Transfer Discrepancies in CWC Scheduled Chemicals Trade Flows
Discrepancies in annual declarations of scheduled chemicals transfers challenge the ability to track the international trade of Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals.
March 21, 2022

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The Verification Annex of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) obliges all States Parties to submit annual declarations to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) of, among other things, aggregate national data on quantities per annum of each Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 chemical imported and exported, including quantitative specification of import and export for each country involved.1Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), “Parts VII and VIII of ‘Activities Not Prohibited Under This Convention in Accordance with Article VI.’” Retrieved 3 February 2022, from https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/annexes/verification-annex/part-vii-regime-schedule-2-chemicals-and, and https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/annexes/verification-annex/part-viii-regime-schedule-3-chemicals-and However, transfer discrepancies arise when these annual declarations are compared by the OPCW Technical Secretariat.

Transfer Discrepancies occur when declarations by Importing and Exporting States Parties on the aggregated quantities of import and export of a Schedule 2 or 3 chemical, during the previous calendar year, do not match.

Examples

2Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), “Section B, Industrial Declarations (Declarations Due Under Parts VII, VIII and IX of the Verification Annex), Annex C.” Declarations Handbook 2013, revised version 3, (2022), P.129. Retrieved 2 February 2022, from https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2021/12/Declarations%20Handbook%202013%20Revised%20Version%203_0.pdf.

  • State Party A declares export(s) of a scheduled chemical to State Party B in a quantity higher than a specific threshold (called the declaration threshold, and which varies depending on the schedule), but State Party B does not declare any import(s) of that scheduled chemical from State Party A.
  • States Parties A and B both declare the trade of a scheduled chemical between them, but the difference between the two declared quantities of import and export is greater than the declaration threshold.

In Numbers

According to the OPCW, in the 2019 Annual Declarations on Past Activities (ADPAs), a total of 1,603 transfers of Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 chemicals were declared to have occurred between States Parties. Of these, 817 transfers were declared with quantities above the declaration thresholds, of which 581 involving 92 States Parties showed discrepancies.3Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), “Report of the OPCW on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction in 2020.” P.13. Retrieved 3 February 2022, from https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2021/12/c2603%28e%29.pdf. Rates of transfer discrepancies in previous ADPAs remain consistent.

*42019 data are from: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), “Report of the OPCW on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction in 2020.” P.13. Retrieved 3 February 2022. https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2021/12/c2603%28e%29.pdf. 52018 data are from: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), “Report of the OPCW on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction in 2019.” P.16. Retrieved 3 February 2022. https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2021/04/c2504%28e%29.pdf. 62017 data are from: “Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), “Report of the OPCW on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction in 2018.” P.8. Retrieved 3 February 2022. https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2019/12/c2404%28e%29.pdf.
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