; and civilian personnel.</td>
<td>Contributors of military personnel: Algeria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, France, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Iran, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay and Zambia. Contributors of civilian police personnel: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, France, Guinea, Jordan, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Sweden, Switzer-land and Turkey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Area</td>
<td>Mission Name</td>
<td>Relevant UNSC Resolutions</td>
<td>Mission Type</td>
<td>Selected Language From UN Mandates</td>
<td>Mission Strength authorized or reported</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>Operation Artemis</td>
<td>1484 (2003), 1501 (2003)</td>
<td>UN-authorized Chapter VII (European Union)</td>
<td><strong>Resolution 1484:</strong> ...1. Authorizes the deployment until 1 September 2003 of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force in Bunia in close coordination with MONUC, in particular its contingent currently deployed in the town, to contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town.</td>
<td>Reported strength: 1,800 troops⁸</td>
<td>France (lead nation), Germany, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, United Kingdom, South Africa, Brazil and Canada⁹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)</td>
<td>1542 (2004)</td>
<td>UN-led Chapter VII</td>
<td><strong>Resolution 1542:</strong> ...7. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations with regard to Section I below, decides that MINUSTAH shall have the following mandate: I. Secure and Stable Environment: (a) in support of the Transitional Government, to ensure a secure and stable environment within which the constitutional and political process in Haiti can take place; ... (e) to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, taking into account the primary responsibility of the Transitional Government in that regard; (f) to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Transitional Government and of police authorities...</td>
<td>Authorized strength: 6,700 military personnel; 1,622 civilian police; 548 international civilian personnel, 154 United Nations volunteers and 995 local civilian staff.</td>
<td>Contributors of military personnel: Argentina, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, El Salvador, France, Ghana, Jordan, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Spain, Togo, Turkey and Zambia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)</td>
<td>1408 (2003), 1442 (2003), 1478 (2003), 1497 (2003), 1509 (2003), 1521 (2003), 1532 (2004), 1549 (2004)</td>
<td>UN-led Chapter VII</td>
<td><strong>Resolution 1509:</strong> ...3. Decides that UNMIL shall have the following mandate: Protection of United Nations Staff, Facilities and Civilians: (j) to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, without prejudice to the efforts of the government, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities...</td>
<td>Authorized strength: Up to 15,000 military personnel, including up to 250 military observers and 160 staff officers, and up to 1,115 civilian police officers.</td>
<td>Contributors of military personnel: Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Moldova, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Togo, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Contributors of civilian police personnel: Argentina, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, China, Czech Republic, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Samoa, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United States, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### II. Selected UN Resolutions for Missions With Implications for Protection of Civilians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Area</th>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>Relevant UNSC Resolutions</th>
<th>Mission Type</th>
<th>Selected Language From UN Mandates</th>
<th>Mission Strength authorized or reported</th>
<th>Troop Contributing Countries</th>
<th>Nation of force commander in italics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)</td>
<td>1386 (2001), 1413 (2002), 1444 (2002), 1510 (2003)</td>
<td>UN-authorizied Chapter VII (NATO)</td>
<td>Resolution 1386: ...1. Authorizes, as envisaged in Annex 1 to the Bonn Agreement, the establishment for 6 months of an International Security Assistance Force to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment; ...3. Authorizes the Member States participating in the International Security Assistance Force to take all necessary measures to fulfill its mandate.... Resolution 1510: ...Authorizes expansion of the mandate of the International Security Assistance Force to allow it, as resources permit, to support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors in the maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its environs, so that the Afghan Authorities as well as the personnel of the United Nations and other international civilian personnel engaged, in particular, in reconstruction and humanitarian efforts, can operate in a secure environment, and to provide security assistance for the performance of other tasks in support of the Bonn Agreement....</td>
<td>Reported strength: 6,500 troops10</td>
<td>Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Germany, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Mali, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Sweden, Tanzania, Thailand, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay and Zambia.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Area</td>
