On May 8 five years ago, then President Donald Trump withdrew unilaterally from the Iran nuclear deal, arguing that he could find a better way to stop Tehran from acquiring the capability to build the world’s most destructive weapons and confront Iran’s other challenges to US interests in the Middle East.

At the time, Iran was complying with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), had less than 300 kilograms of low-enriched uranium and allowed continuous monitoring of its nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran was not targeting US soldiers in Syria or Iraq or lobbing missiles and drones against its neighbors’ oil refineries and tankers. Iran was trying to balance relations with its most important economic partner — China — with continuing trade ties with the European Union.

Fast forward to 2023 and all aspects of the Iran challenge have gotten worse. 

Iran now possesses sufficient highly enriched uranium to build several nuclear bombs and it has only cursory verification of its activities by the IAEA. Iran-backed militias in Syria recently killed a US contractor.  Iran remains the most influential outside actor in Iraq, the country the US invaded two decades ago to eliminate a regime that was seen by Washington then as more threatening. Meanwhile, Iranian politicians who argued for a balanced foreign policy between East and West have been marginalized as Tehran goes all-in on China and Russia, to the point of supplying Moscow with lethal drones to terrorize Ukraine. Domestically, Iran has become more repressive — and Iranians poorer — as the government of Ebrahim Raisi struggles to suppress widespread opposition, going so far as to use chemical agents to sicken schoolgirls to intimidate them into continuing to wear the required hijab.

Despite efforts by the Joe Biden administration, the Europeans and initially Russia and China to revive the JCPOA, it is not happening. Biden, running for a second term, seems to be in no mood to make deals with Tehran that could become an election issue. The Europeans are focused on the Ukraine war and furious with Iran over its growing military ties with Russia as well as its domestic brutality. Having failed to continue much trade with Iran after Trump re-imposed US sanctions, Europe retains diplomatic channels with Tehran but has much less leverage than five years ago.

Russia, once a key participant in the nuclear talks, sees more value in an alliance with another country under heavy sanctions. Iran’s once solidly pro-Western Arab neighbors, who were agnostic at best about the JCPOA and in some cases opposed it, now wish they could get it back and are making their own deals with Tehran and improving relations with the rising rival world power, China. Thus, Saudi Arabia turned to China to finalize what amounts to a truce with Tehran in an effort to end the war in Yemen and safeguard vulnerable infrastructure and ambitious economic development plans. The United Arab Emirates, supposedly still a close US partner, is reportedly allowing China to resume construction of a military base on the Persian Gulf.

Iran, meanwhile, shows little interest in trying to revive an agreement that the US so cavalierly violated. The product of 12 years of arduous negotiations begun by Britain, France, and Germany in 2003, the JCPOA was even codified in a UN Security Council resolution. But if Trump could walk away, Iranians say, what would keep another US president from doing the same if the agreement could somehow be revived? Far better to wait for the results of the 2024 US elections and keep amassing leverage in the form of highly enriched uranium and nuclear know-how.

Preoccupied with Ukraine and China, the US, and its allies hope to avoid a new crisis in the Middle East. But events have a way of intruding. Israel remains a wild card, with a domestically embattled Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu repeating threats to resort to military means to slow Iran’s nuclear advancements.  Iran is also unstable, its government facing continued popular opposition and a potential succession crisis once its octogenarian supreme leader passes from the scene. 

The region is changing, but in what direction remains unclear. US hegemony is waning, but there is no viable substitute; China is not yet capable of safeguarding freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf or mediating entrenched disputes such as the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians that Iran has long exploited. China has so far not used its economic leverage to pressure Iran on the nuclear front, instead benefiting from buying Iranian oil heavily discounted because of US sanctions.

Those sanctions have clearly backfired. As this analyst and others have argued, at least as much effort should be put into easing US restrictions that make it harder to help ordinary Iranians and that only reinforce the government’s monopoly over hard currency. 

Diplomacy remains the only viable option, however difficult it is at present. Contacts continue to free US and other hostages and to encourage Iran to increase transparency about its nuclear advances. While the Biden administration says force is a last resort, it is already too late for a military solution given the dispersed nature of the Iranian program and the knowledge Iranian engineers have acquired. Iran’s other challenges also defy simple remedies.

The situation reminds this writer of the old Joni Mitchell song that has this refrain: “You don’t know what you’ve got til it’s gone.” 

RIP, JCPOA.