After more than two years of massive bloodshed, it would be wonderful to be able to predict a period of calm, reconstruction, and economic progress for the peoples of the Middle East. Alas, no analyst of the region ever went broke forecasting the opposite, and 2026 appears unlikely to alter this dismal paradigm.
The Trump administration’s preference for short spasms of violence rather than protracted wars, as well as its preoccupation with the Western hemisphere, should help keep the region from a major new conflagration. But on every front, from Iran to Yemen, Lebanon to Syria to Gaza and the West Bank, more people are likely to die from armed confrontations, humanitarian failures, and external intervention. Only decisive political change — in Israel, Iran, or the U.S. — might alter this bleak forecast. What follows are a few modest if depressing predictions.
Gaza
The peace plan unveiled by President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in September 2025 remains resolutely stuck in phase one. Hamas has returned all hostages, alive and dead, except for one set of remains whose location, according to the Palestinian group, is still unknown amidst the rubble. Israel has stopped wholesale bombing of the enclave but occupies half of it and continues to attack alleged terrorist targets at will, killing 400 people since the “ceasefire” went into effect on top of the more than 70,000 who have perished in Israeli retaliation for the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel. The humanitarian situation has improved, but aid deliveries are still insufficient, and the Israeli government decision to blacklist international aid organizations as of January 1 looks likely to make the situation even worse for Gazans struggling to survive cold, wet winter weather in flimsy tents. Meanwhile, there is no “Board of Peace” named to supervise the territory and no “International Security Force” to replace Israeli troops. No independent Palestinian technocrats have been identified to replace Hamas, which remains in control of half of Gaza. There may be Palestinians who would leave if given the opportunity, but no countries have agreed to take them.
West Bank
Right-wing members of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government are lobbying for formal annexation of the West Bank, which would eliminate any possibility for a Palestinian state alongside Israel. The Trump administration says it opposes annexation but has done little to convince Israel to restrain militant settlers from carrying out attacks on Palestinian villagers and appears to condone Israeli plans to create new settlements that also make a Palestinian state untenable. More than 1,000 Palestinians died at the hands of Israeli settlers and armed forces in the West Bank in 2025.
Lebanon
With U.S. and international support, the Lebanese army deployed into the south of the country and uncovered and destroyed many caches of Hezbollah weapons. However, Hezbollah is believed to have moved some of its heavy weaponry north of the Litani River. Israel has continued to strike Lebanon, including the capital, when it identifies targets such as Hezbollah commanders; more than 300 people have been killed in Israeli attacks since the November 2024 ceasefire went into effect. Lebanon’s Western-backed government is struggling to overcome a deep economic crisis and to attract multinational and Gulf Arab support. It has broken a long taboo and engaged with Israel diplomatically, appointing a former Lebanese ambassador to the U.S. as an envoy for talks. Absent Israel’s fulfillment of its commitments to Lebanon under the 2024 agreement — including withdrawal of Israeli forces from five outposts they continue to occupy in south Lebanon, the cessation of near-daily attacks, and the return of Lebanese prisoners held in Israeli jails — these talks are unlikely to lead to a breakthrough in diplomatic relations between the two countries.
Syria
Syria has made significant progress since the collapse of the Assad regime a year ago. The country’s president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, even met with President Trump at the White House — the first Syrian leader to do so since the country’s independence from France. Sanctions have been eased, and tens of thousands of Syrian refugees have returned to aid in the country’s reconstruction. But serious clashes continue with minorities, notably Druze and Alawites, and foreign intervention — by Turkey and Israel in particular — undermine the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. While weakened, ISIS still exists in pockets of Syria and killed three Americans in December; in response, U.S. Central Command killed 25 militants in a series of retaliatory attacks.
Yemen
The Houthis who control northern Yemen stopped attacking international shipping in the Red Sea after the Gaza ceasefire but remain embroiled in the country’s endemic internal strife and the object of concern on the part of Israel and neighboring Arab countries. A new rift has emerged between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates over the possible repartition of the country and over the leadership of southern forces who have seized Yemeni oil fields. If left unresolved, this rift risks spilling over into other theaters, further destabilizing an already fragile regional environment.
Iran
A dramatic end-of-year plunge in the value of the Iranian currency sparked the most significant new protests in the country since the “Women, Life, Freedom” movement of 2022-2023, leading to strikes, government shutdowns, and repression by security forces. The country continued its political paralysis under the leadership of the increasingly frail Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and there appeared little prospect for successful diplomacy with the United States that could ease economic sanctions. Israel — with U.S. support — continued to threaten new military action against the Iranian nuclear program as well as Iran’s missile installations. External actors continue to push for regime change, but Iranians internally and externally remain divided, and there is no clear path for revolution or reform. President Trump’s social media comment on January 2, pledging to come to the “rescue” of Iranians if the regime continued to crack down, seemed unlikely to advance Iranian rights or the prospects for US-Iran diplomacy. The Trump administration’s January 3 abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, an Iranian ally, is likely to further stiffen Tehran’s hostility and obduracy.
At this juncture, it is hard to see much progress toward greater stability in the region. Israeli elections due this year could end the long reign of Netanyahu but not necessarily result in a government more willing to make concessions toward Palestinian self-rule. The U.S., preoccupied with its own mid-term voting, remains engaged with the Middle East but has a massive new self-inflicted crisis in Venezuela that will monopolize Washington’s attention. A Middle East that simmers but does not boil over appears to be tolerable to external actors focused on other foreign threats as well as confronting internal divisions and economic woes.
Header image: Israeli airstrike on Gaza Strip during Gaza War 23-25. By Jaber Jehad Badwan.