<td>Mission Name</td>
<td>Relevant UNSC Resolutions</td>
<td>Mission Type</td>
<td>Selected Language From UN Mandates</td>
<td>Mission Strength authorized or reported</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Operation Alba</td>
<td>1101 (1997)</td>
<td>UN-authored Chapter VII (Multinational Force)</td>
<td>Resolution 1101: 2. Welcomes the offer made by certain Member States to establish a temporary and limited multinational protection force to facilitate the safe and prompt delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to help create a secure environment for the missions of international organizations in Albania, including those providing humanitarian assistance.... 4. Authorizes the Member States participating in the multinational protection force to conduct the operation in a neutral and impartial way to achieve the objectives set out in paragraph 2 above and, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, further authorizes these Member States to ensure the security and freedom of movement of the personnel of the said multinational protection force....</td>
<td>Reported strength: 6000 troops</td>
<td>Italy (lead nation), Greece, France, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, and Turkey; slight participation from Austria, Denmark, and Belgium.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina/Croatia/Macedonia</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)</td>
<td>Selected resolutions: 743 (1992), 749 (1992), 755 (1992), 761 (1992), 770 (1992), 771 (1992), 776 (1992), 779 (1992), 781 (1992), 786 (1992), 795 (1992), 815 (1993), 816 (1993), 819 (1993), 824 (1993), 836 (1993), 844 (1993), 900 (1994), 908 (1994), 914 (1994), 941 (1994), 955 (1994), 959 (1994), 982 (1995), 998 (1995), 1004 (1995)</td>
<td>UN-led Chapter VI prior to 1993, and Chapter VII after Resolution 815 (1993)</td>
<td>Resolution 824: 3. Declares that the capital city of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, and other such threatened areas, in particular the towns of Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac, as well as Srebrenica, and their surroundings should be treated as safe areas by all the parties concerned and should be free from armed attacks and from any other hostile act.... Resolution 836: 5. Decides to extend to that end the mandate of UNPROFOR in order to enable it, in the safe areas referred to in resolution 824 (1993), to deter attacks against the safe areas, to monitor the cease-fire, to promote the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units other than those of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to occupy some key points on the ground, in addition to participating in the delivery of humanitarian relief to the population as provided for in resolution 776 (1992) of 14 September 1992; 6. Affirms that these safe areas are a temporary measure and that the primary objective remains to reverse the consequences of the use of force and to allow all persons displaced from their homes in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to return to their homes in peace, beginning, inter-alia, with the prompt implementation of the provisions of the Vance-Owen Plan in areas where those have been agreed by the parties directly concerned; 9. Authorizes UNPROFOR, in addition to the mandate defined in resolutions 770 (1992) of 13 August 1992 and 776 (1992), in carrying out the mandate defined in paragraph 5 above, acting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas by any of the parties or to armed incursion into them or in the event of any deliberate obstruction in or around those areas to the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian convoys....</td>
<td>Reported strength (March 1995): 36,599 military personnel, 684 military observers, 803 civilian police, 2,017 international staff, and 2,615 local staff.</td>
<td>Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, India, Pakistan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom among the top contributors; 37 countries total.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Area</td>
<td>Mission Name</td>
<td>Relevant UNSC Resolutions</td>
<td>Mission Type</td>
<td>Selected Language From UN Mandates</td>
<td>Mission Strength authorized or reported</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Resolution 1031: 14. Authorizes the Member States acting through or in cooperation with the organization referred to in Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement to establish a multinational implementation force (IFOR) under unified command and control in order to fulfil the role specified in Annex 1-A and Annex 2 of the Peace Agreement; 15. Authorizes the Member States acting under paragraph 14 above to take all necessary measures to effect the implementation of and to ensure compliance with Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement, stresses that the parties shall be held equally responsible for compliance with that Annex, and shall be equally subject to such enforcement action by IFOR as may be necessary to ensure implementation of that Annex and the protection of IFOR, and takes note that the parties have consented to IFOR's taking such measures; ...17. Authorizes Member States to take all necessary measures, at the request of IFOR, either in defence of IFOR or to assist the force in carrying out its mission, and recognizes the right of the force to take all necessary measures to defend itself from attack or threat of attack.... The General Framework Agreement, Annex 1A: Article VI: Deployment of the Implementation Force, ...3. The Parties understand and agree that the IFOR shall have the right to fulfill its supporting tasks, within the limits of its assigned principal tasks and available resources, and on request, which include the following: a. to help create secure conditions for the conduct by others of other tasks associated with the peace settlement, including free and fair elections; b. to assist the movement of organizations in the accomplishment of humanitarian missions; c. to assist the UNHCR and other international organizations in their humanitarian missions; d. to observe and prevent interference with the movement of civilian populations, refugees, and displaced persons, and to respond appropriately to deliberate violence to life and person; and, e. to monitor the clearing of minefields and obstacles....