The first year of Masoud Pezeshkian’s presidency has unfolded against a backdrop of unprecedented internal and external challenges for Iran.

Pezeshkian, a soft-spoken cardiologist and former health minister who took office after his predecessor died in a helicopter crash, promised to foster “national reconciliation” and address systemic crises ranging from economic collapse to regional isolation. His tenure has been defined by an unwieldy mix of cautious reformism, geopolitical brinkmanship, and vulnerability to external attack.

Pezeshkian’s central domestic pledge — to bridge Iran’s deep political divides — proved both aspirational and contentious. The concept, initially framed as a “government of national unity,” sought to include reformists, moderates, conservatives, and Sunni minorities in governance. His cabinet appointments were a mix of technocrats, reform-leaning figures like former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif (briefly appointed as strategic affairs deputy), and Sunni Muslim representatives, including Iran’s first female Sunni governor. However, these gestures faced immediate backlash. Hardline factions criticized the inclusion of reformists as a betrayal of revolutionary principles, while reformists accused Pezeshkian of appeasing conservatives by retaining hardliners in security-related ministries. Meanwhile, the judiciary’s continued repression of dissent underscored the limits of Pezeshkian’s reconciliatory rhetoric.

Pezeshkian’s most tangible domestic achievements emerged in social policy, where he cautiously rolled back some of his hardline predecessor’s repressive measures. His refusal to enforce a controversial law further criminalizing lax veiling resonated with a public exhausted by years of state control over personal freedoms.

Other reforms included the reinstatement of some expelled university students and professors, the release of a few political prisoners, and eased restrictions on the house arrest of 2009 reformist presidential candidate Mehdi Karroubi. However, the broader apparatus of repression — internet censorship, arbitrary arrests, and travel bans — remained intact and a much-promised lifting of internet filtering on social media sites such as Instagram and X never materialized, despite half-measures like unblocking WhatsApp and Google Play.

Economically, Pezeshkian inherited a perfect storm: inflation exceeding 40%, chronic unemployment, power and water shortages, and a currency in free fall. His administration’s technocratic approach — decentralizing authority to provincial governors — won cautious praise but structural issues like sanctions, corruption, and mismanagement persisted. The 12-day war with Israel in June exacerbated all these problems, causing more fuel shortages and supply chain disruptions.

Public patience eroded as unfulfilled campaign promises — notably lifting sanctions and improving living standards — remained elusive. While Pezeshkian’s team negotiated with the Financial Action Task Force to ease banking restrictions, for example, progress stalled due to hardline resistance in the Expediency Council, a body tasked with overseeing major government acts, as well as Iran’s failure to reach a new nuclear accord with the United States.

Reviving the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) emerged as Pezeshkian’s flagship foreign policy goal. Early talks with the new Trump administration looked promising, but U.S. insistence on zero uranium enrichment and Israel’s strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities — joined by the U.S. — while talks were still underway upended those efforts and appeared to doom prospects for sanctions relief.  With trust in U.S. commitments shattered yet again (after Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 during his first term),Iran expelled IAEA inspectors and debated withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), plunging its nuclear program into new realms of strategic ambiguity.

Pezeshkian fared better in his regional strategy, continuing détente with Saudi Arabia and making high-profile visits to Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations. The policy bore some fruit during the Israel war, when Oman and Qatar mediated ceasefires, avoiding a broader regional conflagration. However,  the fall in late 2024 of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad — a key Iranian ally — on top of the weakening of Hamas and decimation of Hezbollah in Lebanon, introduced new uncertainties, testing Tehran’s ability to maintain influence in a reshaped Levant. Tellingly, Israel assassinated the head of Hamas’s political branch at a guest house in Tehran on the day Pezeshkian was inaugurated.

Israel’s June assault on Iranian nuclear, missile, and economic infrastructure forced Pezeshkian into a dual role of wartime leader and diplomatic negotiator. Iran’s retaliatory missile strikes targeted Israeli military and economic sites, demonstrating some remaining deterrence capabilities. Domestically, the war fostered rare national unity. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s diplomacy secured widespread condemnation of Israel, though European support remained tepid.

Alliances with Moscow and Beijing deepened, exemplified by a new strategic partnership with Russia, Iran’s formal accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and participation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative.  However, critics warned of overreliance on authoritarian blocs, noting that Sino-Russian investments often came with strings attached, such as oil concessions and military basing rights. Notably, Russia and China were not of any discernable help in preventing the Israeli and U.S. attacks on Iran.

Pezeshkian’s greatest challenge remains internal and structural: governing within a system where ultimate power rests with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and parallel institutions like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Reformist allies urge bold reforms — releasing political prisoners, easing internet restrictions, and addressing other social grievances — while hardliners push to constrain him.

Post-12-day war, the grip of the 86-year-old Khamenei is visibly diminished: he rarely speaks in the public, and criticisms of his failures — military, regional, missile, and nuclear — are increasingly common. The  IRGC, whose top ranks were decimated by Israeli bombs, has curbed its overt political interference while parliamentarians from the extremist Steadfastness Front have temporarily fallen quiet, attracting backlash from allies.

Khamenei’s recent appointment of pragmatic regime stalwart Ali Larijani as the new secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) appeared to be an effort to recalibrate and build consensus after the Israeli attacks. A decree by Pezeshkian tasks Larijani, who previously served in the same post but was forced out by hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, with “wise oversight” of national security affairs, strategic redefinition of security paradigms, and safeguarding territorial integrity.

Critics such as the analyst Sassan Karimi question whether bureaucratic inertia will dilute Larijani’s impact, while the recreation of a Supreme National Defense Council under the SNSC adds yet another layer to Iran’s labyrinthine political system. The moves encapsulate Iran’s precarious balancing act: leveraging seasoned technocrats for unity while navigating factional storms over nuclear policy and regional crises.

Moving forward, Pezeshkian’s success hinges on reconciling seemingly irreconcilable forces: appeasing conservatives while addressing public demands for freedom and prosperity, and balancing East-West diplomacy amid escalating global tensions. As he enters his second year in office, his ability to translate “national reconciliation” from slogan to substance will determine whether his tenure marks a fleeting interlude of relative calm or is the precursor to deeper upheaval. For now, Pezeshkian’s Iran remains a nation suspended between crisis and cautious hope.