More Spasms of Violence Await the Middle East in 2026
By Barbara Slavin
Middle East & North Africa
After more than two years of massive bloodshed, it would be wonderful to be able to predict a period of calm, reconstruction, and economic progress for the peoples of the Middle East. Alas, no analyst of the region ever went broke forecasting the opposite, and 2026 appears unlikely to alter this dismal paradigm.
The Trump administration’s preference for short spasms of violence rather than protracted wars, as well as its preoccupation with the Western hemisphere, should help keep the region from a major new conflagration. But on every front, from Iran to Yemen, Lebanon to Syria to Gaza and the West Bank, more people are likely to die from armed confrontations, humanitarian failures, and external intervention. Only decisive political change — in Israel, Iran, or the U.S. — might alter this bleak forecast. What follows are a few modest if depressing predictions.
Gaza
The peace plan unveiled by President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in September 2025 remains resolutely stuck in phase one. Hamas has returned all hostages, alive and dead, except for one set of remains whose location, according to the Palestinian group, is still unknown amidst the rubble. Israel has stopped wholesale bombing of the enclave but occupies half of it and continues to attack alleged terrorist targets at will, killing 400 people since the “ceasefire” went into effect on top of the more than 70,000 who have perished in Israeli retaliation for the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel. The humanitarian situation has improved, but aid deliveries are still insufficient, and the Israeli government decision to blacklist international aid organizations as of January 1 looks likely to make the situation even worse for Gazans struggling to survive cold, wet winter weather in flimsy tents. Meanwhile, there is no “Board of Peace” named to supervise the territory and no “International Security Force” to replace Israeli troops. No independent Palestinian technocrats have been identified to replace Hamas, which remains in control of half of Gaza. There may be Palestinians who would leave if given the opportunity, but no countries have agreed to take them.
West Bank
Right-wing members of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government are lobbying for formal annexation of the West Bank, which would eliminate any possibility for a Palestinian state alongside Israel. The Trump administration says it opposes annexation but has done little to convince Israel to restrain militant settlers from carrying out attacks on Palestinian villagers and appears to condone Israeli plans to create new settlements that also make a Palestinian state untenable. More than 1,000 Palestinians died at the hands of Israeli settlers and armed forces in the West Bank in 2025.
Lebanon
With U.S. and international support, the Lebanese army deployed into the south of the country and uncovered and destroyed many caches of Hezbollah weapons. However, Hezbollah is believed to have moved some of its heavy weaponry north of the Litani River. Israel has continued to strike Lebanon, including the capital, when it identifies targets such as Hezbollah commanders; more than 300 people have been killed in Israeli attacks since the November 2024 ceasefire went into effect. Lebanon’s Western-backed government is struggling to overcome a deep economic crisis and to attract multinational and Gulf Arab support. It has broken a long taboo and engaged with Israel diplomatically, appointing a former Lebanese ambassador to the U.S. as an envoy for talks. Absent Israel’s fulfillment of its commitments to Lebanon under the 2024 agreement — including withdrawal of Israeli forces from five outposts they continue to occupy in south Lebanon, the cessation of near-daily attacks, and the return of Lebanese prisoners held in Israeli jails — these talks are unlikely to lead to a breakthrough in diplomatic relations between the two countries.
Syria
Syria has made significant progress since the collapse of the Assad regime a year ago. The country’s president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, even met with President Trump at the White House — the first Syrian leader to do so since the country’s independence from France. Sanctions have been eased, and tens of thousands of Syrian refugees have returned to aid in the country’s reconstruction. But serious clashes continue with minorities, notably Druze and Alawites, and foreign intervention — by Turkey and Israel in particular — undermine the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. While weakened, ISIS still exists in pockets of Syria and killed three Americans in December; in response, U.S. Central Command killed 25 militants in a series of retaliatory attacks.
Yemen
The Houthis who control northern Yemen stopped attacking international shipping in the Red Sea after the Gaza ceasefire but remain embroiled in the country’s endemic internal strife and the object of concern on the part of Israel and neighboring Arab countries. A new rift has emerged between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates over the possible repartition of the country and over the leadership of southern forces who have seized Yemeni oil fields. If left unresolved, this rift risks spilling over into other theaters, further destabilizing an already fragile regional environment.
Iran
A dramatic end-of-year plunge in the value of the Iranian currency sparked the most significant new protests in the country since the “Women, Life, Freedom” movement of 2022-2023, leading to strikes, government shutdowns, and repression by security forces. The country continued its political paralysis under the leadership of the increasingly frail Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and there appeared little prospect for successful diplomacy with the United States that could ease economic sanctions. Israel — with U.S. support — continued to threaten new military action against the Iranian nuclear program as well as Iran’s missile installations. External actors continue to push for regime change, but Iranians internally and externally remain divided, and there is no clear path for revolution or reform. President Trump’s social media comment on January 2, pledging to come to the “rescue” of Iranians if the regime continued to crack down, seemed unlikely to advance Iranian rights or the prospects for US-Iran diplomacy. The Trump administration’s January 3 abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, an Iranian ally, is likely to further stiffen Tehran’s hostility and obduracy.
At this juncture, it is hard to see much progress toward greater stability in the region. Israeli elections due this year could end the long reign of Netanyahu but not necessarily result in a government more willing to make concessions toward Palestinian self-rule. The U.S., preoccupied with its own mid-term voting, remains engaged with the Middle East but has a massive new self-inflicted crisis in Venezuela that will monopolize Washington’s attention. A Middle East that simmers but does not boil over appears to be tolerable to external actors focused on other foreign threats as well as confronting internal divisions and economic woes.
Header image: Israeli airstrike on Gaza Strip during Gaza War 23-25. By Jaber Jehad Badwan.
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