</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>Implementation Force (IFOR)/ Stabilization Force (SFOR)</td>
<td>1031(1995), 1088 (1996) UN-authorized Chapter VII (NATO)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IFOR reported strength: 60,000 troops. SFOR reported strength: 34,000 troops.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Note: According to the Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria), the AU mandate for AMIB included monitoring, DDR, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance and other tasks, but no explicit mention of civilian protection. The mission's Rules of Engagement, however, allowed for the use of force to protect civilians &quot;under imminent threat of physical violence.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IFOR troop contributing countries: All NATO nations with armed forces. NATO also invited 16 non-NATO countries to participate: Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Sweden, and Ukraine - all of which are Partnership for Peace countries - plus, Egypt, Pakistan and Malaysia. SFOR troop contributing countries (1997/98 &amp; 2000/01): (NATO) Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States; (non-NATO) Albania, Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Egypt, Finland, Jordan, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Russia, Sweden, and Ukraine.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB)</td>
<td>1375 (2001) Endorsed by UN Security Council after AU deployment, implicit Chapter VI (African Union)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Resolution 1375: ...4. Endorses the efforts of the Government of South Africa and other member States to support the implementation of the Arusha Agreement, and strongly supports in this regard the establishment of an interim multinational security presence in Burundi, at the request of its Government, to protect returning political leaders and train an all-Burundian protection force.... To secure identified assembly and disengagement areas; To provide VIP protection for designated returning leader; To facilitate safe passage for the parties during planned movement to the designed assembly areas.</td>
<td>Authorized strength: 3,500 troops</td>
<td>Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: According to the Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria), the AU mandate for AMIB included monitoring, DDR, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance and other tasks, but no explicit mention of civilian protection. The mission's Rules of Engagement, however, allowed for the use of force to protect civilians "under imminent threat of physical violence."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Area</th>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>Relevant UNSC Resolutions</th>
<th>Mission Type</th>
<th>Selected Language From UN Mandates</th>
<th>Mission Strength authorized or reported</th>
<th>Troop Contributing Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)</td>
<td>1159 (1998), 1182 (1998), 2001 (1998), 1230 (1999), 1271 (1999)</td>
<td>UN-led Chapter VI</td>
<td>Resolution 1159: ...10. Decides that, taking into account the recommendations of the Secretary-General in his report of 23 February 1998, MINURCA shall have the following initial mandate: (a) To assist in maintaining and enhancing security and stability, including freedom of movement, in Bangui and the immediate vicinity of the city; (b) To assist the national security forces in maintaining law and order and in protecting key installations in Bangui; ... (d) To ensure security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel and the safety and security of United Nations property; ... 13. Affirms that MINURCA may be required to take action to ensure security and freedom of movement of its personnel in the discharge of its mandate.... Resolution 1182: ...4. Recognizes that MINURCA, in implementing its mandate, may conduct limited-duration reconnaissance missions outside Bangui, and other tasks involving the security of United Nations personnel in accordance with paragraph 10 of resolution 1159 (1998)....</td>
<td>Reported strength: 1,350 troops and military support personnel and 24 civilian police, supported by international and local civilian staff</td>
<td>Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, France, Gabon, Mali, Portugal, Senegal, Togo and Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)</td>
<td>143 (1960), 145 (1960), 146 (1960), 161 (1961), 169 (1961)</td>
<td>UN-led operation (Chapter VII not specified, but well-known that force was used)</td>
<td>Resolution 143: ...2. Decides to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks.... Resolution 161: ...1. Urges that the United Nations take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for cease-fires, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort....</td>
<td>Reported strength (maximum): 19,828 troops, supported by international civilian and locally recruited staff</td>
<td>Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Denmark, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Liberia, Malaya, Federation of Mali, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Operation Uphold Democracy</td>
<td>940(1994)</td>
<td>UN-author-ized Chapter VII (Multi-national Force)</td>
<td>Resolution 940: ...4. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes Member States to form a multinational force under unified command and control and, in this framework, to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the Governors Island Agreement, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment that will permit implementation of the Governors Island Agreement, on the understanding that the cost of implementing this temporary operation will be borne by the participating Member States; ...16. Emphasizes the necessity that, inter alia: (a) All appropriate steps be taken to ensure the security and safety of the operations and personnel engaged in such operations; and (b) The security and safety arrangements undertaken extend to all persons engaged in the operations....</td>
<td>Reported strength: 22,000 troops</td>
<td>United States (lead nation providing 20,000 troops), and 12 other countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Area</td>
<td>Mission Name</td>
<td>Relevant UNSC Resolutions</td>
<td>Mission Type</td>
<td>Selected Language From UN Mandates</td>
<td>Mission Strength authorized or reported</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)</td>
<td>867 (1993), 940 (1994), 975 (1995), 1048 (1996)</td>
<td>UN-led Chapter VI</td>
<td>Resolution 940: ...9. Decides to revise and extend the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) for a period of six months to assist the democratic Government of Haiti in fulfilling its responsibilities in connection with: (a) sustaining the secure and stable environment established during the multinational phase and protecting international personnel and key installations....</td>
<td>Reported strength (maximum): 6,065 troops and military support personnel, and 847 civilian police, supported by international and local civilian staff.</td>
<td>Contributors of military and civilian police personnel: Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Canada, Djibouti, France, Guatemala, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Mali, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Suriname, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia and the US.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Multinational Interim Force (Operation Secure Tomorrow)</td>
<td>1529 (2004)</td>
<td>UN-authoriz ed Chapter VII (Multinational Force)</td>
<td>Resolution 1529: ...2. Authorizes the immediate deployment of a Multinational Interim Force for a period of not more than three months from adoption of this resolution: (a) To contribute to a secure and stable environment in the Haitian capital and elsewhere in the country, as appropriate and as circumstances permit, in order to support Haitian President Alexandre’s request for international assistance to support the constitutional political process under way in Haiti; (b) To facilitate the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil presence, and other international humanitarian workers to the Haitian people in need; (c) To facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance to the Haitian police and the Haitian Coast Guard in order to establish and maintain public safety and law and order and to promote and protect human rights....</td>
<td>Reported strength: 3,300 troops</td>
<td>United States (lead nation), France, Chile, and Canada.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Iraq</td>
<td>Operation Provide Comfort I/II, Operation Safe Haven</td>
<td>678 (1990); 687 (1991); 688 (1991)</td>
<td>Unclear UN authorization (Unified Forces &amp; Multinational Force)</td>
<td>Resolution 688: ...1. Condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which threaten international peace and security in the region; 2. Demands that Iraq, as a contribution to the removal of the threat to international peace and security in the region, immediately end this repression and express the hope in the same context that an open dialogue will take place to ensure that the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected; 3. Insists that Iraq must provide full access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and to make available all necessary facilities for their operations.... 6. Appeals to all Member States and to all humanitarian organizations to contribute to these humanitarian relief efforts....</td>
<td>Reported strength: 13,000 troops (US, Provide Comfort) and 5,000 troops (US, Safe Haven).</td>
<td>United States (lead nation), UK, France, Turkey, and 9 other nations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Kosovo Force (KFOR)</td>
<td>1160 (1998); 1199(1998); 1203(1998); 1239(1999); 1244(1999)</td>
<td>UN-authored Chapter VII (NATO)</td>
<td>Resolution 1244: ...9. Decides that the responsibilities of the international security presence to be deployed and acting in Kosovo will include: ...c) Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered; (d) Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility for this task; ... (h) Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil presence, and other international organizations....</td>
<td>Authorized strength: 50,000 troops</td>
<td>Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Morocco, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


53
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Area</th>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>Relevant UNSC Resolutions</th>
<th>Mission Type</th>
<th>Selected Language From UN Mandates</th>
<th>Mission Strength authorized or reported</th>
<th>Troop Contributing Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)</td>
<td>1160 (1998), 1199 (1998), 1203 (1999), 1207 (1999), 1239 (1999), 1244(1999)</td>
<td>UN-led Chapter VII Operation</td>
<td>Resolution 1244: ...11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include: (i) Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo; (j) Protecting and promoting human rights; (k) Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo....</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL)</td>
<td>1497 (2003)</td>
<td>UN-authorized Chapter VII (Economic Community of West African States)</td>
<td>Resolution 1497: ...1. Authorizes Member States to establish a Multinational Force in Liberia to support the implementation of the 17 June 2003 ceasefire agreement, including establishing conditions for initial stages of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities, to help establish and maintain security in the period after the departure of the current President and the installation of a successor authority, taking into account the agreements to be reached by the Liberian parties, and to secure the environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to prepare for the introduction of a longer-term United Nations stabilization force to relieve the Multinational Force.... Note: The mandate for the ceasefire monitoring group laid out in the June 2003 ceasefire agreement includes tasks such as monitoring, DDR, and security for VIPs, but no explicit mention of civilian protection.</td>
<td>Reported strength: 3600 troops</td>
<td>Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>United Nations Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)</td>
<td>812 (1993), 846 (1993), 872 (1993), 891 (1993), 893 (1994), 909 (1994), 912 (1994), 918 (1994), 925 (1994), 929 (1994), 935 (1994), 965 (1994), 977 (1995), 978 (1995), 979 (1995), 989 (1995), 997 (1995), 1005 (1995), 1011 (1995), 1013 (1995), 1028 (1995), 1029 (1995), 1047 (1996), 1050 (1996), 1053 (1996)</td>
<td>UN-led Chapter VI: Chapter VII arms embargo after Resolution 918 (1994)</td>
<td>Resolution 912: ...8. Decides, in the light of the current situation in Rwanda, to adjust the mandate of UNAMIR as follows: … (c) To monitor and report on developments in Rwanda, including the safety and security of the civilians who sought refuge with UNAMIR.... Resolution 918: ...3. Decides to expand UNAMIR's mandate under resolution 912 (1994) to include the following additional responsibilities within the limits of the resources available to it: (a) To contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas; (b) To provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations; 4. Recognizes that UNAMIR may be required to take action in self-defence against persons or groups who threaten protected sites and populations, United Nations and other humanitarian personnel or the means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief.... Resolution 925: ...4. Reaffirms that UNAMIR, in addition to continuing to act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a cease-fire, will: (a) Contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas; (b) Provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations....</td>
<td>Authorized strength (maximum, 17 May 1994 to 8 June 1995): 5,500 military personnel, including approximately 5,200 troops and military support personnel, 320 military observers, and 90 civilian police.</td>
<td>Contributors of military and civilian police personnel: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chad, Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Germany, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, India, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Zambia and Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Area</td>
<td>Mission Name</td>
<td>Relevant UNSC Resolutions</td>
<td>Mission Type</td>
<td>Selected Language From UN Mandates</td>
<td>Mission Strength authorized or reported</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Operation Turquoise</td>
<td>929(1994)</td>
<td>UN-authorizado Chapter VII (France)</td>
<td>Resolution 929: ...2. Welcomes also the offer by Member States (S/1994/734) to cooperate with the Secretary-General in order to achieve the objectives of the United Nations in Rwanda through the establishment of a temporary operation under national command and control aimed at contributing, in an impartial way, to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, on the understanding that the costs of implementing the offer will be borne by the Member States concerned; 3. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes the Member States cooperating with the Secretary-General to conduct the operation referred to in paragraph 2 above using all necessary means to achieve the humanitarian objectives set out in subparagraphs 4 (a) and (b) of resolution 925 (1994).... Resolution 925: 4.... (a) Contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas; and (b) Provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations....</td>
<td>Reported strength: 2500</td>
<td>France (lead nation), Senegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Unified Task Force (UNITAF)/Operation Restore Hope</td>
<td>794(1992)</td>
<td>UN-authorizado Chapter VII (Multi-national Force)</td>
<td>Resolution 794: ...10. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes the Secretary-General and Member States cooperating to implement the offer referred to in paragraph 8 above to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia....</td>
<td>Reported strength (peak): 30,000 US military personnel and 10,000 personnel from 24 other states</td>
<td>Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States (lead nation) and Zimbabwe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)</td>
<td>814 (1993), 837 (1993), 865 (1993), 878 (1993), 885 (1993), 886 (1993), 897 (1994), 923 (1994), 946 (1994), 953 (1994), 954 (1994)</td>
<td>UN-led Chapter VII</td>
<td>Resolution 814: This resolution establishes UNOSOM II's mandate according to the Report of the Secretary General of 3 March 1993. According to the UN, this report authorized UNOSOM II to &quot;take appropriate action, including enforcement measures, to establish throughout Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian assistance.&quot; Resolution 837: Reaffirms that the Secretary-General is authorized under resolution 814 (1993) to take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks referred to in paragraph 1 above, including against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks, to establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia, including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment....</td>
<td>Authorized strength (maximum): 28,000 military and civilian police personnel; 2,800 international and local civilian staff</td>
<td>Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United States, Zambia and Zimbabwe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Area</td>
<td>Mission Name</td>
<td>Relevant UNSC Resolutions</td>
<td>Mission Type</td>
<td>Selected Language From UN Mandates</td>
<td>Mission Strength authorized or reported</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Timor Leste</strong></td>
<td>UN-Sponsored International Force for East Timor (INTERFET)</td>
<td>1264(1999)</td>
<td>UN-authorized Chapter VII (Multinational Force)</td>
<td><strong>Resolution 1264:</strong> ...2. Emphasizes the urgent need for coordinated humanitarian assistance and the importance of allowing full, safe and unimpeded access by humanitarian organizations and calls upon all parties to cooperate with such organizations so as to ensure the protection of civilians at risk, the safe return of refugees and displaced persons and the effective delivery of humanitarian aid; 3. Authorizes the establishment of a multinational force under a unified command structure, pursuant to the request of the Government of Indonesia conveyed to the Secretary-General on 12 September 1999, with the following tasks: to restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations, and authorizes the States participating in the multinational force to take all necessary measures to fulfil this mandate;..</td>
<td>Reported strength: As of March, 2000, two Brigades numbering approximately 9,000 troops(^\text{44})</td>
<td>Includes Australia(lead nation), Brazil, Brunei, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Fiji, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, United Kingdom and the United States.(^\text{44})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Timor Leste</strong></td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)</td>
<td>1272(1999), 1319(2000), 1338(2001), 1392(2002)</td>
<td>UN-led Chapter VII</td>
<td><strong>Resolution 1272 (1999):</strong> ...Decides to establish, in accordance with the report of the Secretary-General, a United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which will be endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and is empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice; 2. Decides also that the mandate of UNTAET shall consist of the following elements: (a) To provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor; ... (d) To ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance... <strong>Resolution 1319:</strong> ...6. Underlines that UNTAET should respond robustly to the militia threat in East Timor, consistent with its resolution 1272 (1999) of 22 October 1999....</td>
<td>Authorized strength (maximum): Military 9,150 troops and 1,640 civilian police</td>
<td>Contributors of military personnel: Australia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Denmark, Egypt, Fiji, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Nepal, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovakia, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay. Contributors of civilian police personnel: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Benin, Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, China, Egypt, Gambia, Ghana, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Russian Federation, Samoa, Senegal, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Vanuatu, and Zimbabwe.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FOOTNOTES

1 Unless otherwise noted, figures in this column come from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) website, mission “Facts and Figures” pages, available online at http://www.un.org/depts/dpko as of 16 November 2004.
5 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
11 As of June 2004; “NATO in Afghanistan Factsheet.”
14 Selected resolutions relate to the UNPROFOR mandate, troop strength, humanitarian relief escorts, no-fly zone, safe areas and exclusion zones. For an extensive list of UN Security Council Resolutions related to UNPROFOR, IFOR and SFOR, see NATO SFOR Security Council Resolutions online at http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/un-resol.htm as of 16 November 2004.
24 There was also a provision for 114 international civilian staff, 111 local staff and 13 United Nations Volunteers. Additional short-term and medium-term United Nations observers were deployed during the legislative (November/December 1998) and presidential (September 1999) elections.
26 Ibid.


ANNEX 2

A Sample Task List

From

Peace Support Operations Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-50
(United Kingdom)

Section I – Observation and Monitoring
May include deter breaches of ceasefires and peace agreements; up-to-date report; observe, monitor, verify, report, use confidence building measures; monitor movement of refugees and IDPs. Liaise, investigate and negotiate.

Supervise Truces and Ceasefires
Interposition
Transition Assistance

Military Tasks: Supervision, Administration, Protection, Response, Control, Co-ordination
Law and Order
Support to the Electoral Process

Demobilisation and Disarmament
Securing Agreement, Establishing and Managing a Cease-fire (Scope, Delineated Cease-fires, Management of Cease-fires, Response); Withdrawal and Assembly of Belligerent Force, Disarming Belligerent Forces, Dispersal and Rehabilitation of Belligerent Forces

Humanitarian Relief and its Protection
Human Rights Issues
Strategic Co-ordination
Subjects of Humanitarian Relief
The Conduct of Humanitarian Relief Operations
Emergency Relief
Reconstruction Activities

Operations Co-ordination
Protection of Humanitarian Assistance Operations
Negative Effects of Humanitarian Aid

Explosive Ordnance (Mine) Clearance
The Hazards
Tasks

Section II – Peace Enforcement Tasks
Restoration of Law and Order Operations
The Protection of Humanitarian Operations and Human Rights
Conflict Containment
The Forcible Separation of Belligerent Parties
The Establishment and Supervision of Protected or Safe Areas

The Requirement
Conduct (Establishing, monitoring and enforcing weapons exclusion zones; establishing and maintaining cantonment areas and weapon holding areas and sites; holding ground; dominating approaches; conducting patrols and searches; manning checkpoints and other control measures; development of reinforcement and extraction plans)

The Guarantee and Denial of Movement
The Enforcement of Sanctions
ANNEX 3

ADDITIONAL OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ARISING FROM THE REPORT’S CRITERIA

Most operational questions affecting the means of intervention – who, how, when, with what, and with what success rate, etc – require looking at military capacities to conduct humanitarian interventions to protect civilians. A few added questions arise, however, from the Commission’s criteria themselves. In Chapter 4, “The Responsibility to React,” lays out the threshold conditions for military intervention to be “contemplated.” Before getting to the criteria, the report states that any intervention must be both “defensible in principle” and “workable and acceptable in practice.” The six criteria for intervention are: *right authority*, *just cause*, *right intention*, *last resort*, *proportional means*, and *reasonable prospects*. These criteria raise operational questions themselves:

1) **Just Cause.** To prevent imminent or existing threat of large scale loss of life, the Commission makes clear that the use of military force “can be anticipatory” to respond to “clear evidence” of likely large scale killings:141 better not to wait for genocide to justify acting against it. Operationally, this raises the question of how nations will find the evidence of potential mass death and organize intervention forces on those grounds. Which countries can take action if large scale loss of life has not happened? Which ones can only act, formally, if genocide or ethnic cleansing is declared?

2) **Right intervention.** Under this criteria, the Commission identified one scenario as that of state collapse, and suggests that “there should be a clear commitment from the outset to returning the territory to its sovereign owner at the conclusion of hostilities or, if that is not possible, *administering it on an interim basis under UN auspices.*”142 In facing a situation with either state collapse or where that is a possibility, is the capacity of the UN to act as a transitional administrator considered prior to intervention? The UN has been given the role of transitional administration, accepting it reluctantly; the UN’s enhanced peace operations capacity since the Brahimi Report has not addressed this area of capacity, however, or reflected political will to move in that direction. If state collapse results from such intervention, the UN may be given this responsibility whether or not it has the resources to do the job, potentially putting those in the region into murky waters at least.

This section also suggests that a “sub-component” of the question of *right intervention* is whether action is taken on a multilateral or collective basis, rather than by a single nation or actor, and whether it is supported by those for whom the intervention is being conducted – or their neighbors.143 Is the military capacity to intervene controlled by countries which are likely to fit these criteria? This should be asked as capacity is examined, with an eye on whether it is. One can imagine a scenario where the United States offered to take action, but where other nations decline to join a coalition with the United States and/or where the recipients of its potential forces (e.g., Sudan) would reject intervention based on its political views of actions elsewhere (e.g., in Iraq). Another operational question is: If all other criteria except this one are met, is this “subcomponent” grounds to disqualify action from being justified? The answer is likely to depend on what bodies are established to assess the right intervention criteria and the actors for each intervention.

3) **Proportional Means.** The Commission provides only two paragraphs in its summary report on the question of the scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention. Little is delineated, except for the need to minimize the intervention force to:

“…the minimum necessary to secure the humanitarian objective in question. The means have to be commensurate with the ends, and in line with the magnitude of the original provocation…. The effect on the political system of the country targeted should be limited, again, to what is strictly necessary to accomplish the purpose of the intervention.”144

---

141 Section 4.21, page 33.
142 Section 4.33, page 35.
143 Section 4.34, page 36.
144 Section 4.39, page 37.

60
This criterion raises a challenging proposition: What if proportional means do not exist? Is that the basis for rejecting the use of force? One can imagine a situation where the only available military options for an intervention could either be a large military organization such as NATO – which may have a concept of operations that predetermines the scale of force – raising the scale of appropriate use of force – or a force that might be willing to go in under Chapter VII conditions but has no formal doctrine, training, ROE or force sustainability specifically for such operations and therefore, could deliver some but not all the actions associated with conducting missions for civilian protection and limited use-of-force measures (e.g., Nigeria).

4) **Reasonable Prospects**. This criterion establishes that a “reasonable chance of success” is required to justify military action to halt or avert the atrocities. Further, the intervention must both protect civilians and not make things worse: “Military intervention is not justified if actual protection cannot be achieved, or if the consequences of embarking upon the intervention are likely to be worse than if there is no action at all.”\(^{145}\) This test raises operational questions as well: a) is the military goal guaranteed to be achievable and to halt the atrocities? b) can the consequences of action be worse or trigger a larger conflict? If either of these questions are not clearly answerable and involve some risk, is there a coin toss? These are very useful and fair questions, at the heart of the *Responsibility to Protect*, as seen today in looking at humanitarian intervention in Darfur, Sudan.

How do the intervention criteria deal with results? What if it requires, for example, the UN to administer the State and the UN has no such capacity?

*Responsibility to Rebuild*

After analysis of the *Responsibility to Prevent*, the Commission covers the *Responsibility to Rebuild*. In this section, a few operational questions arise about the military interveners’ role in the post-conflict reconstruction environment and with handing off security from the interveners to those who will provide security during this stage. Security is both the responsibility of the intervention force and for the contingency operations/peacebuilding and/or transitional administration after the intervention:

One of the essential functions of an intervention force is to provide basic security and protection for all members of a population, regardless of ethnic origin or relation to the previous source of power in the territory. In post-conflict situations, revenge killings and even “reverse ethnic cleansing” frequently occur as groups who were victimized groups associated with their former oppressors. It is essential that post-intervention operations plan for this contingency before entry and provide effective security for all populations, regardless of origin, once entry occurs.\(^{146}\)

Could the intervention force withdraw morally if the consequences were unknown and resumption of civilian deaths a possibility? What is the operational capacity for others to take over the tasks of peacebuilding and to follow on the intervention?

---

145 Section 4.41, page 37.
146 Section 5.8, pages 40-41.